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3Foreword
FOREWORD
This year we already witness results in defence transformation in Hungary, and this is why 
we decided to focus this issue on defence innovation . One might say that basic research, 
and academic writing is a solid reflection of overall culture change in the military, this is 
why it is a privilege to showcase a thought provoking piece from our current commander of 
the defence forces emphasizing his belief that a structured transformation approach for the 
armed forces must be based on a solid innovation strategy, and mindset change is crucial for 
the future force development of the Hungarian Defence Forces . 
Lt Gen Ferenc Korom’s message, that in order to establish a capable, agile, and ready 
HDF which can respond to new threats and challenges effectively, we must not only focus on 
acquisition of the best available platforms and technology, but also on changing the culture 
of the force through innovation, organizational learning processes as well .
These ideas resonate with our other ones in the issue, which range from disruptive tech-
nology thought pieces on mobile systems helping human resource management, to superca-
pacitators and their applicability in defence . 
But, as we always emphasize, technology in and of itself is just a tool, and does not 
bring about real lasting change and adaptability . This is why we thought that it is important 
to showcase articles on the role of leadership in the modern VUCA environment, critical 
infrastructures in counterinsurgency operations, behavioural change in lifestyle change pro-
grammes, ISIS recruiting and cognitive operations, migration trends, and lessons learned 
from Kosovo as well as from EU missions .
We strongly believe that defence innovation is much more than fancy ideas . Innovation 
is a strategic endeavour, where the civilian innovation ecosystem must be focused on solving 
critical defence challenges, enabled to carry out joint efforts of developers and operators, 
and supported by a solid learning process, where warfighters can experiment safely in order 
to apply the best equipment to face the multitude of challenges. This is a truly national effort, 
where governmental support through resources of the Z2026 program, and the HDF’s will-
ingness to adapt and change must go hand in hand . In an unpredictable world, we can only 
build a strong, ready and capable force together, and it takes a whole nation to enhance our 
defence industrial complex . 
We will be paying close attention to these trends here in the Defence Review, and wel-
come everyone, who are willing to share their ideas on contemporary security challenges, 
force modernization, technology trends, and other thought provoking ideas about the nature 
of war in the 21st century .
Col Imre Porkoláb PhD
Deputy National Armament Director for Research Development and Innovation
Chief of the Editorial Board, Hungarian Defence Review
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Lt Gen Ferenc Korom:
HUNGARIAN DEFENCE FORCES CAPABILITY 
TRANSFORMATION: BALANCING ACQUISITION 
AND INNOVATION
ABSTRACT: This article is based on the speech held on the conference “Disruptive Technol-
ogy for Defence Transformation” in London, 24 September 2019 by Lt Gen Ferenc Korom.
KEYWORDS: defence capability transformation, military transformation, national defence 
planning, Z2026
I took over as the commander of the Hungarian Defence Forces (CHOD) at an auspicious 
moment – in the very early stage of a top-to-bottom modernization programme of the Hun-
garian Defence Forces . It is an exciting, but at the same time a very challenging time to 
transform the HDF . 
My job is exciting and rewarding, because I have the opportunity to oversee the creation 
of a new, more effective and thoroughly modern defence force, one that is capable of guaran-
teeing Hungary’s sovereignty and contributing in a meaningful way to the common defence 
of the Alliance as well . But it is challenging at the same time because we do not know, what 
challenges lie ahead and what is the nature of armed conflicts in 10 or 15 years. Yet we must 
plan ahead, organize, equip and train our forces today considering these black swan events .1 
Perhaps the most difficult part of my job is making every day decisions about allocating finite 
resources and managing the myriad of challenges in finding the best available servicemen and 
women, as well as communicating our transformation efforts to society. 
My article is built around three W-s: what defence capability transformation really means 
for Hungary; why the country decided to launch it; and what is our strategy to reach our desired 
end state . Our concept of military transformation is a continuous, proactive process with a roll-
ing horizon . It is not necessarily fast, it does not have to cover the full scope of the HDF, and 
it does not exclude equipment which is already working well . It is not just development, but a 
fundamental change . Acquiring new equipment to do the same thing better, at longer range and 
with greater precision is not a transformation . Replacing our AK-47 with the BREN 2 assault 
rifle is not a transformation, only incremental improvement. But the integration of artificial 
intelligence into the structure of the armed forces is, and it requires a mind-set change .2 
1 The black swan event is referring to a phrase used in a book by the essayist, scholar, philosopher, and statisti-
cian Nassim Nicholas Taleb released on April 17, 2007 . The book focuses on the extreme impact of certain kinds 
of rare and unpredictable events (outliers) and humans’ tendency to find simplistic explanations for these events 
retrospectively . This theory has since become known as the black swan theory . Taleb, N . N . The Black Swan: The 
Impact of the Highly Improbable. New York: Random House, 2007 .
2 Porkoláb, I . “Szervezeti adaptáció a Magyar Honvédségben: Küldetés alapú vezetés 2 .0 a digitális transz-
formáció korában” . Honvédségi Szemle 147/1 . 2019 . 3-12 .
 https://honvedelem.hu/files/files/114204/hsz_2019_1_beliv_003_012.pdf
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Our purpose is to develop and maintain military advantage, by making the HDF adap-
tive, capable of dealing with the changing security environment, and react faster and more 
effectively than our adversaries. Adaptability is key,3 and it enables us to respond adequately 
to new and emerging challenges . To this end we make transformation the driver of future 
short-, medium- and long-term force development plans .
Hungary is implementing defence capability transformation through the so called 
“Zrínyi 2026 programme” .4 The programme is named after a 17th century Hungarian gener-
al, politician and poet, who advocated the replacement of the inadequate mix of local forces 
and feudal levies with a professional standing army . In all but name this was a fundamental 
transformation of Hungary’s defence system . 
Implementation through the Z2026 in a VUCA environment5 is very complex, it means 
the simultaneous development of the DOTMLPF-I (doctrine, organization, training, mate-
riel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities) components together, in order to 
make the HDF more capable of facing new threats and challenges . Our goal is to achieve 
and keep military advantage through quality advantage, and eliminate shortcomings that are 
likely to arise in the future, or are likely to be brought about by the changing security envi-
ronment . We intend to achieve this by turning the armed forces into a learning organization .6 
The success of the Z2026 is based on a goal-oriented development strategy, which is sched-
uled for the period between 2018 and 2026, and is supported by the twin pillars of National 
Defence Programmes and Force Development Programmes . 
These programmes cover not only the HDF itself, but also include plans to redevelop the 
national industrial base . Thus, our transformation programme will not only support capabili-
ty building, but will also contribute to the retention of a high-quality work force, and the end 
result I expect is a more capable HDF . 
3 NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg said that “one of our greatest strengths is our ability to adapt .” Stol-
tenberg, J . “Keynote speech at the 2015 Chiefs of Transformation Conference” . 11 December 2015 . Norfolk, 
VA .; Stoltenberg, J . “Keynote speech by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg at the opening of the NATO 
Transformation Seminar” . NATO . 25 March 2015 . http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_118435.htm
4 The Hungarian government launched the most significant development programme since the end of the cold war. 
It affects all segments of the Hungarian Defence Forces – even the defence industry sector. It entails a plan for 
robust acquisition projects in order to modernize the Hungarian Defence Forces and revive the defence industry 
through the transfer of knowledge, technology and establishment of defence industrial capacities . 
5 VUCA is short for volatility, uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity. It is meant to describe the highly dynamic 
chaotic environment. VUCA also conflates four distinct types of challenges that demand four distinct types 
of responses . The notion of VUCA was introduced by the U .S . Army War College in the 1990s . The deeper 
meaning of each element of VUCA: (1) Volatility . The nature and dynamics of change, and the nature and speed 
of change forces and change catalysts . (2) Uncertainty . The lack of predictability, the prospects for surprise, 
and the sense of awareness and understanding of issues and events . (3) Complexity (or variety) is measured 
by the number of distinguishable states it is capable of having and is beyond the control of any individual . The 
multiplex of forces, the confounding of issues, no cause-and-effect chain and confusion that surround an organ-
ization creates an entangled web of complexity . (4) Ambiguity occurs when there is no clear interpretation of 
a phenomenon or set of events . It can never be eliminated altogether and the haziness of reality, the potential 
for misreads, and the mixed meanings of conditions always cause-and-effect confusion. For a better under-
standing see: Berinato, S . “A Framework for Understanding VUCA” . Harvard Business Review 59/9 . 2014 . 
https://hbr .org/2014/09/a-framework-for-understanding-vuca; Bennett, N . and Lemoine, G . J . “What VUCA Really 
means for You” . Harvard Business Review 59/1 . 2014 . https://hbr .org/2014/01/what-vuca-really-means-for-you
6 Porkoláb, I . “Szervezeti innováció a Magyar Honvédségben: Az ember-gép szimbiózisa a stratégiaelméletek 
tükrében” . Haditechnika 53/1 . 2019 . 2-8 . DOI: 10 .23713/HT .53 .1 .01
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As part of the adaptation to the new situation, Hungary is planning to establish two 
multinational commands (MND-C, SOCC-R) and we have initiated the reform of the C2 
structure of the HDF as well . The bottom-line is that we are all aware of the current, deteri-
orating security environment, increasing complexity of threats and challenges which act as 
a trigger for the transformation of the defence sector . This proves the need for adapting to 
the new environment . 
The lessons learned from current operations and the transformational pressure from 
NATO does not allow us to base our defence on our current capabilities, as a reliable ally 
we need to increase our defence capabilities through the acquisition of the most modern 
equipment in order to improve our responsiveness and status, but at the same time we need 
to build innovation to create an adaptive and resilient organizational culture . 
The objectives are clear: we need to create an agile, responsive and modern defence 
force which can contribute to operations and ensure the safety and prosperity of Hungary; 
but at the same time we also need to support the improvement of our national economy . 
The four main drivers behind our capability transformation are:
•  Changing security environment – as we must continuously adapt to keep up with the 
rapidly changing security environment .
•  NATO summit decisions – as we also have our commitments and obligations stem-
ming from our NATO membership .
•  National defence ambitions – as our aim is to develop the HDF to become a leading, 
state-of-the-art military force in the region .
•  New trends and opportunities – because it is essential to keep ahead of the threats and 
challenges we face and to make use of all new opportunities .
Figure 1: Drivers of HDF transformation
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One of the drivers for transformation has been the changing security environment . I am 
quite certain that by looking at the trajectory of events of the past three decades, we can con-
clude that we are moving away from a relatively simple Cold War period (when the enemy 
was clearly defined) towards an era of complex conflicts – which has many names: hybrid 
war, cyber war, unrestricted war. I am sure we can realise the enormous differences between 
the capabilities that needed during the Cold War, and those that are required today to pre-
vail in expeditionary operations, and those of the future uncertain battlefield. In the 1980s 
artificial intelligence was still mostly considered to be science fiction – today it is becoming 
reality, and changes the very essence we fight modern wars. 
The sequence of the NATO summit decisions responding to the challenges, especially 
those in the last decade or so, has reflected on this complexity, and provided a clear guidance 
on how to proceed . Hungary, as a member of the Alliance is determined to keep up with its 
Allies . We do our share of responding to the deterioration in the security environment; from 
upgrading our capabilities, through adapting our mind-set, to building cutting edge capabil-
ities, like the ones able to deter adversaries in the evolving cyber domain .7 Hungary cannot 
become a security freeloader and rely on others to provide its defence . We want to remain 
a relevant actor in the common defence of the Alliance, so we must make a relevant and 
valuable contribution . That is possible only if our capabilities are equal or superior to those 
of the potential adversaries of the Alliance .
Obviously, there are other motivating factors as well . Hungary is a sovereign nation . Its 
interests and ambitions may be closely parallel to those of our Allies, but they do not coin-
cide in every case . A capable military force is an essential element of a nation’s existence . 
A nation that cannot defend its sovereignty by force of arms will remain sovereign only as 
long as it is convenient for other nations. Meanwhile, it will have to be careful not to offend 
its potential adversaries, and defer to allies that defend it . But the armed forces are also a 
symbol of national unity and an instrument of realizing our national ambitions .
A very real problem the HDF has been facing for some time is the legacy equipment 
from our membership in the Warsaw Pact. We still use a significant number of Russian made 
equipment that is quite obsolete by today’s standards and must be replaced . However, re-
source constraints in the past forced us to postpone the acquisition of modern western equip-
ment . It has all changed, as now we have not only the urgent need, but also the opportunity 
to make it happen, as significant funds for the foreseeable next couple of years were made 
available by the government to the Ministry of Defence . But buying modern equipment in 
and of itself is not enough, we have to enable the warfighter, and just about every compo-
nent of DOTMLPF-I has to be re-assessed, modified, and brought up to date. Our domestic 
industrial capacity needs serious improvement, and initially may impose some constraints, 
but I am confident that we can overcome these challenges as well in time. We expect that a 
collateral benefit of the transformation process will be the revival of the Hungarian defence 
industry and the birth of a defence innovation ecosystem .
The fourth driving factor of transformation is the realisation that the changing security 
environment brought not only challenges, but opportunities as well . I believe that in our 
current situation the challenges and the opportunities are two sides of the same coin . If we 
meet a challenge head on, analyse it, seek to resolve it, and identify the appropriate solution, 
7 Cyber has been declared as a domain at NATO’s Warsaw Summit in July 2016 . “Warsaw Summit Communiqué” . 
NATO . 9 July 2016 . http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133169.htm
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we can now identify the appropriate direction for future improvement, because we have sig-
nificant foresight regarding our resources. We must also realize that our potential opponents 
face very similar challenges . 
Taking into account the characteristics of a future war, although there are plenty of 
buzzwords out there, from agnostic fires platform to semiautonomous wingman teaming, 
we really do not have a clear idea what a conflict will look like in ten or fifteen years from 
now . Is it going to be a hybrid war full of ambiguity? A nuclear Armageddon? Fast moving 
manoeuvre covering entire continents and all domains? Protracted, low intensity war of at-
trition? Or bits and pieces of all four? We really have no idea, and we do not have any clue 
who our adversaries will be . Will they be nation states and their alliances? How resilient and 
strong will they be? How will they fight? These are all relevant questions for strategic deci-
sion makers and force planners alike, yet they are mostly unanswered these days . 
Still the fact remains, we must make long-reaching decision today, acquire and field 
complete warfighting systems that best fulfil our requirements, and we also need to train 
our forces, while we fully realize two things . First, when we deploy our forces in combat, 
their training and equipment may prove less than perfect in an operational environment that 
is substantially different from what we had planned for. Second, due to the very rapid pace 
of development in the technology sector, better systems will be available in the near future, 
since the technology disruption cycles, especially in autonomy, and digital technology are 
becoming shorter and shorter . 
Figure 2: New challenges and new opportunities
Much the same applies to the other challenges and opportunities . Resource constraints 
like the supply of and access to water, natural resources and rare-earth minerals, the popula-
tion explosion in the Global South and population decline in the Global North, the rapid pace 
of technology development, raise questions like: how to translate into capabilities within the 
armed forces, and how to deal with ethical questions like hunter-killer autonomous systems . 
One thing seems to be certain: with superior situational awareness (which requires robust 
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intelligence, solid analysis, and an agile organizational learning system using AI and mod-
ern technology) we can allocate adequate resources to defence, and face present and future 
challenges . 
Our national defence planning is in harmony with the NATO Defence Planning Process 
(NDPP). Although the Z2026 programme is – first and foremost – based on national inter-
est, we have ensured that it is also in line with the NDPP . We incorporated our obligations 
from the Capability Target Package 2017 in the national force development plans in order 
to fulfil our commitments in the Alliance. We also continuously enhance our forces offered 
to NATO, and review our short-term plans in order to keep up with the rapidly changing 
security environment .
At the Wales NATO Summit the presidents and prime ministers of NATO member states 
approved that they will raise their defence expenditures to 2% of GDP, and 20% of this will 
be used for research & development and the acquisition of new military equipment .8 In line 
with the above commitment the Government’s decision to allocate the necessary funds for a 
7 year time period is unprecedented, and provides us with an opportunity to plan ahead and 
make the necessary strategic decisions .
As a part of this transformation process, we made structural changes as well, separated 
the Ministry of Defence and the Hungarian Defence Forces Command, in order to clarify 
the lines of authority and responsibility . We also created some new organisational elements . 
The HDF Transformation Command and the HDFC Inspectorates are recently established 
within the HDF . The Modernisation Institute is also a new HDF entity focusing on bringing 
in new technology and building defence innovation . As it scouts out new ways to inno-
vate, it manages R&D projects and acts as a bridge between the HDF’s defence capability 
building effort, links up the MoD with an innovation ecosystem, and makes suggestions for 
technology development focus areas . The Cyber Academy is responsible for the training and 
education of personnel working in the field of cyber defence. We established a new officer 
and non-commissioned officer training system as well to support capability transformation 
with well-trained NCO personnel .
There can be no question that technology was a very important enabler in Russia’s 
seizure of Crimea . Cleverly designed algorithms and bot farms are certainly essential for 
spreading fake news in order to influence international public opinion. We (the Alliance as 
a whole and each member state) must find the human and financial resources to match our 
potential adversaries – and not only match, but surpass them in the military application of 
cutting-edge technology . But we must not be dazzled by the possibilities inherent in tech-
nology . Acquisition of new whizz-bang equipment in and of itself does not lead to enhanced 
capability . New equipment must become an integral part of the armed forces through doc-
trines, training, and capable operators, before it can contribute to success .
I believe that in our current quest for transformation technology is just one of the driv-
ers . And perhaps not even the most important one . If you look at Hungary’s reasons for 
launching its force modernization project, you will note that they are really the outcomes 
of political, societal and economic developments in the country’s immediate vicinity, and in 
some cases further away . 
8 “Wales Summit Declaration” . NATO . 5 September 2014 . http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2014_2019/
documents/sede/dv/sede240914walessummit_/sede240914walessummit_en.pdf
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For us it is imperative that we think in complete capability packages which cover all 
the aspects of the DOTMLPF-I spectrum . The thorough reform of the HDF will cover all 
areas: organization, doctrine and training must all be changed to enable the warfighter to use 
the brand new up-to-date equipment and materiel acquired through the Z2026 Programme . 
Perhaps the most crucial aspect of the transformation effort will be the recruitment and reten-
tion of educated personnel who are capable to operate the new equipment . 
Still, we must not forget that an armed conflict, whether low intensity expeditionary oper-
ations or high intensity conventional war, is still a very dangerous business that requires us to 
close with and destroy the enemy by fire and manoeuvre, or repel his assault by fire and close 
combat . Thus the very basic nature of war has not changed: it still demands young, skilled, 
well-trained, physically fit, strong and brave men and women and commanding officers with 
exceptional leadership skills . Also, in order to support the new equipment we need new facili-
ties and a robust defence industrial complex . Developing the national industrial base supports 
not only defence capacity building, but also retains the quality workforce we are so proud of, 
generates opportunities for the younger generation, and supports local companies to scale up 
defence related businesses in the region or globally . 
We also have to realize, that the defence sector needs allies in capability development . 
While in the past, defence related research and development has been the main driver to create 
new technology, today a lot of military innovations come from the civil sector, and the armed 
forces become aware of them only when they are manifested in commercial-purpose drones, 
cyber-attacks against their information networks, or in jammed communications . These tech-
nologies are becoming more and more accessible to non-state actors, their development cycles 
are shortening, and the attacks using this equipment are extremely low-cost . 
On the other hand, the majority of new military equipment takes several years to devel-
op, is extremely complex and expensive, and contains critical electrical components sourced 
through long and fragile supply chains . 
Figure 3: Thinking outside the box
The answer to this challenge is clear: quick and effective adaption and integration of 
the most promising civil technologies in military equipment, development of modular and 
scalable systems, use of open architecture design, avoidance of over-engineering in new 
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systems, shortening of development cycles, and development of the national industrial base 
in order to decrease supply risks . However, the military cannot do all this alone, therefore 
we need to build an innovation interface organization to be able to connect to the already 
existing ecosystem .
Innovative, new defence solutions are only guaranteed by partnering with specific talent 
and knowledge base, agile research facilities . Since the armed forces do not have the neces-
sary scientific and technical knowledge at the moment, and our research and development 
capabilities are cumbersome, we need to articulate our capability needs and operational and 
technical requirements in order to foster academic thinking and focus the industry (espe-
cially SMEs and start-ups) on specific problem areas we need to solve. At the same time, 
the validation and certification of the solutions and their integration into larger capability 
building projects must remain a function of the armed forces . 
Innovation is about new ideas merging, creating options, and finally as prototypes being 
tested by operators . Dedicated military centres with typical military mind-set and procedures 
alone and in isolation cannot guarantee the cross-pollination of innovative ideas . Therefore, 
we also need the involvement of a large number of civil researchers in defence innovation . 
Moreover, the civil sector is the leader in a number of key technology areas, and the civil 
and defence research sectors are integral parts of national economic and science systems in 
all developed countries . Decision makers in the defence sector, who disregard the fact that 
there is no real innovation without building a strategic innovation ecosystem approach with 
civil research institutes, universities, think tanks and industry, put the competitiveness of 
their national defence industrial and technological base, and take a strategic risk .
Hungary has a robust academic system, including a network of academic research in-
stitutes and polytechnic institutes . The innovation potential of the academic system is a 
solid basis for the development of cutting-edge defence technologies . Moreover, our start-up 
ecosystem is blooming and it is a talent base that must be tapped into in order to generate 
solutions for defence problems . On the basis of this particular innovation ecosystem the 
Hungarian defence R&D projects are starting to take shape . We are particularly interested 
in developing autonomous off-road vehicles, energy systems supported by hybrid sources 
like hydrogen fuel cells, artificial intelligence based dynamic route planning, quantum cryp-
tography algorithms, Artificial Reality/Virtual Reality-based simulation systems, and aero-
nautic capabilities as well .
To sum up and answer my original question, I believe that a structured transformation 
approach that is based on a solid innovation strategy is crucial for the future force devel-
opment of the HDF, and in order to establish capable, agile, and ready HDF which can 
respond to new threats and challenges effectively we should not only focus on the acquisi-
tion of the best available platforms and technology, but also on changing the culture of the 
force through innovation, and on the organizational learning processes like design thinking,9 
which will enable our warfighters to use the technology and guarantee the sovereignty of the 
country as well as to contribute to operations carried out by our Allies .
9 Porkoláb, I. and Zweibelson, B. “Designing a NATO that thinks differently for 21st century complex challenges” . 
Defence Review 146/1 . 2018 . 196-212 .
 https://honvedelem.hu/files/files/112426/dr_2018_1_beliv_angol_szemle_196_212.pdf
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TUATARA 
DOI: 10.35926/HDR.2019.1-2.1
ABSTRACT: Since the era dominated by industrial production to the knowledge-based 
society, the traditional way of choosing leaders has been to change the development of 
non-traditional leadership skills. In addition to the traditional leadership virtues, taking 
into account the previously unconventional skills have become extremely important in 
selecting leaders in a modern army. 
Future challenges can only be tackled by adaptive organizations in which individuals 
have to make much more autonomous decisions, to adapt to the ever-changing envi-
ronment that management needs to take into account and support. 
The generals of the future have to form a strategy in a complex environment, they have 
to learn how to apply a comprehensive approach, when they have to cooperate with dif-
ferent types of professionals and participants in the possession of visionary, operative and 
bridge building skills – and this is not easy because different roles require different ways 
of thinking. 
In history, we find examples of such leaders, which in our time are becoming alive, be-
cause if organizations are not ready to find rapid answers to the challenges, if their deci-
sion-making processes are overwhelmed, no hopeful success is expected. Deeply embed-
ded, centralized command and control in the armed forces is not an appropriate response 
to extremely complex asymmetric situations, especially when facing critical challenges 
that require immediate decisions. 
Leadership is not the same as power. Non-traditional leaders need to have followers, 
associates who support their idea and achieve a degree of freedom. 
A good example of acquiring the necessary learning and adaptation skills in this world 
is the convincing example of the success of tuatara, a real living fossil, of evolutionary 
survival. 
KEYWORDS: leadership, tuatara, unconventional leadership 
Thomas E . Ricks argued in his recent book1, that in American history the leadership quality 
started to deteriorate when the highest-ranking generals became reluctant to fire underper-
forming generals under their command . He pointed out that the fear made the generals per-
form better . We tend to disagree with this argument, as we believe that any quality degrada-
tion, if it exists, is more likely a result of a leadership gap . 
There are several reasons, why this leadership gap is present . First of all, we would like 
to point out that since the end of WWII (World War II) the political masters have been in-
creasingly influencing who gets removed, which has made the leader selection process and 
the mind-set of military leaders more conventional . Secondly, during this time the context 
1 Ricks, Th . E . The Generals: American Military Command from World War II to Today. New York: Penguin Press, 
2012 .
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have changed as well and as we are progressing from an industrial era towards a knowl-
edge-based society, leadership is quite different and more complex. Today the use of fear 
and an arsenal of other tools of an autocratic leader to motivate seems to be inadequate and 
has quite the opposite effect from the one that we got used to twenty years ago. The modern 
toolkit of leaders must be much wider and they need to develop unconventional leadership 
skills as part of their arsenal to compliment the conventional skills . 
At Exercise Allied Reach2, the main theme was Future Security Challenges for the Al-
liance and the transformation efforts required from NATO countries to be able to counter 
such challenges . In our opinion the real goal is not to counter future challenges, but rather 
embrace the uncertainty of the complex environment and build adaptive organizations which 
proactively influence the future. With the amount of uncertainty all around, it is an almost 
impossible task to figure out what the future brings, and the key for success is the capability 
of organizations to quickly adapt to the ever-changing environment . One of the key aspects 
of adaptation is the unconventional leadership capability within the organization .
THE LEADERSHIP GAP
Thomas Ricks, in his book, formulates an answer3 and it is somewhat similar to the one 
described by General Krulak in his Three Block War concept . Ricks suggests that future 
generals need not only to understand strategy in a complex environment but they need to 
learn to fight the war amongst the people, show respect for the population with a cultural 
sensitivity, use a comprehensive approach (including all services, interagency, indigenous 
and multinational partners), as well as being able to speak a political language, not just a 
military one . We have heard about the Strategic Corporal before, but what we really need is 
more generals who are unconventional thinkers and leaders . Hence, this article attempts to 
answer what unconventional leadership is about .
Maccoby4 in his research also points out that in the fast pacing and complex world we 
need leaders who can mobilize people for the common good . He calls the new era knowl-
edge workers interactives, and argues that these people need a flatter, networked working 
environment and a leader who possesses three leadership qualities: transformational vision, 
operational obsessiveness and trust-creating bridge building . He also emphasizes that Per-
sonality and Strategic Intelligence are the new leadership qualities for the age of knowledge 
work . Personality Intelligence builds more on emotional intelligence5, Strategic Intelligence 
more on systems thinking and practical intelligence6 . 
Transformational visionaries are leaders, who communicate vision with a compelling 
sense of purpose . Operational obsessives are operational leaders, who have the systems 
thinking to build the organization and infuse the energy that transforms the visions into 
results . Finally, bridge builders are leaders, who can facilitate the understanding and trust 
2 Allied Reach is a yearly Strategic exercise for NATO . In 2013 it was organized in Norfolk, Virginia .
3 Ricks, Th . E . The Generals: American Military Command from World War II to Today. New York: Penguin Press, 
2012 .
4 Maccoby, M . The Leaders We Need . Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 2007 .
5 To read more on emotional intelligence read Goleman, D . Emotional intelligence: Why it can Matter More Than 
IQ . New York: Bantam Press, 2006 . and Bradberry, T . Emotional Intelligence 2.0 . New York: Talent Smart, 2009 .
6 For a description of the difference between analytic, practical and creative intelligence, see Sternberg, R. J. The 
Hierarchic Mind: A New theory of Human Intelligence . New York: Viking, 1988 . and Sternberg, R . J . Successful 
Intelligence: How Practical and Creative Intelligence Determine Success in Life. New York: Plume, 1997 .
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that turns different types of specialists into collaborators. This is a very important piece of 
leadership, since, we are facing more and more complex problems, and while solving these 
problems, adaptation and organizational change always create a lot of stress . People’s skills 
are also important during the adaptation process, since people resist a change if they per-
ceive this change as a loss. It is my belief, that the different leadership roles required from 
modern leaders require different mind-sets, therefore it is quite difficult to obtain all the 
necessary skills by one individual . 
It is clear that the officers who were promoted during the Cold War era were rewarded 
for showing talent in commanding large manoeuvre units on the conventional battlefield. 
This conventional mind-set was action oriented, concentrated on producing results with 
very little thought spent on considering the consequences or people’s feelings during the 
process. In asymmetric conflicts though, which were a dominant form of combat in the last 
fifty years, a broader range of knowledge was needed, and the military leaders had to rely 
on unconventional leadership skills as well as conventional ones to be able to successfully 
engage the enemy in these very complex conflicts. It is not a new phenomenon though, so 
in this article we use an ancient example of Attila the Hun as well as a modern case study 
of Special Forces to support our argument and shed some light on the unconventional side 
of leadership .
There are many ancient examples of unconventional leaders throughout the histo-
ry, and John Arquilla’s book7 is an excellent read to study many of them, but we have 
chosen the Attila, who is often called the Scourge of God for a specific reason. There 
are relatively few researches on his leadership style and he is mostly misunderstood and 
portrayed as a bloodthirsty barbarian, instead of a brilliant, unconventional leader . Special 
Forces also have long been on the forefront of fighting asymmetric conflicts and their 
importance seems to be steadily rising ever since 11 September . Many of their heroic 
accomplishments might never see the light8, and the full scale of the shadow war might 
never be revealed, but it is interesting to see the expansion of the role of Special Forces 
in contemporary conflicts. The establishment of a JSOTF (Joint Special Operations Tasks 
Force) in Iraq was an organizational example of unconventional leadership in itself, and 
Stanley McChrystal’s role as an unconventional leader is a perfect example how one per-
son is able to influence an organizational adaptation process and change ages old theories 
on asymmetric warfare9 .
We argue that conventional and unconventional leadership styles are quite different and 
it takes a lot of efforts to master both of them. It is not our purpose to argue which one is 
better, we just simply want to point out that unconventional leadership is an often neglected 
and relatively rarely used leadership option, which must be on the repertoire of every leader 
today .
7 Arquilla, J . Insurgents, Raiders, and Bandits: How Masters of Irregular Warfare Have Shaped Our World . Chi-
cago, Ivan R . Dee, 2011 .
8 Kelley, M . “US Special Ops Have Become Much, Much Scarier Since 9/11” . Business Insider, 10 May 2013 . 
http://www .businessinsider .com/the-rise-of-jsoc-in-dirty-wars-2013-4#ixzz2jtF8yaxV
9 My understanding here is that the ages old theory that “you are not supposed to kill your way into victory” in an 
asymmetric conflict has changed and through the increasing effectiveness of JSOTF activities in Iraq, the Task 
Force was able to eliminate so many key insurgent leaders that the insurgent conversion mechanism was unable 
to create enough replacements .
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THE SCOURGE OF GOD 
When we think of a King archetype, hardly anyone would mention Attila, the Hun, who 
is mostly remembered as the Scourge of God .  He is widely portrayed as a savage and a 
bloodthirsty barbarian, and being Hungarian ourselves, we thought that we should do some 
research, before we buy into this story. What we found out, was quite different from the 
misconception and was surprisingly revealing at the same time .
In his book Leadership Secrets of Attila the Hun10, Roberts describes timeless lessons 
in win-directed, take-charge management that best describes Attila’s real character . From 
Roberts we learn that barbaric, husband of four hundred women, cruel, and carnivorous are 
qualities that typically do not describe the ideal leader: Attila the Hun . Taking over the world 
is the ultimate challenge for just about any leader, and Attila seems to have accomplished it 
with poise and grace . Nearly 1,500 years after his reign, some researchers are still studying 
his strategies, which are applicable to any organization, group, company, or country . This 
single man initiated and led the transformation of nomadic tribal barbarians into undisputed 
rulers of the ancient world .
Very few people know that if he was living today, he would be described as an entrepre-
neur, diplomat, social reformer, statesman, civilizer, brilliant field marshal and host of some 
outstanding parties . Researchers have found that he dared to accomplish seemingly impos-
sible tasks in his age . He began his rise to power by renewing and developing relationships 
with tribal chieftains . He lived a very simple life (even when he was ‘guest’ of the Roman 
court in his youth) and reformed the strategies of the 700,000-strong Hun army (a loose con-
glomeration of barbarians) so well that it is still an example of swarming tactics11 this day . 
It is important to point out that Roberts defines leadership as the privilege of having 
responsibility over others’ actions and the organization’s purpose, all of which can affect 
the organization’s success or failure . The organizational application of unconventional 
leadership represents a model or system, that also embraces the fact that no one can pre-
dict circumstances or situations, and consequently the influence they will have on others. 
10 There are several books on Attila, but by far the most insightful one seems to be Wess Robers’s book: Leadership 
Secrets of Attila the Hun . This is the book that reveals the leadership secrets of Attila the Hun - the man who 
shaped an aimless band of mercenary tribal nomads into the undisputed rulers of the ancient world centuries ago, 
and who offers us timeless lessons in win-directed, take-charge management today.
11 Swarming is a seemingly amorphous, but deliberately structured, coordinated, strategic way to perform military 
strikes from all directions. It employs a sustainable pulsing of force and/or fire that is directed from both close-
in and stand-off positions. It will work best – perhaps it will only work – if it is designed mainly around the 
deployment of myriad, small, dispersed, networked manoeuvre units . This calls for an organizational redesign – 
involving the creation of platoon-like pods joined in company-like clusters – that would keep but retool the most 
basic military unit structures. It is similar to the corporate redesign principle of flattening, which often removes 
or redesigns middle layers of management . This has proven successful in the ongoing revolution in business 
affairs and may prove equally useful in the military realm. From command and control offline units to logistics, 
profound shifts will have to occur to nurture this new way of war. This study examines the benefits – and also 
the costs and risks – of engaging in such serious doctrinal change . The emergence of a military doctrine based on 
swarming pods and clusters requires that defence policymakers develop new approaches to connectivity and con-
trol and achieve a new balance between the two . Far more than traditional approaches to battle, swarming clearly 
depends upon robust information flows. Securing these flows, therefore, can be seen as a necessary condition for 
successful swarming . This concept is best described in Arquilla, J . and Ronfeldt, D . Swarming and the Future of 
Conflict. Santa Monica: RAND, 2000 . http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/documented_briefings/2005/
RAND_DB311.pdf
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Thus, relating it to Attila initially appears difficult. His leadership qualities (many relate to 
emotional stability and stamina) show that a leader must be loyal, courageous, self-con-
fident, empathetic, and credible. In Robert’s book we can also read extensively how he 
takes care of his Huns and encourages their active participation and through this enables 
their success . 
Attila’s leadership style includes a pattern of constant strategies involving the impor-
tance of commitment, accountability, standards, and quality . The undoubtedly successful 
approach of Attila the Hun focuses on continuous improvement and full commitment of the 
organization, the Huns, but not at the expense of the people’s morale . Focusing on quality, 
Attila created consistently disciplined Huns, who ideally, and realistically, began to disci-
pline one another individually and subordinately . Morale within an army of 700,000 wild 
creatures is not easy to attain, but through consistent behaviours of his own such as account-
ability, loyalty, and confidence, Attila maintained this unified purpose. 
Holding every member of any sized organization accountable for their actions and en-
suring reliability and consistency in their behaviour is a must for a king who wants to rule 
his realm for extensive periods of time . Again, and again he stresses the importance of indi-
vidual quality performance and commitment . He understood that if at the basic, single level, 
you cannot rely on one person, then your army will not be successful, therefore he gave a 
lot of freedom to his chieftains, but held each of them accountable for their actions and the 
actions of their subordinates as well .  
If he was able to talk about leader development today, Attila would surely say that lead-
ers must encourage creativity, freedom of action and innovation among their subordinates, 
as long as these efforts are consistent with the goals of the tribe or nation. 
THE MASTER OF DESTRUCTION
The recent book of General Stanley McChrystal12, who has been the JSOTF Commander in 
Iraq, and several recent articles published in open sources and magazines, shed some light 
on the organization and leadership used to track down and eliminate a highly elusive and 
networked enemy in Iraq . 
In order to make the JSOTF more effective, McChrystal partnered with agencies to 
fuse intelligence, and synchronize operations . Together they redesigned the bureaucratic 
ways information travelled up in a pipeline, and developed a real-time information sharing 
environment . It was not enough though, so in the next phase of organizational transforma-
tion they combined all elements of intelligence (finding the enemy); drone operators and 
SIGINT (Signals Intelligence) specialists (who fixed the target); various teams of Special 
Forces operators (for finishing); as well as analysts and experts in exploitation and crime 
scene investigation (who pulled immediate information and exploited it in order to feed it 
back to the cycle for further analysis) in order to carry out the full cycle of the operations 
that was called F3EA (find, fix, finish, exploit and analyse). From a leadership point of view, 
the linear and cumbersome bureaucratic conventional methods were replaced by a shared 
informational and operational environment . As a result of this process, there was a shift in 
mind-set and organizational culture as well through the shared consciousness among the 
various organizations . 
12 McChrystal, S . A . My Share of the Task: A Memoir. Boston: Portfolio, 2013 .
18 HUNGARIAN DEFENCE REVIEW, Special Issue 2019, Vol. 147, Nr. 1–2
These changes meant a whole lot more than just an experiment . This was a game chang-
er in modern warfare and had a real strategic effect as well. As it was published in Foreign 
Policy13 and in Foreign Affairs14 as well, the old COIN (counter – insurgence) adage, stating 
that it is not effective to attack the insurgent fighters as they will be replaced soon enough 
was proved wrong . With the help of some technological adjustments but mainly by reorgan-
izing and changing the leadership mentality the newly organized teams were able to turn the 
F3EA cycle around three times a night! This meant that while in 2004 in all of Iraq the task 
force did 18 raids; two years later, by August 2006 they carried out up to 300 raids a month . 
This meant that the network was operating at speeds that had never been seen before and 
all that was enabled through a new leadership approach which encouraged decentralizing 
decision making . 
Although the teams included more organizations, many of them being unconventional 
actors, they valued competency above all else . The overall result was not just a lot of cap-
tured and killed enemy fighters, but since the enemy network was hit in many places simul-
taneously, it had a very difficult time to regenerate. This had a decisive strategic effect15 and 
the disruption of the enemy network reached a previously unseen proportion . 
This organizational adaptation process of becoming a network for the JSOTF has not 
only technological and organizational components, but leadership ones as well, and the lead-
ership aspects seem to be the hardest to achieve . McChrystal points out in his interview16 
that “if organizations aren’t ready to move faster, their decision-making processes become 
overwhelmed by the information flow around them”. For JSOTF to be successful it was not 
enough to survive, but they needed to thrive . 
The concept of adaptation arises from scientific efforts to understand biological evo-
lution17, the necessary changes in the way military leaders think of asymmetric challenges 
require a completely different mind-set, which is the organizational equivalent of biological 
thriving18 . 
Operating with a decentralized decision making within the military is hard enough . The 
hierarchical decision-making process implies that the leader at every level of the pyramid 
is the person in charge of deciding and directing everything below him . By proxy the high-
est-ranking individual is the one, who always has the best answers, the deepest understand-
ing and the best solutions . This process is very deeply entrenched in the military, but it is un-
13 McChrystal, S . A . “It takes a Network” . Foreign Policy, 21 February 2011 . http://www .foreignpolicy .com/arti-
cles/2011/02/22/it_takes_a_network
14 McChrystal, S . A . and Rose, G . “Generation Kill: A conversation with General Stanley McChrystal” . Foreign 
Affairs 92/2 . 2013 . 2-8 . http://www.foreignaffairs.com/discussions/interviews/generation-kill?page=show
15 Robert H . Scales wrote that “as head of the U .S . Joint Special Operations Command, McChrystal oversaw the 
development of a precision killing machine unprecedented in the history of modern warfare,” one whose “scope 
and genius” will be fully appreciated only “in later decades, once the veil of secrecy has been removed” . Scales, 
R . H . “The quality of Command: The wrong way and the right way to make better generals” . Foreign Affairs 
91/6 . 2012 . 137-143 . https://www.foreignaffairs.com/reviews/review-essay/quality-command
16 McChrystal and Rose . “Generation Kill…”
17 See Mayr, E . Toward a New Philosophy of Biology: Observations of an Evolutionist . Cambridge, MA: Belknap/
Harvard University Press, 1988 .
18 Biological evolution conforms to laws of survival, organizations, however, generate purposes beyond survival . 
Thriving in biological terms means that the species is fruitful and by multiplying and protecting its own kind it 
succeeds in passing on its gene pool . Thriving is much more than simple survival, it eventually leads to a vastly 
expanded range of living . 
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suitable for highly complex asymmetric situations, especially when we are facing adaptive 
and critical challenges which are changing minute by minute . 
Decentralizing C2 (Command and Control) is just the first step on a long road towards 
adaptation. Synchronizing and fusing different service cultures to finally become a learning 
organization (one that is able to constantly adapt) and providing a unifying vision for all this 
effort is quite an endeavour. Using unconventional leadership during this adaptation process 
is a must . 
UNCONVENTIONAL LEADERSHIP
As we could see in the two case studies, unconventional leadership takes place in the context 
of problems and complex challenges . In fact, it makes little sense of even thinking about 
leadership, when everyone is on the same sheet of music and all we need to do is to coordi-
nate routine activities . Leaders step up, when a tough or complex problem arises and they 
need to be tackled; therefore, mostly while we are in the in the zone of learning . 
The root cause of not being able to lead in an unconventional manner is our convention-
al military training, which is based on following orders, and on a clearly defined chain of 
command . But as we could see in our case studies, people without formal authority can prac-
tice leadership on any given issue at any given time . We have all seen cases in our lives when 
people had formal authority, thus a following per se, but they did not lead . Unconventional 
leaders operate without anyone experiencing anything remotely similar to the conventional 
experience of following19 . 
Before we define unconventional leadership, we must answer the questions: who is a 
leader, and where does leadership take place? There is very much debate in academic circles 
regarding the definition of a leader, but I believe that a leader is someone people follow. This 
somewhat simplistic definition captures the essence of leadership, emphasizing the main 
component: followers . Leadership always implies a relationship between a leader and those 
who are led, and that relationship exists within a context. This context can be very different 
in many cases . Corporate bureaucracies thrive in a stable, predictable environment, where 
people are mostly in their comfort zone and these organizations are best led by conventional 
leadership. But when complex problems arise, these organizations seem to be less effective 
to cope with the situation . 
So according to our definition: Unconventional leadership moves beyond conventional 
leadership territory and is presented beyond managing technical problems crossing the line 
into boldly facing complex adaptive or critical problems, and in most cases, it means going 
beyond your authority in order to tackle the problems at hand in order to orchestrate solu-
tions to unresolved problems . Unconventional leadership results in organizational or proce-
dural changes, and most importantly, changes people’s mind-sets within the organization . 
Adaptive and critical challenges also demand constant learning from unconventional 
leaders . This learning process however, is reaching a lot farther than just collecting infor-
mation . Those lessons that we gathered in the past are to be applied so that it could be stated 
that we have learned from them. This makes a critical difference in organizations between 
lessons identified and lessons learned. In the comfort zone model, we can only close the gap 
19 Heifetz, R . A . “Anchoring leadership in the work of adaptive progress” . In Hesselbein, F . and Goldsmith, M . 
(eds .), Leader of the Future 2: Visions Strategies, and Practices for the New Era . San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 
2006 . 74 .
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between our aspirations and the reality if we learn in new ways and are able to constantly 
adapt . This in turn requires a new approach in leadership education as well . 
Another interesting factor is the people-centric approach of unconventional leaders . 
Leadership is not the same as authority . Exceeding authority is not, by itself, leadership . 
A compelling vision is not enough either . Unconventional leaders need to get followers, 
collaborators who support their vision and buy into it . What is interesting, unconventional 
leaders can also mobilize those, who are opposed to their ideas or just fence sitting . This is 
an essential skill in facing complex challenges . 
Adaptive and critical challenges often require a shift in responsibility from the shoul-
ders of the authority figures and the authority structure to the stakeholders themselves20 . In 
contrast with the technical challenges, where experts can solve our problems, in the zone of 
challenge, facing critical challenges, a different kind of responsibility-taking and leadership 
mentality are required . This is where unconventional leadership can thrive . If we are look-
ing for authority figures in these kinds of situations, it means that we are treating critical 
challenges just as if they were technical ones, and approaching them with a conventional 
leadership mind-set and in most cases this can be really damaging . 
Finally, we have to mention the time factor, as it is most likely one of the most 
critical parts of the military decision-making process . Adaptive challenges require sig-
nificantly more time for people to develop innovative solutions and learn, than technical 
challenges . Moreover, critical challenges are even worse from the perspective of time, 
as they do not have a cookie-cutter ready to apply solutions, but generally we do not 
have time to take, as it would be the case in the case of an adaptive challenge . Overall, 
organizations need time to make cultural changes in order to adapt, but in the contem-
porary, 21st century VUCA (volatile, uncertain, complex, ambiguous) context we do not 
have that luxury any more .
FINAL THOUGHTS
As Heifetz suggests in his article21, “our language fails us in many aspects of our lives” . 
This is why we have chosen the Maori word tuatara for the title of our article . Tuatara are 
reptiles that are endemic to New Zealand . They are often referred to as living dinosaurs, as 
have largely not changed physically over very long periods of evolution going back millions 
of years . Tuatara is the only survivor of an ancient group of reptiles that lived at the same 
time as dinosaurs . The last relatives of tuatara died out about 60 million years ago which is 
why tuatara is called a ‘living fossil’ . 
But tuatara at the same time have broken records for DNA evolution as well . A dis-
covery that has astonished New Zealand scientists proves that “the tuatara has the highest 
molecular evolutionary rate that anyone has measured”22 . The new research also support-
20 Heifetz, R . A . “Anchoring Leadership in the Work of Adaptive Progress” . In Hesselbein, F . and Goldsmith, M . 
(eds .), Leader of the Future 2: Visions Strategies, and Practices for the New Era . San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 
2006 . 76 .
21 Heifetz, R . A . “Anchoring Leadership in the Work of Adaptive Progress” . In Hesselbein, F . and Goldsmith, M . 
(eds .), Leader of the Future 2: Visions Strategies, and Practices for the New Era . San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 
2006 . 73 .
22 Hay, J . M . et al . “Rapid Molecular Evolution in a Living Fossil” . Trends in Genetics 24/3 . 2008 . 106-109 .;
 DOI: 10 .0 .3 .248/j .tig .2007 .12 .002
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ed a hypothesis by the evolutionary biologist Allan Wilson, that the rate of molecular 
evolution was uncoupled from the rate of morphological evolution . This basically means 
that the tuatara is capable of remarkable rates of adaptation, yet it has hardly changed for 
ages . 
Tuatara in the local Maori language also indicates tapu (the borders of what is sacred 
and restricted) beyond which there is mana (meaning there could be serious consequences if 
that boundary is crossed) . In our example when a leader decides to walk the line and venture 
out from the comfort zone (of traditional autocratic command and control leadership) to 
tackle complex challenges, he is surely setting himself up for a lot of pushing back from oth-
ers as he disturbs the organizational equilibrium . Anyone, who has done it before, is aware 
of the personal and professional vulnerabilities of this endeavour . But with the great danger, 
there are great opportunities presented as well .
Leadership in the contemporary security context is very different to what we have been 
trained to as military personnel in the last century . Most of the time our training included 
known scenarios, and as we trained for certainty, we learned the science of war . But in the 
context of new complex challenges we also need to educate our leaders for uncertainty and 
teach them the art of war . The brave option is to embrace uncertainty, as it has a reason; it 
pushes us to reach out and by learning and adapting, develops our leaders personally, as well 
as creates remarkable organizations, not just good ones . 
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ABSTRACT: Electronic information systems used by interior and national emergency organ-
izations are based on the same functional components, but even within an organization, 
specific entities can be equipped with different types of devices from different manufac-
turers. Apart from the fact that today the management of increasingly complex systems 
requires serious expertise, it is also complicated with the diversity of system components – 
so in their operation it is hard to become proficient and well-skilled. The attention of the 
operator becomes divided, so it is not entirely focused on their task. The topicality of the 
matter is the growing number of security developments. The purpose of my publication is 
to explore the tools and user aspects – with emphasis on user overload – related to these 
systems.
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INTRODUCTION
Seminars and exhibitions dealing with interior and national security issues present interest-
ing novelties and systems with useful new features year after year . This process is deliber-
ate, Europe’s security situation has prompted European Union leaders and defense industry 
players to change and continuously improve . One of the results is that EU leaders approved 
the Rome Declaration on 25 March 2017 . In this statement, EU leaders have committed 
themselves, to strengthen the common security and defense policy in cooperation with 
NATO on the one hand, and to support a more competitive and integrated defense industry 
on the other .1
The result of this process is that the emergency organizations can continuously modern-
ize and replace their equipment that has been used up due to the lack of financial resources. 
However, this puts a lot of pressure on system operators: they have to learn the management 
of new technologies parallel with their standard workload, and they may have to manage 
multiple technical solutions simultanously with the same activity . There are several reasons 
for this: from the technical side, the continuous development of the manufacturers, and from 
the financial side, the purchases of the replacement equipment are not based on the manu-
1 “A Bizottság vitafórumot rendez az európai védelem jövőjéről”. European Comission. 24 May 2017. http://euro-
pa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-1427_hu.htm, Accessed on 23 May 2018 .
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facturer or the type of the equipment, but on the better offer price in a competitive tendering 
procedure .
Operating the system components distracts the attention of an already overloaded staff 
from the management of their tasks . This is especially true for drivers of vehicles equipped 
with complex systems .2 From Border Police’s mobile thermal imaging car to modern police 
cars, vehicles are all equipped with sophisticated IT systems that require drivers to handle 
these components at a high skill level .
Figure 1: Mobile thermal imaging car3      Figure 2: Integrated solution from Federal 
Signal4
Several manufacturers have recognized the above-mentioned problem, and for ease 
of use, integrated the separated systems into a common interface . These integration 
packs include the manufacturers’ own product line and other products from a narrow 
range of suppliers, so full implementation for older purchases cannot be achived with 
these systems .
For a complete implementation, a general-purpose integration platform should be de-
veloped that is capable of handling devices with the same functionality in one system, pro-
viding the same interface .
DETERMINATION OF DEVELOPMENT GOALS AND DIRECTIONS
In order to determine the purpose and exact directions of the niche development, the type of 
equipment used by user organizations, the use case should be assessed and we need to know 
user opinions, needs, and helpful comments on how to use the tools .
2 James, S. M. “Distracted driving impairs patrol officer driving performance”. Policing: An International Journal 
of Police Strategies and Management 38/3 . 2015 . 505-516 . 
 DOI: 10 .0 .3 .248/j .tig .2007 .12 .002
3 “Újabb hőkamerás fejlesztések”. 9 July 2014. http://www .police .hu/hirek-es-informaciok/legfrissebb-hireink/
hatarrendeszet/ujabb-hokameras-fejlesztesek, Accessed on 23 May 2018 .
4 “ATENA System” . https://www .fedsigvama .com/en/product/atenea-system/, Accessed on 23 May 2018 .
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In the rest of the study, I present a survey of the technical equipment used by emergency 
organizations, as well as a survey of users’ direct opinions . For the survey I chose empirical 
research from the special methods, we used a questionnaire method, and we made inter-
views .5
VOICE COMMUNICATION DEVICES
The purpose of speech communication devices is to achieve immediate, reliable group com-
munication between the driver and the dispatcher – who controls their activity . 
For the purposes of the study, two modes of communication are distinguished:
• point to point communication
• point to multipoint communication
A typical example of point-to-point communication is when the two parties can talk to 
each other in full duplex (they can listen and talk at the same time) .
In a point to multipoint communication on the other had, we always distingwish a trans-
mitting party who initiates the call by pressing the PTT (Push to Talk) button and opens the 
channel to all the other devices in that particular group that can receive the transmitted content . 
Once the transmission is ended any of the group’s participants can initiate a response call . 
The benefit of group communication – PTT communication – is that the information for a 
group member is shared immediately . For a particular event, all members of the geographically 
dispersed intervention staff (belonging to the same speech group) are fully provided with the 
event information, are also aware of the instructions the other staff has received, therefore the 
individual is able to carry out its own task in full transparency of the entire activity .
Of course, PTT-based voice transmission is the main function of the equipment, but 
modern devices can also be used in additional communication modes: 
• private call initiation; 
• sending short text messages (all user, status); 
• sending telemetry informations (control inputs, outputs, status polling); 
• data communications (sending GPS positions, low rate data communication) . 
The above is true for modern digital systems . Analog devices are only suitable for their 
main function, using minimal signaling system, or some type is suitable for data transmis-
sion at a limited speed .
TETRA6 digital trunked radio standard was defined in the 1990s. The purpose of the 
standard is to create a spectrum efficient system by defining 4 logical speech channels on a 
25 kHz wide radio channel, and to create a scalable trunk infrastructure for a large number of 
users . TETRA can provide single, multi-site and even nationwide coverage . The system got 
in focus when the Schengen Border Cooperation was defined, which required a cross-border 
communication system between the cooperating organizations . In that time the cooperation 
between standardization organizations, manufacturers, users of international organizations 
was exemplary .
5 Berek L ., Rajnai Z . and Berek L . A tudományos kutatás folyamata és módszerei . Budapest: Óbudai Egyetem 
Bánki Donát Gépész és Biztonságtechnikai Mérnöki Kar, 2018 . 36-39 .
6 TETRA – Terrestrial Trunked Radio – European standard for trunked radio system
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The TETRA system in Europe is typically used by emergency organizations . In addi-
tion, there are civil organizations that are very similar to professional establishments with re-
gard to their fleets, their equipment and should use the same system to facilitate cooperation.
Nowadays for civil organizations (such as public police and outgoing cars of civil secu-
rity services, in Hungary), DMR7 system is most commonly used for voice communication . 
Of course, it is reliable, even tens of years have not completely worn out such analogue 
systems, but fading of compatible DMR systems into the background, which ensures a con-
tinuous transition, is expected as the equipment breaks .
On other continents, systems with a similar set of services, and the way they are used, 
could be interpreted as the same as the TETRA standard . In the United States, a system 
called P258 was constructed while in China the PDT9 system was introduced . These systems 
do not differ in their integration from the systems used in Europe.
The use of a new technology started in critical communications, LTE10, which had al-
ready proven its capabilities in mobile data communication, when allowing high data rates 
to be used . The solution used in this system is called PTT over the LTE . Its widespread 
availability is expected in the near future .
Figure 3: Mobile versions of TETRA, P25, DMR, and LTE radios11
7 DMR – Digital Mobile Radio – standard defined by ETSI for frequency efficient evolution of analogue radio 
system
8 P25 – Project 25, standards for public safety organizations in North America, replacement for analog radios 
9 PDT – Professional or Police Digital Trunking – open standard for trunked police radio system in China
10 LTE – Long-Term Evolution, a standard for wireless broadband communication for mobile or data terminals
11 “TETRA Radio Solutions” . MOTOROLA Solutions . https://www.motorolasolutions.com/en_xu/products/tetra.
html, Accessed on 23 January 2018 .; “EV 750 Vehicle Radio” . Huawei . http://e .huawei .com/en/products/wire-
less/elte-trunking/trunking-terminal/ev750, Accessed on 23 January 2018 .
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After defining the devices, we need to identify the integration interface where these 
devices become suitable not for their own system environment or for access or control func-
tions via their own interfaces . With an overview of the leading manufacturers of equipment, 
we can see that the USB12 or RS232 serial port is defined as the device integration interface.
We can state that the TETRA equipment may possibly be integrated with the RS23213 
port, while the DMR equipment can be integrated on the USB interface with a NDIS14 driver .
The driver supplied by the manufacturer supports the environment of the windows oper-
ating system, so it is advisable to consider this aspect for development .15
LIGHT BARS AND SIRENS
The purpose of the distinctive sound and light signals is to signal the approach of a special 
vehicle to other participants in traffic on the road, and their obligation to give priority. This 
ensures that the travel time is significantly reduced in a specific traffic situation.
In accordance with Decree 12/2007 . (III . 13 .) of the Hungarian Ministry of Justice and 
Law Enforcement, distinctive light signals are blue or blue-red, the device blinks at different 
speeds, or a sound signal when the siren is changing pitch .
Light signals are mostly used in roof-mounted design, which ensures that it is detectable 
from a long distance. If needed, additional flashing lights are used beside the light bars for 
better visibility . Regardless of their manufacturers, it can be stated that modern light signals 
use efficient, low power LED technology of high brightness. However, it is not possible to 
ignore the old flashing devices or the rotating mirror visual warning signals.
The light signals have two modes of control . One is that each function of these devices 
can be activated separately on a dedicated interface, and the other is to receive information 
from the device interface via a communication bus to activate the functions .
The use of the communication bus is not yet widespread, it is expected to be more wide-
ly adopted in the future . During the development, it is advisable to prepare for it, but the 
main direction of the system should be used by the parallel communication .
Figure 4: Modern light bars16
12 USB – Universal Serial Bus is an industry standard for a communication platform between computers, peripheral 
devices and other computers
13 RS232 – Recommended Standard 232, an industry standard for serial communication platform between comput-
ers, peripheral devices and other computers
14 NDIS – Network Driver Interface Specification abstracts lower-level drivers that manage hardware from up-
per-level drivers, such as network transports
15 Farkas T . and Prisznyák Sz . “Kormányzati célú infokommunikációs hálózatok: A rendészeti szervek infokom-
munikációs rendszere” . Hadtudományi Szemle 10/4 . 2017 . 583-596 .
 http://epa.oszk.hu/02400/02463/00037/pdf/EPA02463_hadtudomanyi_szemle_2017_04_583-596.pdf
16 “Phoenix Series” . https://www .fedsigvama .com/en/product/serie-phoenix/, Accessed on 23 January 2018 .
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In the case of audible signals, the siren control unit determines the siren sounds . This 
unit is usually integrated with the amplifier. Controlling the sounds can also be handled from 
a control wire, or in the new units, the CAN control bus17 can be used similarly to the light 
signals .18
ON-BOARD VIDEO RECORDERS
The purpose of on-board video recording equipment is on the one hand, to capture the traffic 
conditions of the vehicle or video record police actions, and on the other hand, visual or 
in-vehicle speech record the behavior of passengers and forced passengers in the vehicle .
Simple on-board cameras fulfil only commercial demands, for instance, a clear recording 
of traffic situations, and they are able save information on their own internal memory or an SD 
card . Such devices are equipped with accelerometer, GPS, motion detector, and can manage 
the recordings via their own applications – if Wi-Fi or bluetooth connection is available .
It is easy to see that these tools are not suitable for integration into the planned system . 
The functional features of professional devices specifically designed for installation in the 
vehicle are the same as those of modern professional imaging equipment, however, their 
whole design and cable interface surfaces are designed for a more demanding environment 
(continuous shaking, temperature changes) . 
Closed circuit, so the cameras are connected directly to the recording equipment, the 
information is only available to the authorized person . 
Some manufacturers (for example, of the Dahua devices in our study) also provide 
software components for the development of the devices to integrate their equipment to a 
special vhehice .19
Figure 5: On-board NVR20
17 CAN bus – Controller Area Network is a comunication standard designed for the microcontrollers, computer 
mainly in vehicle application .
18 Rusz D. “A megkülönböztető jelzések jogszabályi háttere és aktualitása”. Hadmérnök 10/4 . 2015 . 43-55 .
 http://hadmernok.hu/153_04_ruszd.pdf
19 Berek L ., Berek T . and Berek L . Személy- és vagyonbiztonság . Budapest, Óbudai Egyetem Bánki Donát Gépész 
és Biztonságtechnikai Mérnöki Kar, 2016 . 51-66 .
20 NVR – a computer with a special program that records and processes IP camera streams . “Mobile NVR: 
NVR0404MF” . Dahua Technology . http://au .dahuasecurity .com/au/products/nvr0404mf-11951 .html, Accessed 
on 23 January 2018 .
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AUTOMATIC VEHICLE LOCATION
The Global Positioning System – the GPS – is a widespread, reliable system that can deter-
mine the current position of the vehicle, or, by forwarding this position, you can immediately 
inform the dispatch center .21
Positioning should be the basis for integration . Due to the widespread use of the system, 
several devices have been listed in which this module is integrated:
• devices for modern digital PTT communication (TETRA, DMR, LTE)
• mobile NVR with optional card
• mobile PC with optional card . 
ON-BOARD COMPUTERS 
The purpose of the on-board computer is to assemble the components to incorporate it into 
the development, control through its hardware unit, and running the software components to 
be developed, visual display of system states .
The computer must handle the components that are installed in the vehicle listed above, 
therefore, they must have matching interfaces, communication ports .
The computer has to be designed for special needs, so it must be protected against ex-
treme temperature and environmental influences.
It is best to design a touch screen interface for the computer, due to the problem of key-
board and mouse placement .22
DEVICES TO BE INTEGRATED IN THE FUTURE  
ACCORDING TO THE TREND 
According to this trend, the basic equipment of future patrol cars will not change in the 
next 10 years, however, the interfaces of the devices are expected to be converted to digital 
communication .
A couple of professional materials forecast the direction that car manufacturers make 
“ready” patrol cars – with factory-fitted equipment. However, in this case, the manufacturers 
of professional tools determine the main supplier direction, since the development of the 
target devices and the professionals are found in these companies .
21 RUDOLF Á. “GPS rendszer működése és alkalmazása a biztonságtechnikában”. Hadmérnök 7/1 . 2012 . 40-47 .
 http://hadmernok.hu/2012_1_rudolf.pdf
22 “Mobile Computing Solutions” . Nexcom . http://www .nexcom .com/Products/mobile-computing-solutions, Ac-
cessed on 27 May 2018 .
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Figure 6: Motorola Integrated Control Panel23     Figure 7: Motorola Mission Critical LTE 
device24
Convergence is expected in the field of voice and video communications, its signs can 
also be found in the new government-oriented LTE equipment . The devices come onto the 
market with a touchscreen display, a camera, and a dedicated PTT button, suitable for com-
municating specifically on LTE systems for government purposes. There will also be a fu-
ture for the deployment of vehicle-mounted devices through Voice over LTE applications 
like Mission Critical PTT .25
SURVEY RESEARCH 
In order to achieve the research goals, I have divided the available human resources into four 
research groups . The four research teams surveyed the leaders of the Hungarian emergency 
organizations with a survey questionnaire, visited experts in these systems in Budapest and 
in all county headquarters in the country . We interviewed the Police, the Counter Terrorism 
Centre, the National Directorate General for Disaster Management, the National Ambulance 
Service and the National Tax and Customs Administration staff, about their experience and 
opinion of the digital systems in use .
Before completing the questionnaire compiled by us, we were informed during a per-
sonal interview about the mobile data systems installed in the organizations’ service vehicles 
and their experience in using it, and local forms of protection against security threats to IT 
systems . After the interview, we had the questionnaire completed on a voluntary basis and it 
was done without exception .
23 “APX™ 7500 Multi-Band P25 Mobile Radio” . Motorola Solutions . https://www.motorolasolutions.com/en_us/
products/two-way-radios/project-25-radios/discontinued/apx-7500 .html#tabproductinfo, Accessed on 27 May 
2018 .
24 “LEX L11 Mission Critical LTE Device” . MOTOROLA Solutions . https://www.motorolasolutions.com/en_us/
products/lte-broadband-systems/volte .html#tabproductinfo, Accessed on 27 May 2015 .
25 “VoLTE (Voice over LTE)” . MOTOROLA Solutions . https://www.motorolasolutions.com/en_us/products/
lte-user-devices/lexl11 .html#tabproductinfo, Accessed on 27 May 2015 .
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The questionnaires were processed one by one, organizations were visited by research 
teams, and the answers to questions 1-8, and the number of responses from interviewees to 
the given question were analysed . The survey was answered by 60 people .
QUESTIONS OF THE SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE 
1. What kind of tools are available in the vehicles of the emergency organizations?
on-board computer
□  voice communication device (TETRA, DMR, etc.)
□  light bars and sirens
□  on-board video recorders
□  other devices (please list them)
…………………………………………………………………………………………
The respondents were marked without exception, so they are in the patrol vehicles, and 
they have to use it on every deployment – the voice communication devices (in this case 
the TETRA radio), 91 .7% the lightbars and sirens, while 83 .3% the on-board computers, 
61 .7% the on-board cameras and 10% other, in-vehicle systems . They listed to the other de-
vices on-board terminals (called “IPT” in the vehicles of the National Ambulance Service), 
smartphones, if necessary, public address loudspeakers, and mobile reflectors. In addition, 
some police authorities listed bulletproof vests in the vehicle that became necessary during 
deployments, or the use of roadblocks, or occasional use of images from public surveillance 
cameras .
Figure 8: Number of answers to question 1 (edited by the publisher)
2. How does it impact the distraction of driving the paralell use of the devices above during 
deployment? (Please indicate one possible answer)
□  highly
□  a little
□  not at all
66 .7% of respondents stated that operating in-vehicle technical devices is only a little 
distracting, 23.3% finds this workflow very straining, and 10% do not feel the burden of 
handling the tools at all .
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Figure 9: Number of answers to question 2 (edited by the publisher)
3. Your organization will need in the future (Please indicate all the possible answers)
□  easy implementation of local communication
□  easy communication with central organizations
□  easy access to the database of local and central organizations
□  high speed data access at variable locations
□   communication options between different communication networks and devices (eg: 
laptop, applications used by mobile devices, etc.)
76.7% of the experienced staff of the emergency organizations completing the question-
naire think that their organization would need high-speed data access . 60% lack communi-
cation tools and capabilities between different communication networks and devices, 46.7% 
consider it important to have easy access to the database of local and central organizations, 
while 28 .3% vote to preparing easy to communicate with central organizations and only 20% 
think that the simple implementation of local communication could help their work the most .
Figure 10: Number of answers to question 3 (edited by the publisher)
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4. Does your organization use mobile video solution? (Please indicate all the possible an-
swers)
□   we use a mobile camera system
□   we use a camera system worn by the end user (body worn camera, camera mounted 
on a helmet, etc.)
□   we use video analytics software
□   we do not use a mobile camera system 
65% of the surveyed said, that there is a camera system in the service vehicles of their 
organization and is used in their work . During the interview, we came to the conclusion that 
this was basically true for police vehicles .
35% of the respondents indicated in the questionnaire that they do not use video capture 
solution, 25% is the end user who uses a body camera or a helmet mounted camera . They 
also belong to the police . Only 10% of the interviewees use video analysis software during 
their work .
Figure 11: Number of answers to question 4 (edited by the publisher)
5. How important is real-time data access to your emergency organization? (Please indicate 
one possible answer)
□   critical – data access has higher priority than voice communication
□   very important – data access has the same priority as voice communication
□   important – data access is important when there is no voice communication
□   less important – data access can wait until colleagues return to the station
From 31 emergency organization staffs 60 respondents interviewed during the sur-
vey said that the real-time data access is very important, it has same priotrity as voice 
communication . 22 said that real-time acces is only important when there is no voice 
communication; 5 people believe that real-time data access has higher priority than voice 
communication .
Just two participants thought that data access could wait until colleagues return to their 
place of service, so no data is required to be queried at the site during the deployment .
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34 HUNGARIAN DEFENCE REVIEW, Special Issue 2019, Vol. 147, Nr. 1–2
Figure 12: The proportion of the answers to question 5 (edited by the publisher)
6. Does your emergency organisation need data access during deployment? (Please indicate 
one possible answer)
□   always
□   sometimes
□   never
55% of respondents think that data access is required every time during deployment, the 
remaining 45% believe that this is necessary only sometimes .
(The question is related to the previous one, therefore there is some doubt to the answer 
given by those two persons to question 5, stating that data access can wait until colleagues 
return to the station .)
Figure 13: Proportion of responses to question 6 (edited by the publisher)
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7. What tools are used to access the data? (Please indicate all the possible answers)
□   an on-board pc
□   portable devices (please list them)
…………………………………………………………………………………………
Based on 80% of the answes, data are accessed by a computer installed in the vehicle, 
51 .6% use portable device (TETRA, tablet, notebook, laptop or smartphone) to access data . 
Both replies could be marked, so there is an overlap in the number of responses .
Figure 14: Number of answers to question 7 (edited by the publisher)
8. How is their organization protected against the security threat to their IT system? (Please 
indicate all the possible answers)
□   with the staff training
□   with daily safety audit
□   with antivirus software
□   using spam and phishing filters
□   with data encryption
□   with data access control
□   with firewall
□   I have no information
According to the information provided by the respondents the segment examined is 
basically and primarily (85-85%) protected with firewall and antivirus software. This is fol-
lowed by – with an almost equal percentage – the limitation and regulation of user data 
access (68%), education on IT security (63%), and use of spam and phishing filters (57%).
Data encryption, as a protection method was indicated on the fifth place, 48%.
The last form of defense of the imaginary ranking, daily security audits are rarely used 
by law enforcement and emergency services, only 12% of the respondents’ answers men-
tions it .
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Figure 15: Number of answers to question 8 (edited by the publisher)
PERIPHERALS TO BE INTEGRATED IN THE PRESENT AND THE 
FUTURE, ACCORDING TO THE TREND
Vehicles used by the enforcement or emergency organizations are basically not equipped, 
and we can declare that assets, according to their basic features, minimally differ from each 
other .
The conclusion of the above is that it is enough to find this common set, for which the 
system to be developed has to be prepared . According to the previous results it can be stated 
that the focus of development has to be on the following devices:
• voice communication devices (TETRA, DMR or analogue PTT based devices)
• light bars and sirens
• on-board video recording devices
• automatic vehicle location
• on-board computers
CONCLUSION 
Complex systems used by domestic law enforcement and emergency organizations include 
digital or analog components of nearly the same purpose and operation . These increasingly 
sophisticated systems need to be handled by the operators in addition to their basic task . 
Beyond the listed tools, using additional tools during deployments is needed (body worn 
camera, bulletproof vest, mobile reflector, stinger, paper-based documentation, other law 
enforcement tools, etc .), which requires extra attention and focus from the employee .
During my research, I made sure that the use of mobile systems installed in a vehicle 
is particularly dangerous while driving . The solutions provided by the main manufacturers 
only manage the problem at the level of integration and do not provide a solution to the 
distracting components .
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The results described in my publications can form the basis for the design and develop-
ment of systems, which do not present additional workload on the user but effectively help 
their work .
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Lt Col Zsolt Végvári:
SUPERCAPACITORS AND THEIR MILITARY 
APPLICABILITY
DOI: 10.35926/HDR.2019.1-2.3
ABSTRACT: There are several types of the electrical power devices that are hardly known 
outside professional circles. One of them is the supercapacitor, which is very interesting 
attributable to its capabilities. Given its parameters, it can be considered unique, thus, its 
use in some special equipment is indispensable. With the spread of electricity, there will 
be more and more military equipment in which currently there is no alternative to its use. 
It is therefore well worth learning a bit more about it.
KEYWORDS: capacitor, supercapacitor, electrical energy storage 
SUMMARY OF CONVENTIONAL CAPACITORS AND THEIR FEATURES
Before starting to elaborate on supercapacitors, it is also worth reviewing the major features 
of traditional capacitors as these are more or less the same . Capacitors are electro-technical 
components that have been known for a long time. The first such device was the well-known 
Leyden jar . This was built by the German physicist, Ewald Georg von Kleist and the Dutch 
physicist working at the University of Leiden, Pieter van Musschenbroek independently 
from each other in 17451. This was the first device with the help of which static electricity 
could be stored . Thus, this device can be considered to be the antecedent of all power storage 
devices . The ancestor of the modern capacitors, the paper capacitor had already appeared 
by the late 1800s . By the 20th century, capacitors had become an integral part of everyday 
life attributed to the revolutionary developments taking place in the fields of electro-tech-
nology, electronics and microelectronics . Although it is not widely known, hundreds of such 
devices can be found in an average household either in the form of discrete circuit elements 
or integrated into a circuit board . Before moving on, I enclose a brief overview of physical 
quantities and their units used in the present paper:
Physical quantity Symbol SI unit
voltage U Volt (V)
electric current I Ampere (A)
electric charge Q Coulomb (C)
1 Young, G . “Leyden jar”. Encyclopedia Britannica (online). 16 May 2013 . https://www .britannica .com/technol-
ogy/Leyden-jar, Accessed on 19 January 2018 .
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Physical quantity Symbol SI unit
resistance R Ohm (Ω)
capacitance C Farad (F)
energy W Joule (J)
power P Watt (W)
speed V meters per second (m/s)
mass M kilogram (kg)
The structure of the capacitor is rather simple as it consists of two electrical conductors, 
called plates and an insulating layer between them, called dielectric medium [2, p . 141] . If these 
plates are connected to direct voltage, they become charged, and the magnitude of the electric 
charges accumulated on the plates is proportional to the magnitude of voltage . The (DC) equa-
tion describing this goes as (1): Q=CU2 [2, p . 140], which clearly shows that capacitance3 is 
the major feature of such devices, namely a sort of proportionality factor between voltage and 
the quantity of charge . The more charge it can take at lower and lower voltage, the higher the 
capacitance is . If this is examined in terms of geometrical design, the bigger the surface of the 
plates is and the closer these plates are located to one another without leakage (i .e . the better 
the dielectric constant (insulating capacity) of the insulating layer is), the higher the value of 
capacitance is. The magnitude of capacitance can be deduced from equation (1) (2): C=Q/U (2).
The capacity of conventional, the so-called ‘dry’ capacitors used in practical electronics 
is merely pF and nF (10-12 and 10-9 Farad) . Although it was patented in 19284, it was not until 
the 1970s that electrolyte capacitors, in which one of the plates was a conductive liquid called 
electrolyte, began to spread . Owing to the electrolyte, these devices are polarized, so these can 
only be used in DC circuits, but in terms of magnitude their capacitance exceeds that of dry 
capacitors and falls in the μF range (10-6 or one millionth Farad) . The current energy of the ca-
pacitors is (3): W = ½CU22, that is to say, high energy goes with high voltage and capacitance . 
This already hints at the fact that the magnitude of energy stored by the largest devices with 
the highest capacitance manufactured for electronic purposes is only a few Joule making them 
unsuitable for providing the energy needed for the amount of work done .
Although the complete model of real capacitors is more complex, it is sufficed to include 
the below simple model as we are analysing only DC energy conditions . This model will 
prove to be useful later on: 
Figure 1: The simplified DC energy model of a capacitor (by the author)
2 Gergely I . Elektrotechnika . Budapest: General Press, 2006 .
3 The applicable term is ‘capacity’, and the term ‘capacitor’ is derived from this .
4 Dubilier, W . “Electric Condenser”, US Patent no . 468787 .
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In the model, the symbol RL represents the imperfection of the dielectric medium . If 
a charged capacitor is left alone leakage of charge occurs through the dielectric medium . 
The resulting leakage current IL slowly discharges the capacitor . ESR symbolizes the loss 
of energy experienced in the case of the intended discharge of the battery or in the form of 
increased temperature upon charging .
A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF SUPERCAPACITORS5  
AND THE PHYSICS BEHIND
First in the 1950s, General Electrics was experimenting with porous carbon electrodes to de-
velop traditional capacitors, batteries and fuel cells as the coiled surface of the carbon elec-
trodes formed an extremely large surface, which proved to be highly beneficial in these devic-
es . In a certain double-layer constellation, extraordinarily increased capacitance was detected . 
In 1957, a patent was also issued, but its true significance was not recognized at that time and 
the experiments were discontinued6. In 1966, Standard Oil of Ohio staff continued the work, 
and even though they wanted to develop fuel cells, they already realized the potential for ener-
gy storage lying in this technology6. Eventually, the first laboratory instruments appeared in the 
1970s, but it was not until the turn of the millennium that the production technology reached 
the level which made the technology available for the general public .
Figure 2: A typical commercially available supercapacitor (Source: lerablog.org)
About 80-90% of the commercially available supercapacitors belong to the category 
of electrical double layer capacitors, i .e . EDLC7 . The active carbon layer deposited on the 
electrodes and the electrolyte – given compact sizes – provide higher performance than the 
conventional capacitors do8 . Later on, I will compare the supercapacitors and their direct 
rival technology, the batteries . It is important to note that in EDLCs charges are stored with 
the help of chemicals, but only in a physical way, and in contrast to the batteries, there are no 
chemical transformations involved . The reason why this has been pointed out is that in the 
case of other forms of supercapacitors, the so-called pseudo-capacitors, this distinction is no 
5 Besides the term ‘supercapacitor’, the terms ‘ultracapacitor’, ‘supercap’ and ‘goldcap’ are also used in the Eng-
lish language literature .
6 Katsuhiko, N. and Simon, P. “New Materials and New Configurations for Advanced Electrochemical Capaci-
tors” . Electrochemical Society Interface 17/1 . 2008 . 34-37 .
7 Electric Double Layer Capacitor
8 Zhong, C . Electrolytes for electrochemical supercapacitors . Boca Raton: CRC Press, 2016 .
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longer obvious . In this case, the redox9 processes taking place on the surface of the carbon 
layer help bind charges8 .
Some experts think that with the developments in the near future besides keeping the ben-
eficial features of the supercapacitors, low self-discharge and high-power density properties of 
batteries can also be reached10 . In this article, it would not be fortunate to make predictions in 
this respect, so I will only examine the currently available supercapacitor technology . 
Figure 3: The structure of EDLC (Source: RS Components Hungary)
A COMPARISON OF SUPERCAPACITORS AND BATTERIES 
In order to be able to find the place of supercapacitors among the various modes of power 
storage, they need to be compared with the most common available technology, namely with 
batteries . As it has been mentioned above, chemical processes take place in batteries when 
charging or discharging11 . These processes, however, are never 100% as electrodes wear out, 
the battery ages, and loses capacity during each and every charge-discharge cycle12 . A bat-
tery can be regarded as depleted, if its capacity falls below 80% of the nominal value . This 
varies from one battery technology to another, but this generally occurs after 103 cycles . 
In contrast, the aging of capacitors based on physical processes is minimal, generally with 
a lifetime of at least 106 cycles . As opposed to physical processes, chemical processes are 
highly dependent on the temperature of the environment . It is a well-known fact that while 
the parameters of batteries deteriorate in line with the decrease of temperature, capacitors are 
9 Reduction – oxidation
10 Guerra, M . “Can Supercapacitors Surpass Batteries for Energy Storage?” Electronic Design, 16 August 2016 . 
http://www .electronicdesign .com/power/can-supercapacitors-surpass-batteries-energy-storage, Accessed on 22 
January 2018 .
11 The dry battery is an electrochemical storage device, but as there is only one cycle, this technology cannot be 
regarded as a direct rival to supercapacitors .
12 Végvári Zs . “Akkumulátorok a gyalogos lövészkatonák felszerelésében, a fejlesztés lehetséges irányai” . Műsza-
ki Katonai Közlöny 26/2 . 2016 . 85-101 .
 https://mkk.uni-nke.hu/document/mkk-uni-nke-hu/2016_2_007_Vegvari%20Zsolt.pdf
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significantly less susceptible to this, in the case of certain types the temperature/ capacitance 
graph is basically a straight line .
Despite the above-mentioned non-beneficial properties, the market of electric storage devic-
es is still dominated by batteries . There are two reasons for this: one being that the energy density 
(i .e . the energy that can be stored in unit mass or volume) of batteries largely exceeds that of 
the supercapacitors, and the other being the self-discharge . To explain this, the model shown in 
Figure 1 should be invoked and applied to electrochemical storage devices . The magnitude of 
the leakage current in the case of batteries and supercapacitors follows a voltage-dependent and 
temperature-dependent curve, but while in the case of batteries it usually takes months for the 
charge to drop below 80%, in the case of supercapacitors it is usually a matter of hours13 . 
It is the dimension of power density (i .e . how much power it can deliver at a given 
moment) in which supercapacitors perform very well . To understand this, we need to look 
at the model in Figure 1 again . When charging and discharging, the device has a so-called 
internal resistance, in other words, equivalent serial resistance (ESR) . This resistance needs 
to be overcome by the charging and discharging current . For batteries, this value is typically 
around 100mΩ, whereas for supercapacitors this value falls between 100µΩ and 1mΩ (for 
the time being let us calculate with the least beneficial value of 1mΩ). Let us suppose, that 
our devices (one battery and one supercapacitor) are charged to the same voltage value level 
(now let this be 2V) and discharged with 0 .1, then 1, 10, and 100A .
Applying Ohm’s law, the voltage on the internal resistance can be calculated as follows 
(4): U=IR, and the thermal dissipation on the resistance is (5): P=IU. If relation (4) is insert-
ed into the latter, one ends up having the relation (6): P=I2R . If the generated heat output is 
entered into a table, the below can be seen:
Table 1: Thermal dissipation at various discharging currents in a battery  
and in an EDLC (by the author)
ESR Current 0,1A 1A 10A 100A
Battery 100mΩ Thermal 
Dissipation
1mW 100mW 1W 1kW
EDLC 1mΩ 10µW 1mW 100mW 10W
It is even more interesting, if one takes a look at how much voltage out of the nominal 
voltage of 2V falls on the internal resistance and the load:
Table 2: Voltage on internal resistance at various discharging currents in a battery and in an 
EDLC (by the author)
ESR Current 0,1A 1A 10A 100A
Battery 100mΩ Voltage at 
ESR
10mV 100mV 1V –
EDLC 1mΩ 100µV 1mV 10mV 100mV
It can be clearly seen that if higher performance is required from the device, the battery 
starts to warm up drastically, and less and less voltage is delivered to the load . In this case, 
100A cannot be obtained from the 2V cell, whereas the supercapacitor – besides tolerable 
13 Yu, A ., Chabot, V . and Zhang, J . Electrochemical supercapacitors for energy storage and delivery: fundamentals 
and applications . Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 2013 .
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loss of heat – can still supply the load with 1 .9V . It is also true that the battery under 1A 
constantly maintains 1 .9V until total discharge while the voltage of the supercapacitor con-
tinuously decreases . 
What if we want to charge our devices? The faster we want to charge a device, the bigger 
charging current we use . While in the case of the battery voltage higher than the nominal 
value has to be switched on due to the big internal resistance, the supercapacitor can practi-
cally be charged with the nominal voltage . The increase of charging current and that of the 
voltage are hindered by the fact that the high temperature generated by dissipation damages 
the device . As a result, charging batteries is a quite time-consuming process .
The chargeability of the supercapacitor is hardly limited by dissipation, due to meagre 
internal resistance one can expect a linear charging curve, and the following formula can be 
applied: (7): I=C*dU/dt [8, p. 284]. Assuming that our supercapacitor is 100 Farad and is 
charged with 10A, its voltage increases by 100 mV per second, thus it can be charged within 20 
seconds . If 100A charging current is applied, the duration of charging is altogether 2 seconds . 
Table 3: A comparative overview of basic battery and EDLC technologies (by the author)
Equipment
Cubage- 
related  
Energy 
Density
Mass-relat-
ed Energy 
Density
Power Density Temperature Dependency
Life-
time
Self-dis-
charge
Ba
tt
er
y
Pb acid 100- 150 kJ/l 90-100 kJ/kg 150-200 W/kg significant
500 
cycles
4-6% 
per 
month
NiCd, 
NiMH
500- 
1000 kJ/l 30-500 kJ/kg 200-1000 W/kg very strong
1-2000 
cycles
20-30%
per 
month
Li-ion 2000-2500 kJ/l
800- 
1000 kJ/kg 300-350 W/kg very strong
500-
1500 
cycles
2-3%
per 
month
LiFePO4 6-700 kJ/l 3-400 kJ/kg 150-200 W/kg significant
2-4000 
cycles
3-4%
per 
month
ED
LC
porous 
graphene 5-700 kJ/l 30-40 kJ/kg 10-15 kW/kg
minimal 10
5-106 
cycles14
5-25%
per hourgraphite-
oxide15
800- 
1000 kJ/l 40-50 kJ/kg 15-20 kW/kg
MILITARY APPLICABILITY OF SUPERCAPACITORS 
It can be stated that batteries are preferably to be used under circumstances where there is no 
possibility for charging, and besides this, in fields where it is important to store energy given 
the smaller mass and volume . Military applications of batteries include radio appliances, 
lamps or most electricity powered devices and equipment . 
14 Since one million cycles are difficult to interpret, and due to the short duration of cycles their use is basically 
constant, the duration of supercapacitors is usually given in hours, which is minimum 10,000 hours .
15 The term is used in an abbreviated form, the complete name of the technology is activated microwave exfoliated 
graphite oxide (a-MEGO)/1-ethyl-3-methylimidazolium bis(trifl uoromethylsulfonyl)imide.
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Where to use supercapacitors then? In applications where the charge can more or less 
be maintained continuously, but at times we want to obtain enormous amounts of energy 
impulsively in a very short period of time . Today, in cutting edge (sometimes pilot) systems 
these areas of application already exist . Although it is not widely known, supercapacitors 
have already set their feet in military technology . Let us take a look at these systems . 
1. Laser weapons 
Laser weapons no longer exist only in science fiction. The United States, Russia and presum-
ably China have systems with which enemy aircraft, ballistic missiles and anti-ship ballistic 
missiles are destroyed with a laser beam16 . It is apparent that the energy needed is generated 
by a generator rotated by the engine of the aircraft or that of the ship, but how the energy is 
transmitted to the weapon . In the case of a fast-moving distant target (i .e . an aircraft, not to 
mention a missile), it is not possible to hold the laser beam on the target, therefore, the en-
ergy that can destroy the target must be delivered in the form of single radiation that occurs 
in some milliseconds. Such type of ‘firing’ laser, which does not only disrupt the navigation 
of the target but it also destroys it, presupposes approximately 10-100kW impulse perfor-
mance . Currently, only supercapacitors are capable of accumulating electric power for a few 
seconds and delivering it in a matter of milliseconds . 
Figure 4: USS Portland belonging to San Antonio-class will certainly be equipped with the laser 
(shown in the picture) developed against sea skimming anti-ship missiles17 
16 Ványa L . Irányított energiájú fegyverek . Budapest: Nemzeti Közszolgálati Egyetem, 2013 .
17 Insinna, V . “US Navy’s next amphibious warship to get laser weapon”, Defense News, 10 January 2018 . https://
www .defensenews .com/digital-show-dailies/surface-navy-association/2018/01/10/navys-next-amphibious-war-
ship-to-get-laser-weapon/, Accessed on 20 January 2018 .
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2. Electromagnetically accelerated projectiles, i.e. railgun 
The situation with the railgun is similar . What makes this weapon interesting is that while the 
laser proves to be efficient against flying objects (most of the aircrafts and the missiles are 
not armoured, in addition, minor damage can entirely cripple a fast-moving object), railgun 
is efficient against bunkers and tanks. The kinetic energy of the 12.7 kg projectile hitting 
the target at multiple sound speed corresponds to the impact of several kilograms of TNT18 .
“The introduction of the railgun was postponed in the last minute supposedly due to 
financial reasons, but based on the current state of the weapon, it is already deployable and 
commensurate to similar-purpose conventional ship cannons in efficiency. On the basis of 
the published results, the ready-made railgun is capable of launching 10 HVP type projec-
tiles per minute at an approximate 7 .5 times the sound speed (7 .5 Mach) . This means nearly 
40 MJ of muzzle energy for which – ignoring the losses – a capacitor capable of delivering 
minimum of 200MW electrical power is needed. Taking the planned firing speed into con-
sideration, one charging cycle takes 5-6 seconds, and the required 40-50MW power demand 
puts an immense burden on the electrical system of the carrying platform . By comparison, 
if all electrical appliances of an average household are simultaneously switched on, only 
4-6 kW is required meaning that the power demand of the railgun commensurate with that 
of a small town”19 .
Figure 5: One of the first test shootings of the Railgun (Bae Systems)
18 Végvári Zs . “Elektromágnesesen gyorsított lövedékek a tüzérség eszköztárában, A Bae Systems EM railgun-ja . 
1 . rész” . Haditechnika 51/1 . 2017 . 28-31 . DOI: 10 .23713/ht .51 .1 .06
19 Végvári Zs . “Elektromágnesesen gyorsított lövedékek a tüzérség eszköztárában, A Bae Systems EM railgun-ja . 
2 . rész” . Haditechnika 51/2 . 2017 . 18-22 . DOI: 10 .23713/ht .51 .2 .04
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3. Catapults of aircraft carriers 
Experts from the few countries deploying aircraft carriers have been long waiting for the 
introduction of the electromagnetic catapult because the currently used steam catapult 
has many weaknesses . The steam powered catapult is very big in size, rather heavy, and 
a very complicated system . For seawater is an extremely aggressive corrosion agent, the 
necessary steam is developed from desalinated water, and desalination is a very ener-
gy-intensive process . The system is supplied with the steam from the turbines, thus there 
is no need for heating a separate boiler, but constant level of pressure must be maintained 
in the system to ensure preparedness, moreover, between two launches it takes quite a 
lot of time for the system to reach the proper level of steam pressure again . Power need-
ed for the aircraft of various weights can only be roughly controlled, and the enormous 
pulling force puts a big strain on the structure of the aircrafts . In addition to this, the 
high-pressure hot steam runs the high risk of causing accidents, plus the system also has 
high maintenance needs20 .
The latest super aircraft carrier of the United States, the USS Gerald Ford (CVN-78), 
currently undertaking its sea trials, is equipped with electromagnetic launch units or systems 
(EMALU or EMALS21) replacing the steam catapult . Despite the many initial problems, in 
principle, these are free of the shortcomings of the steam catapult . Here, the energy needed 
for the launch is stored kinetically in huge rotating rotors . It is obvious that research and de-
velopment will be focused on the possible substitution of mechanical parts with high space 
and maintenance needs22 .
Figure 6: USS Gerard Ford with EMALS (General Atomics)
20 Allamadani, R . and Chen, F . “Electromagnetic Aircraft Launching Unit (EMALU)” . Presentation . ASEE 2014 
Zone, Bridgeport, 2014 .
21 Electromagnetic Launch Unit/System
22 Yu, Chabot and Zhang . Electrochemical supercapacitors for energy storage and delivery…
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4. Vehicle drive train 
More and more experts are dealing with hybrid and purely electricity driven vehicles . At the 
current level of technology, only batteries can store the energy needed in such vehicles, but 
supercapacitors can improve a few parameters of the system . As it has been pointed out ear-
lier, at a higher load the loss of batteries significantly grows, thus, in theory a supercapacitor 
functioning as a buffer can have beneficial effects on the efficiency of the system23 . 
As the energy density and power density of the batteries deteriorate at low temperatures, 
a buffer supercapacitor would provide the starting current needed for the cold-start of a 
conventional diesel engine . The so-called hybrid batteries produced for such purposes are 
currently available24 .
Figure 7: The well-proven Oshkosh HEMTT is also available with electric drive (TruckTrend)
The American Oshkosh Corporation known for its military vehicles went even further . 
The newest, electricity powered version of the HEMTT25 military vehicle – first produced 
35 years ago – has been available in its product range since 2011 . HEMTT A3 is equipped 
with a 470LE Cummins diesel engine, which does not only drive the wheels but it also drives 
a 340kW generator which constantly charges a series of supercapacitors of 1 .9 MJ nominal 
capacitance, and drives four AC engines of 480V (one per each axle) through an inverter26 . 
23 Mihalczuk, M ., Grzesiak, L . M . and Ufnalski, B . “A lithium battery and ultracapacitor hybrid energy source for 
an urban electric vehicle” . Przeglad Eelektrotekniczny 88/4 . 2012 . 158-162 .
24 “Maxwell Technologies Engine Starting Module” . Maxwell Technologies . http://www .maxwell .com/esm/de-
fault .aspx, Accessed on 22 January 2018 .
25 Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck
26 Thompson, J . “The Diesel-Electric Hybrid HEMTT A3 Lean by OSHKOSH – Diesel Power Magazine” . Truck 
Trend . 1 July 2011 . http://www .trucktrend .com/cool-trucks/1107dp-diesel-electric-hybrid-hemtt-oskosh-a3/, 
Accessed on 28 November 2017 .
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Oshkosh claims that the ProPulse version consumes 20% less fuel than the diesel driven 
version with the same capacity, but this is not the most remarkable novelty of the system . 
With the help of the supercapacitor, the ProPulse is suitable for supplying military facilities, 
communication stations, military medical units, etc . with medium-level consumption needs, 
but it is also capable of launching a 120kW electric power-impulse making it an ideal plat-
form for radars, land-based laser or railgun weapon systems .
Figure 8: The structure of HEMTT ProPulse (A – generator, B – diesel engine,  
C – supercapacitors, D – AC engines, TruckTrend)
CONCLUSION 
Today it is not always the military research and development that represents the leading edge 
of innovation. It is sufficed to take the smart devices, IoT, or electromobility as an example. 
Society’s ever-growing demand for electric power and desire for mobility are a lot stronger 
than the demand of the armies . As a consequence, one of the most intensely researched 
fields of science has been the storage of electric power. Everyone wants to have a storage 
device, which has properties such as huge capacity, high power output and increased resist-
ance to the cold . At this moment, it cannot be foreseen if there will be batteries capable of 
power output similar to that of supercapacitors, or there will be supercapacitors with higher 
capacity and with the ability of staying charged for months . Hybrid batteries may spread . It 
is certain that supercapacitors are already here, and other technologies are not suitable for 
meeting special military needs at the moment . In all likelihood, supercapacitors will be more 
frequently used in the armed forces in the future .
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ABSTRACT: The establishment of a safe, secure and predictable environment combined with 
a capable legislation and operational key infrastructures is the only possible way for COIN 
forces to permanently isolate the insurgents from the populace and to gain their support. 
This can only be achieved through the combined and simultaneous utilization of skilled 
and proficient security forces and by administrative, economic, social development.
KEYWORDS: asymmetric, insurgency, COIN, innovation, critical infrastructure, normative 
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INTRODUCTION
Since the beginning of written history there have been numerous conflicts and small wars 
that were not waged between two states, but between a state and a non-state actor . Since in 
many cases there were huge inequalities between the belligerents’ relative military and com-
bat power, the warring parties were forced to use significantly different tactics and strategies 
to defeat their opponents thus as an outcome these conflicts were asymmetric in nature. If we 
take a good look at the proportion of symmetric and asymmetric wars of all armed struggles 
in the second half of the 20th century and in the first seventeen years of the 21st century, we 
can clearly identify that most of the conflicts were asymmetric (Vietnam, Cuba, Afghanistan, 
Iraq, Syria, Nigeria) .1 By analysing the asymmetric conflicts throughout the last 200 years, 
the following tendency can be seen . For the entire 200 years, it can be stated that 70 .8 per-
cent of the asymmetric conflicts were won by the stronger (the state) warring party. But by 
dividing the era into 50-year intervals the result is a lot more diversified. Between 1800 and 
1849 88 .2 percent, between 1850 and 1899 79 .5 percent during the 1900-1949 period 65 .1 
percent and between 1950 and 1998 only 45 percent of the asymmetric conflicts were won 
by the stronger party .2
Based on the above analysis it can be unambiguously stated that the closer we are to our 
present day, the less successful the stronger party has become in achieving its’ strategic goals 
and the more successful the weaker party has been in asymmetric conflicts. The decreasing 
1 Read, D. “Airpower in COIN: Can Airpower Make a Significant Contribution to Counter-Insurgency?”. Defence 
Studies 10/1-2 . 2010 . 126 . DOI: 10 .1080/14702430903392828, Accessed on 20 December 2010 .
2 Arreguín-Toft, I. “How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict”. International Security 26/1 . 
2001 . 96-97 . https://web .stanford .edu/class/polisci211z/2 .2/Arreguin-Toft%20IS%202001 .pdf, Accessed on 04 
January 2018 .
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success of the nation states is what makes it extremely substantial to draw the attention of 
politicians, military leaders, and scholars to this type of armed struggles . Therefore, mili-
tary leaders and scholars must constantly analyse these asymmetric conflicts, to draw new 
conclusions, and to come up with new ideas and theories how regular armies combined with 
special operation forces and civilian advisors can efficiently combat this irregular enemy.
There are many theories, books and even military doctrines written about how our mil-
itary power should be used to defeat an enemy that uses insurgency, terrorism and guerrilla 
methods as their primary tactics . The leading doctrine for the US Military Forces on how to 
operate against an insurgent force – the 2007 United States Army and Marine Corps Field 
Manual (FM) 3-24 Counterinsurgency – whose making was coordinated and overlooked by 
General David Petraeus and David Kilcullen mentions two different types of approach to 
defeating insurgencies . With the enemy-focused approach, which mainly concentrates on 
hunting down the insurgents, COIN3 forces are not able to accomplish their assigned tasks 
most of the time . Instead of killing the enemy the focus should rather be on isolating the 
insurgents from the population and on improving their living standards . In opposition to 
Maslow’s hierarchy of needs – which states that the most important necessities for mankind 
are the physiological needs – in COIN operations the emphasis should rather be focused 
primarily on the security of society .
Figure 1: Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs4 
Foremost the security of the populace must be guaranteed and only after that – or par-
allel with it – can the emphasis be put on the development of critical infrastructures such as 
healthcare, road-system, public utility, communication systems and good governance which 
is free from corruption .
3 Counter Insurgency
4 “Needs for Lifestages” . http://needsforlifestagessmhs .weebly .com/maslows-pyramid4 .html, Accessed on 24 
January 2018 .
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SOME VERY SHORT CASE-STUDIES
On September 10, 2009, a patrol was sent out from the American-led Jalalabad5 PRT6 in 
Dara-i-Nur District, Nangarhar Province, Afghanistan to handover a hydro plant to the locals 
in a remote area of the district . On the way, back from the ceremony the US convoy was 
ambushed by RPGs7 and small arms fire. It did not require a great effort from the attackers to 
choose the location of the ambush since the Afghan hills and the sparse road network made 
the movements of the Americans predictable and forced them to use the exact same road 
whenever they wanted to get to and from their base to this part of the district . Still, the site 
of the attack did not help the accomplishment of a successful ambush, because it was too 
far from the road for the RPGs and for the machine guns to lay down an effective fire on the 
MRAPs8 or on the dismounting soldiers . The execution of the attack was also half-hearted 
and lacked professionalism because the attackers did not make serious effort to block the 
road or to blow up the bridge to halt the American convoy. They chose firing positions on 
the forward slope of the mountain making their own withdrawal nearly impossible and giv-
ing away their own positions by the dirt that the RPGs kicked off by firing them. Most of 
the soldiers travelling in the convoy and their military leaders believed that the Taliban was 
responsible for conducting the attack, but deeper analysis revealed that this was not the case .
Dara-i-Nur district, where the ambush took place has never been supportive towards the 
Taliban not even during the era when they were in power throughout the country . Further-
more, no Taliban activity had ever been reported or observed by any coalition, allied or local 
forces and indigenous inhabitants in the region before this attack happened . This district is 
inhabited mainly by Pashai people who are not supporters of the central government9 but 
they do not provide support for the Taliban either, which is mainly Pashtun . Locals did not 
tolerate outsiders in their area and it was almost impossible to for the Taliban to operate in 
this region without the knowledge of the locals . It would have not made any sense either for 
the Taliban to insert some forces to the region since there were only a couple of weeks left 
until winter season arrived which would have locked them in this zone isolated from their 
base areas or safe havens in Pakistan . In conclusion, all the evidence collected and analysed 
by the investigators suggested that the ambush was not conducted by the Taliban so they 
turned their attention towards the mission that the PRT personnel were conducting that day .
The main objective of the mission was to hold a handover ceremony where the engi-
neers and US military personnel from the Jalalabad PRT would officially put in operation 
a hydro plant which could provide electricity for half of the village . The intent of this con-
struction was not only to improve the living standard of the locals but also to give them work 
opportunity on the construction site with which the goal was to provide alternative revenue 
streams to farmers other than growing and selling poppy . Next to the hydro plant another 
5 Capital of Nangarhar Province, Afghanistan
6 Provincial Reconstruction Team – the first PRT emerged in an ad hoc way but a couple years later PRTs were 
common throughout Afghanistan and they were all part of a multinational reconstruction effort. PRTs included 
civilian and military specialists responsible for providing guidance for the provincial leaders in order to facilitate 
nation building and economic growth and good governance .
7 Rocket Propelled Grenade
8 Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles
9 Almost no tribes or inhabitants of any districts were supportive to the central government this deep in the coun-
try . Most of the time these tribes lived separated from all other tribes and they only wanted and still just want to 
be left alone .
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project – the building of a slaughterhouse – was also ongoing further increasing the living 
standard and job opportunities of the local inhabitants . Neither of these projects were done 
in the central area of the province but in a peripheral zone and the attack did not happen near 
the construction sites . Since the ambush site was close to the district centre and tactically it 
was not performed in a professional manner made the analysts think that the attack was not 
conducted by a well-organized insurgent force like the Taliban but rather by local inhabitants 
unsatisfied with the fact that a certain part of their province gets infrastructures that improve 
the living standards of the nearby populace while leaving the central area of the province 
completely out of the development process .10
A similar incident happened in Helmand province where the security guards of a road 
construction were attacked and killed by locals just because the constructors did not con-
sult them whether they needed the road or not and because they did not hire local workers 
and security personnel from the surrounding villages but they got the job done by foreign 
workers . Besides there was a Taliban opposition to the construction of the road too since de-
veloped road systems and well-maintained high-speed avenues of approaches make it easier 
for bigger armies to manoeuvre and by this, roads make defeating insurgency and governing 
a lot easier . So, insurgents and locals had a common interest in this case which made them 
cooperate to stop the construction .11
A third incident to underline my point happened in Wanat where a US PRT intended to 
build a road into a valley. This valley was a traditional buffer zone between two hostile pop-
ulation groups the Nuristanis and Safi Pashtuns. In this case the locals and the Taliban also 
had a shared interest since the locals did not want the road to be built because it kept them 
isolated from their historical enemies and helped them keep their autonomy from the central 
government while the Taliban opposed this avenue because it would have brought ANA12 
and US troops in striking distance to their major infiltration routes to and from their bases.13
From the above-mentioned examples, it can be stated that critical infrastructures or the 
lack of critical infrastructures may have a significant role in COIN operations. On the one 
hand, for a weakened or not yet properly operating central government – with the primary 
mission of nation building – or for an occupying force the creation and maintenance of systems 
like a well-maintained road network, healthcare, public utility, communication systems and 
corruption free governance are vital to win the support of the population . On the other hand, 
for an insurgent group opposing the power of the central government the destruction or the pre-
vention of improving these systems may go hand in hand with success . As in Helmand prov-
ince and in the city of Wanat the Taliban did not want the roads to be built because they would 
have made high speed avenues of approaches for highly mobile mechanized government units 
with enormous firepower which would or could have resulted in catastrophic consequences for 
the insurgents . By the government being able to send and successfully use extremely mobile 
forces in great number, the freedom of movement and the capability to execute attacks would 
have been seriously limited for the insurgents . It is also not favourable for rebellious forces to 
let COIN forces build any other kind of infrastructures – such as hydro plants – because as the 
government improves the living standard of the population the inhabitants would slowly but 
10 Kilcullen, D . Out of the Mountains, The Coming Age of the Urban Guerrilla. New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2015 . 3-10 .
11 Kilcullen . Out of the Mountains. 10-11 .
12 Afghan National Army
13 Kilcullen . Out of the Mountains. 11-12 .
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surely turn away from the guerrilla forces . The long-term objective for the government or the 
COIN forces is to assume full responsibility and accountability for the vital services .
From the inductions derived from the Jalalabad, Helmand and Wanat examples it can 
be stated that the defeat of an insurgency does not always primarily depend on the number 
of insurgents killed in kinetic direct actions but also on how the government or COIN forces 
can improve the living conditions of the population .
“A REVOLUTIONARY WAR IS 20 PERCENT MILITARY ACTION  
AND 80 PERCENT POLITICAL!”14
There are two main kinds of approaches to counterinsurgency operations . One – which by 
most of the field manuals, essays, and books is referred to as the enemy-centric counterinsur-
gency approach – puts the focus on the elimination or killing of hostile guerrilla forces . The 
other – and in most of the cases the more effective way of fighting insurgency – is a more 
indirect method which is usually referred to as the population-centric approach .
The primary goal of every COIN force is to make an area – which may be part of a coun-
try, or even an entire county – free of insurgents. If a COIN force has a sufficient number 
of troops, then it is a relatively easy task to drive away, kill or capture the key leaders, the 
hardliners, and the fighting elements or cells of an insurgent movement. The challenge has 
always been in keeping the cleared area free of insurgents and in preventing the guerrillas 
from re-infiltrating, so that COIN forces may move to other areas – or in case of a third party 
to withdraw to their own countries – and to hand over security tasks to local police forces .
With the enemy-centric approach where COIN forces focus almost exclusively on kill-
ing guerrillas, the goal of keeping an area free of insurgents permanently is almost unachiev-
able .15 It is not feasible because while it is relatively easy to disperse and to expel insurgent 
forces from a certain zone, it is almost impossible to destroy their political organizations and 
their ideology and to rally the bulk of the population by purely military actions .16 Political 
organizations may be temporarily destroyed by intensive police actions, but it is still impos-
sible to prevent the return of the guerrillas and to prevent them from re-establishing their 
political parties unless the population cooperates with and provides support to the COIN 
forces . If most of the population sponsors and assists the insurgents it is preposterous for 
COIN forces to believe in success . Therefore, guerrilla forces focus on obtaining and keep-
ing the support of the populace by either coercive or non-coercive means . As Mao Zedong 
said guerrillas cannot operate without the help of the population:
It is only undisciplined troops who make the people their enemies and who, like the fish 
out of its native element cannot live .17 
Therefore, the focus should be on draining the sea,18 which means that the main ob-
jective for COIN forces – just as well as for insurgents – should be the population . This 
15 Resperger, I ., Kiss, Á . and Somkuti, B . Aszimmetrikus hadviselés a modern korban. Budapest: Zrínyi Kiadó, 
2013 . 225-226 .
16 Galula . Counterinsurgency Warfare. 52
17 Zedong, M . “The Political Problems of Guerrilla Warfare” . In Zedong, M .: On guerrilla warfare. Maoist Doc-
umentation Project, Mao Tse-tung Reference Archive, 2000 . https://www .marxists .org/reference/archive/mao/
works/1937/guerrilla-warfare/ch06 .htm, Accessed on 23 March 2018 .
18 Zagorski, P . W . and Harmon, S . A . “The War on Terror: Separating the (Star) Fish from the Sea” . Freedom From 
Fear Magazine, issue 5. http://f3magazine.unicri.it/?p=419, Accessed on 22 March 2018.
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objective can only be accomplished through the population-centric counterinsurgency app-
roach which puts the emphasis mainly on the protection of the population and on the fulfil-
ment of their necessities . The easiest way to describe the basic needs of the commonwealth 
is through critical infrastructures – the existence of an operable healthcare, road-network, 
public utility, and communication system and a corruption free governance is vital to win 
the support of the populace . But even if the most advanced infrastructure system is run in 
a certain area, even if the inhabitants live in an outstandingly developed milieu, the most 
important aspect of meeting the needs of the population is a safe, secure and predictable 
environment . Progress in building support for the host nation government requires protect-
ing the populace. Thus, an effective political and economic action on the population must 
be preceded by military, secret service and police operations against the guerrilla units . If 
the population is not convinced that COIN forces have the will and the capabilities to defeat 
the insurgency, counterinsurgent forces will not be able to win the support of the populace . 
People who do not believe that they are secure from insurgent intimidation, coercion, and 
reprisals will not risk overtly supporting COIN efforts.19 A permanent victory can only be 
achieved through the physical (military, police actions) and the psychological (counter prop-
aganda, development of key infrastructures) isolation of the insurgents from the population 
and by addressing and eliminating the root causes of the insurgency . Military and police 
forces can compel obedience and secure areas, however, they cannot by themselves achieve 
the political settlement needed to resolve the situation . Thus, COIN operations should com-
bine offensive, defensive and stability operations to achieve a stable and secure environment 
needed for essential governance, essential services, and economic development .20
Figure 2: Essential services and their objectives21 
19 “Counterinsurgency” . Headquarters Department of the Army . December 2006 . 5-20 . http://usacac .army .mil/
cac2/Repository/Materials/COIN-FM3-24 .pdf, Accessed on 16 December 2017 .
20 “Counterinsurgency” . 5-2 .
21 “Counterinsurgency” . 5-15 .
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“POLITICAL POWER GROWS OUT OF THE BARREL  
OF A GUN”22 … BUT! 
Most of the time there are several groups who contest for the control of a community . Even 
when we talk about the different parties in democratic states trying to win the elections, or 
about warlords, guerrillas or insurgents fighting against each other or against the central 
government, there is always one thing that is common . It is almost never just one party, one 
group, band, gang or any kind of none state actor struggling to gain the upper hand over a 
certain part of the population, but several or at least two . That armed actor that the populace 
sees as the most competent to establish a resilient normative system23 by which this actor 
can provide security, project full-spectrum control over violence, control, conduct or even 
improve economic activities is most likely to prevail in gaining control .24 In other words, this 
means that whoever sets up rules that is correlated with a set of consequences with which the 
group can maintain a resilient system of control that gives people the sense of security, and a 
predictable and safe environment, is going to gain the support of the population . The empha-
sis here is on the “resilient, full-spectrum control”.25 Though for the groups fighting to gain 
the control over a certain populace being armed is critical, indispensable, and a priority it is 
not a sufficient characteristic. A very good example of it is Iraq in 2006-2007. Al Qa’eda in 
Iraq could enforce their will on a large number of inhabitants only by coercive means, but it 
did not prove to be long-standing . As soon as the Coalition Forces increased their presence 
in the insurgent-ruled area and the inhabitants realized that the foreign forces could protect 
them from the atrocities committed by the insurgents, moreover, they even provided social 
justice, work opportunities, a running healthcare, school and a workable public utility sys-
tem they turned their back on Al Qa’eda in Iraq and started supporting the Coalition Forces . 
During this period the number of Al Qa’eda fighters and followers dropped significantly 
and the organization almost ceased to exist . This was the case up until the President of the 
United States publicly announced that he was going to withdraw forces from Iraq . From 
that point on the locals knew, that the most competent group that would stay permanently 
in their region is Al Qa’eda in Iraq, which resulted in the loss of support for the Coalition 
Forces and slowly but surely helped the evolution of the Islamic State . In conclusion, it can 
be stated that every time when different groups struggle for the control over the population 
the actor that creates a better normative system of competitive control is likely to dominate 
the target audience .26
CONCLUSION
Military doctrines, books and articles written about counterinsurgency mention two differ-
ent types of method to fight against insurgents. The one which puts the emphasis primarily 
on killing the enemy and does not deal with the securement and the improvement of living 
standards of the population is usually not as effective as the population-centric counterinsur-
gency approach . The later tactic stresses the importance of meeting the basic and essential 
23 Alchourron, C . and Bulygin, E . Normative Systems. New York: Springer Verlag, 1971 . 53-59 .
24 Kilcullen, D . Counterinsurgency. New York: Oxford University Press, 2010 . 152-154 .
25 Kilcullen . Counterinsurgency. 152 .
26 Kilcullen . Out of the Mountains. 133 .
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necessities that individuals and communities need and which has long been identified in 
Maslow’s hierarchy of needs .
The establishment of a safe, secure, and predictable environment combined with a ca-
pable legislation and operational key infrastructures is the only possible way to permanently 
isolate the insurgents from the populace and to gain their support . This can only be achieved 
through the combined and simultaneous utilization of skilled and proficient security forces 
and by administrative, economic, social development .
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ABSTRACT: Developing and maintaining a healthy lifestyle is an important and up-to-date 
topic for the Hungarian Defence Forces, too. A health-conscious lifestyle, which helps 
achieve the mental and physical well-being of the soldiers of the Hungarian Defence 
Forces and increases their deployability, may be adopted with the help of intervention 
programmes focusing on lifestyle change. The Hungarian Defence Forces Body Compo-
sition Programme (hereinafter referred to as HDF BCP) was introduced in 2015 in accord-
ance with the above. According to Article 12 of Decree No. 10/2015 (VII.30.) of the Hun-
garian Ministry of Defence on medical, mental and physical fitness for military service 
and on the review procedure,1 a soldier who has different parameters than the physical 
recommendation must be offered a participation in the HDF BCP. Based on the starting 
body weight and body fat percentage of the soldier, a weight loss schedule is determined 
which is to be met every three months during a 12-month period. Within the framework 
of the Programme, this study examined the distribution of participants of the Programme 
according to the stages of the behavioural change process, on which the transtheoretical 
model (TTM) was based. According to the results of the literature, the effectiveness of the 
lifestyle change programs and the possible number of dropouts are greatly influenced by 
the stage of change in which participants are.
KEYWORDS: behaviour, health, Hungarian Defence Forces Body Composition Programme, 
lifestyle 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
By examining the process of behaviour change, we sought an answer to the question of how, 
through what processes, health-damaging behaviour is quit and new behaviour is developed .2
Prochaska, DiClemente and Norcross developed their transtheoretical model of behaviour 
change, which describes intentional behaviour change and was first used in the treatment of ad-
dicts, by integrating several cognitive and behaviour models, and pointed to the possible ways 
of acquiring positive behaviour .3 The model can demonstrate the processes that take place in 
the behaviour of an individual and can assign individuals to one of its stages . Practically, it can 
2 Urbán, R . Az egészségpszichológia alapjai. Budapest: ELTE, Eötvös Kiadó, 2017 . 325 .
3 Czeglédi E. “A viselkedésváltozás transzteoretikus modelljének alkalmazási lehetőségei az elhízás kezelésé-
ben” . Mentálhigiéné és Pszichoszomatika 13/4 . 2012 . 411-434 . DOI: 10 .1556/Mental .13 .2012 .4 .4
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be adapted to any disease or lifestyle change, making step-by-step communication easier and 
revealing information about emerging problems, e .g . on what level a person got stuck .4 
There is no “royal path” in the field of efficient weight loss intervention, either. Certain 
methods are very efficient for some obese individuals, whereas they are less efficient, or are 
even inefficient, for others. The reason for this, as Teixeira, Going, Sardinha and Lohman 
argue, is that the success of weight loss treatment depends on the characteristics of the treat-
ment and of the given individual, as well as on the interaction of these two . Patients starting 
lifestyle-changing therapies and weight loss treatments, and changing their physical activi-
ties, without being ready for the multiple changes that are required for an efficient lifestyle 
change affecting several areas of their life may play a role in their dropout.5 
PRESENTATION OF THE TRANSTHEORETICAL MODEL  
OF BEHAVIOUR CHANGE (TTM) 
The transtheoretical model of behaviour change (one that spans several theories) was orig-
inally introduced as an integration of the theories and concepts of clinical psychology to 
understand the process of change .6, 7, 8
TTM is an integrative model of behaviour change which encompasses process-orient-
ed variables to explain and predict when and how persons change their behaviour .9 They 
thought a model was needed which could be applied to the entire population, not only to 
those who are motivated to lose weight . 
STAGES OF BEHAVIOUR CHANGE 
The stages of behaviour change have already been described in detail .10 
1. Precontemplation 
People in this stage do not intend to change their physical activity, to lose weight, or to 
control their weight, in the foreseeable future (in the next six months) . The absence or 
inadequacy of information about the unfavourable consequences of overweight may play 
a role in the fact that people who lead an unhealthy lifestyle, and overweight people, do 
not see their excess weight as a problem . Previous, failed weight-loss attempts may also 
4 Prochaska, J . O ., DiClemente, C .C . and Norcross, J .C . “In search of how people change: Applications to addic-
tive behaviors” . American Psychologist 47/9 . 1992 . 1102-1114 .
5 Teixeira P .J ., Going S .B ., Sardinha L . B . and Lohman T .G . “A review of psychosocial pre-treatment predictors 
of weight control” . Obesity Reviews 6/1 . 2005 . 43–65 . DOI: 10 .1111/j .1467-789X .2005 .00166 .x
6 Prochaska, J . O . and DiClemente, C .C . “Transtheoretical therapy: Toward a more integrative model of change” . 
Psychotherapy: Theory, Research and Practice 19/3 . 1982 . 283 .
7 Prochaska, J . O ., DiClemente, C .C . and Norcross, J .C . “In search of how people change: Applications to addic-
tive behaviors” . American Psychologist 47/9 1992 . 1105 .
8 Prochaska, J . O ., Norcross, J .C . and DiClemente, C .C . Valódi újrakezdés. Hatlépcsős program ártalmas szoká-
saink leküzdésére és életünk jobbá tételére. Budapest: Ursus Libris, 2009 . 98 .
9 Johnson, S.S. et al. “Transtheoretical model-based multiple behavior intervention for weight management: Effec-
tiveness on a population basis” . Preventive Medicine 46/3 . 2008 . 238-246 . DOI: 10 .1016/j .ypmed .2007 .09 .010
10 Prochaska, J . O . and Prochaska, J .M . “Behavior change” . In D . B . Nash, J . Reifsnyder, R . J . Fabius and V . P . 
Pracilio (eds .), Population health: Creating a culture of wellness. Sudbury: Jones and Bartlett, 2011, 25 .
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discourage individuals and undermine their faith in their ability to change . People in this 
stage are not ready for traditional health promotion programmes; these just do not work 
for them . 
2. Contemplation 
Although people in the contemplation stage do not make any effort to lead an active lifestyle 
change or lose weight, they seriously contemplate starting it in the next six months . They are 
more aware of arguments for health promotion but arguments against change are also present 
to the same extent . The balance of advantages and disadvantages, which results in ambiva-
lence, leads to the fact that overweight people who avoid physical activities stay in this stage 
for a long time, contemplating over their problems and delaying action . People in this stage are 
not ready for traditional, action-oriented programmes which require immediate action, either . 
3. Preparation 
In this stage, people intend to start a health-conscious lifestyle, or to lose weight, in the near 
future, i .e . in the next month . Typically, they have already made some steps to achieve this 
goal (e .g . they use sweeteners instead of sugar, go for a walk after dinner from time to time, 
etc .) . People in this stage make action plans, e .g . they are planning to consult a specialist 
(general practitioner, life coach, dietitian, naturopathic practitioner), or read about diet . They 
are ready for change, and traditional, action-oriented health promotion programmes are like-
ly to work for them . 
4. Action 
People in the action stage are those who actively strive for changing their lifestyle or con-
trolling their body weight, and have achieved results in this field by clear, specific lifestyle 
changes; however, this has been taking place for less than six months . For example, they 
limit their daily energy intake to 1,700 calories, avoid fast food restaurants, eliminate sug-
ared soft drinks from their diet, do regular exercise, always walk instead of taking the lift, 
and chose an alternative activity (e .g . walking, jogging) instead of eating when they are 
tired, sad or distressed. All this requires enormous dedication and effort from an individual. 
Lifestyle changes and weight loss are usually evident for the individual’s environment as 
well, and that is when it gives the most appreciation, encouragement and support to the per-
son . We have to emphasize that action does not equal change . Several developments which 
are necessary to induce behaviour change (e .g . changes in self-image or thinking) take place 
in the pre-action stages . 
5. Maintenance 
Those people belong here who have maintained their achieved lifestyle change for at least six 
months . There is no consensus with respect to what changes are considered to be successful; 
this largely depends on how the given person perceives them in his own life . General charac-
teristics of this stage include that the person actively works on preventing relapse; he is less 
threatened by temptations; at the same time, he becomes more and more confident in his ability 
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to maintain the changes he has achieved so far11 . Although the above may be well explained 
and seem valid for several kinds of health-damaging behaviour (especially for smoking), it 
is less true for weight management . Weight control in obesogenic environments practically 
constantly requires resistance to temptation and demands permanent efforts in the field of diet 
limitations and physical activities . Consequently, the argument of Kristal et al .12 that the action 
and the maintenance stage with respect to diet change should be interpreted within the frame-
work of the development and persistence of cognitive and behavioural alertness connected 
to healthy food choices is justified and acceptable. In the stage of action, the person tries to 
acquire a number of new behaviours. With respect to specific behaviours, he may be in various 
stages of change at the same point in time . A person in the maintenance stage, however, has 
already acquired a sufficient number of behaviours to achieve the goal, but needs to check the 
changes and efforts in his new lifestyle to achieve long-term maintenance. In this context, fluc-
tuations between action and maintenance are to be perceived positively and not as a relapse . 
All these take us closer to the understanding of the characteristics of the maintenance stage in 
the context of behaviour change connected to lifestyle management . 
6. Termination 
In general descriptions of TTM, people in the stage of termination are no longer tempted, and 
their self-efficacy is 100%. No matter what their mood is, they will definitely not return to 
their previous health-damaging habits as a coping method . In accordance with the above, the 
termination stage seems less applicable to weight management because overweight people 
rarely achieve the healthy weight range . No matter how much weight they lose, maintain-
ing their weight and physical activities represent practically a lifelong challenge for them: 
they need long-term restrictions in eating and permanent energy input in physical activities, 
so maintaining the behaviour change requires constant efforts from the person;13 if due to 
nothing else but to inevitable weight gain that comes with ageing .14 Prochaska admit that in 
areas such as physical activity or weight control, the realistic goal is a lifelong persistence 
in the maintenance stage. They highlight that the termination stage gets much less emphasis 
in TTM research, partly because of the limitedness of its practical reality, and partly because 
it appears well after the end of the intervention .15 
Generally, only a relatively small proportion (mostly less than 20%) of the threatened 
populations are ready to act .16 However, readiness to change usually evolves in a more fa-
vourable way in the field of weight control. Time spent in the various stages shows high in-
dividual variability . It can take years, although the tasks required to step further are the same . 
In each stage, certain principles and change developments work most efficiently for re-
ducing resistance, promoting progress, and preventing relapse . Progress between the stages 
is not necessarily linear, since relapse is inevitable in the process of behaviour change.17
11 Prochaska and Prochaska . “Behavior change” . 29 .
12 Kristal, A . R . et al . “How can stages of change be best used in dietary interventions?” Journal of the American 
Dietetic Association 99/6 . 1999 . 681 . DOI: 10 .1016/S0002-8223(99)00165-0
13 Baranowski T . et al . “Are current health behavioral change models helpful in guiding prevention of weight gain 
efforts?”. Obesity Research 11 . 2003 . 34 .
14 Hu, F . B . Obesity epidemiology. New York: Oxford University Press, 2008 . 42 .
15 Prochaska and Prochaska . “Behavior change” .
16 Prochaska and Prochaska . “Behavior change” . 32 .
17 Prochaska, Norcross and DiClemente . Valódi újrakezdés… 103 .
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INTRODUCTION OF THE HDF BCP
The HDF BCP is a complex lifestyle change support programme, which provides professional 
assistance to soldiers committed to lifestyle change . The programme is adjusted to the partici-
pants’ needs, personal goals as well as physical condition and health. During the first consulta-
tion, the applicant’s goals, schedule and available resources are determined . Every participant 
– mainly cadre personnel and contract soldiers – receives a programme which sets realistic 
goals for the next 12 months and for which constant support is provided by experts working 
in the programme . The body composition recommendation introduced as a regulation by the 
Ministry of Defence 10/2015 . (VII . 30 .) is based on the US Army Body Composition Pro-
gram18 and is in accordance with the military health disciplines set in NATO doctrines as well 
as with the prevention policy and health promotion goals of the Hungarian Defence Forces .
Application is currently optional and free of charge . Soldiers whose body composition 
parameters differ from the recommended standards (see charts), need to be offered the pos-
sibility to enter the programme .
Chart N . Own editing: Maximum allowable weight
Chart O . Own editing:  Minimum and maximum recommended body fat percentage by 
age groups
Chart P . Own editing: Ideal BMI values by age groups
PROCEDURE 
During the first session, the participant’s lifestyle is assessed in detail both by objective, instru-
mental (body composition, cardiac stress, fitness) and subjective methods (questionnaire-type). 
For a successful programme, the participant’s level of motivation, reasons for their previous 
lifestyle change, successes and difficulties need to be understood and taken into consideration 
when forming new habits . Furthermore, more information is needed regarding possible chang-
es in the participant’s health so that the programme can have an optimal effect even in the pres-
ence of health deficits. The participant’s lifestyle is assessed by using SAQ (self-assessment 
questionnaire), which includes internationally accepted questions suitable for independent as-
sessment as well. The assessment is carried out before the first session. Within the 12-month 
programme, participants are re-evaluated every 3 months so as to introduce individual changes 
concerning both the diet and the exercise programme if necessary .
ASSESSMENTS 
The OMRON BF 511 type body composition monitor is used to assess changes in the 
body composition (body weight, BMI, body fat%, skeletal muscle%, visceral fat and rest 
metabolism) . Initial screenings are carried out monthly, later every three months . The 
professional analysis of body composition, nutrition and fitness is based on the BIA 500 
bio-electronic impedance analyser, where body fat, lean body mass, water content (intra- 
and extracellular fluid), cell ratio and phase angle are assessed and compared to the ideal, 
optimal and special targets. The documentation contains a written evaluation with figures 
18 “AR 600-9: The Army Body Composition Program” . 28 . June 2013 . http://www .wood .army .mil/sapper/docu-
ment_frames/ar600_9.pdf
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as well as detailed recommendations for the participants . The regular comparison of body 
composition assessment results enables us the evaluation and optimization of the diet and 
exercise programme . Medical treatment and diagnostic tests are not carried out in the 
programme .
The results provide a complex picture on the physical condition and nutrition of the 
participant, making the diet and exercise programme controllable . The aim is to reduce cal-
orie intake; therefore, the daily calorie intake will be prescribed during the sessions and 
participants will be given a one-week sample menu . The recommended daily calorie intake 
is based on the participant’s rest metabolism and amount of physical exercise . During the 
first 4 weeks of the programme, the daily calorie intake equals the resting metabolic rate and 
is later increased by +10%; this, of course, might change depending on the rate and speed of 
weight loss . The number of calories burnt during exercise is generally 250-350 kcal; partic-
ipants’ individual target pulse rate for exercising is also identified depending on their fitness 
level and body composition .
SAMPLE, METHODS, ASSUMPTIONS 
Sample 
In total, 68 persons participated in the examination (n=68). Their average age was 35 + 7,9 
years and, as for their gender distribution, the proportion of women was 56% . The respond-
ents were typically university graduates . Some participants have already had experience 
with one or more unsuccessful lifestyle change programmes . 
Methods 
We used a self-completion questionnaire in the research . We sought an answer to the follow-
ing question: In your opinion, where do you stand in the transition to a physical activity you 
consider more regular or to a diet you consider healthier?
The participants in the Programme had to select one of the five possible statements 
which were as follows .
1 .  I do not intend to shift to a physical activity I consider more regular or to a diet I con-
sider healthier in the next six months (precontemplation phase) .
2 .  I feel a strong urge to shift to a physical activity I consider more regular or to a diet 
I consider healthier (contemplation phase) .
3 .  In the next one month, I am going to take steps to shift to a physical activity I consider 
more regular or to a diet I consider healthier (preparation phase) .
4 .  During the last six months, I shifted to a physical activity I consider more regular or 
to a diet I consider healthier (action phase) .
5 .  I have been doing physical activities/eating more healthily for more than six months, 
and the chances of relapsing to my old habits are minimal (maintenance phase) . 
Assumptions
Concerning the study, the following assumptions have been formulated:
•   We have assumed that most of the participants in the HDF BCP are in the stage of 
preparation and /or action . 
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•   We have assumed that concerning physical activity, participants reached more ad-
vanced stages of behavioural change than in nutrition .
RESULTS 
Based on the results, we may establish that all the participants in the HDF BCP have already 
passed the precontemplation phase with respect to physical activity as well as a healthi-
er diet . This is understandable, since their application for the Programme must have been 
preceded by the precontemplation phase, for this is already a “second step” with respect to 
change. In the field of physical activity, the majority of the participants (34%) were in the 
contemplation phase, although many of them (30%) were already in the preparation phase . 
21% of the current participants were in the action phase, whereas the fewest of them (15%) 
were in the maintenance phase (Figure 1). 
Figure 1: Distribution of the HDF BCP participants according to TTM stages with respect  
to physical activity (N=66)
In the field of diet, the majority (32%) of the respondents were in the precontemplation 
phase, 28% were in the contemplation phase, and 27% ranked themselves into the action 
phase . 13% of the respondents were in the maintenance phase (Figure 2).
Figure 2: Distribution of the HDF BCP participants according to TTM stages with respect to diet 
(N=68)
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SUMMARY
Initially, it was assumed that the majority of the applicants would be in the stage of prepara-
tion and action concerning physical activity and healthy eating habits . Considering that the 
application in the HDF BCP is currently optional which assumes awareness of the problem 
and searching for solutions.This assumption was only partly justified, as regarding exercise, 
the majority of the applicants were still in the stage of contemplation; whereas regarding a 
healthy diet the majority of them were in the stage of preparation, some still in the stage of 
contemplation . It was also assumed that considering the profession itself – the personnel of 
the Hungarian Defence Forces have to undergo annual physical screening tests – the partici-
pants had reached more advanced stages of behaviour change concerning exercise than diet . 
This hypothesis failed, as a higher percentage of the participants were found in the stage of 
preparation concerning diet than concerning regular physical activity . A similar distribution 
of the participants can be found regarding both the increase of physical activity as well as 
developing/maintaining a healthy diet . It was found that while concerning physical activity, 
the majority of the participants were in the stage of contemplation, regarding diet change, 
they were in the stage of preparation . This is understandable if we consider that fact that 
while introducing or increasing the amount of regular physical activity in a person’s lifestyle 
requires extra time and energy, the time for eating is given . Regular dieting – in most cases – 
is part of everyday life, the change needed might be qualitative or quantitative, which might 
require less extra time and energy than the introduction of daily physical activity .
Appearance showing physical strength and stamina, which is part of military identity, 
cannot manifest itself in case the soldier’s body weight and body fat percentage are above 
the prescribed standards . This might decrease physical and medical aptitude as well as in-
dividual readiness . The HDF BCP – currently optional – provides complex professional 
support for the army personnel so that they can meet the body composition requirements, 
and last but not least, supports the development of health education policy in the Hungarian 
Defence Forces .19 Besides monitoring the participants, our aim is to identify the factors 
which need to be emphasized more in the programme (in our case the introduction of regular 
physical activity) as well as to support soldiers committed to a lifestyle change as effectively 
as possible . 
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ABSTRACT: This paper discusses the marketing strategy of ISIS to recruit its members includ-
ing locals and expats. It illustrates the military information support operations and tech-
nical tools used by insurgents while focusing on the recruitment strategy. 
The marketing analysis illustrates the recruitment strategy in marketing including open-
ing new markets and expanding existing markets as compared to guerrilla recruitment 
locally and globally. It provides an overview of the use of information operations by ISIS 
and it concludes with a description of the recruitment strategy.
KEYWORDS: ISIS, insurgents, marketing strategies, Information Operations, military infor-
mation support operations, cognitive dimensions 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
Information plays a vital role in military operations, and the new trends in warfare have 
resulted in an increased use in the information operations in the command, control, and 
execution of military operations . 
Information Operations are vital in modern warfare as it includes a wide variety of 
military operations that aims at influencing beliefs, feelings, and behavioural tendencies. 
According to the Joint Publication 3-13, “Information operations (IO) are described as the 
integrated employment of electronic warfare (EW), Computer network operations (CNO), 
psychological operations (PSYOP), military deception (MILDEC), and operations security 
(OPSEC), in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to influence, dis-
rupt, corrupt, or usurp adversarial human and automated decision making while protecting 
our own .”1 It integrates the application of force and the employment of information with 
the goal of affecting the perception, emotion, and attitude of adversaries. With this def-
inition in hand; the IO includes a wide variety of military tools related to the information 
operations and aims at ensuring a competitive advantage in the information environment . 
“The information environment is the aggregate of individuals, organizations, and systems 
that collect, process, disseminate, or act on information . This environment consists of 
1 “Joint Publication 3-13, Information Operations”. Washington, D.C., Government Printing Office, 2006. 10. 
https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=461648, Accessed on 12 August 2019 .
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three interrelated dimensions, which continuously interact with individuals, organizations, 
and systems . These dimensions are known as physical, informational and cognitive” .2 
The term IO has been evolving and the definition has been changing due to ambigu-
ities in the definitions provided. More clarity can be found by separating the functional 
domains of the IO: the technical domain and the functional domains associated with the 
PSYOP/MISO .3 
One of the main producers of actions within the IO is the PSYOP . “Psychological Op-
erations are planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign 
audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the 
behaviour of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals . The purpose of 
psychological operations is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behaviour favour-
able to the originator’s objectives .”4 
“Information operations are marketing communications”5 since marketing as in infor-
mation operations aims to influence a target audience. This paper illustrates this metaphor 
through an in-depth analysis of recruitment strategies of insurgents and more specifically 
of ISIS .
Marketing management is the art and science of choosing target markets and acquir-
ing, maintaining, and growing customers through creating, delivering, and communicating 
superior customer value .6 While there is a clear match between the objectives of marketing 
and information operations, the question lies in how the processes of each are correlated . 
This will help analyse how insurgents utilize the marketing communication strategies in 
their recruitment of new members .
The aim of this study is to point out the recruitment strategies of insurgents and more 
specifically of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), while comparing this strategy 
with the marketing strategies used in the business world . It utilizes the concepts of com-
mercial marketing strategies to understand insurgency operations . This paper analyses the 
Ansoff growth matrix7 with the insurgents’ recruitment strategies . Furthermore, it analyses 
the relationship between insurgency operations and marketing strategies to identify link-
ages that can help uncover the behaviour of insurgents .
INFORMATION OPERATIONS VS. MARKETING STRATEGIES
To be able to utilize civilian advertising and marketing in the IO, an analysis of the paral-
lelism between both should be examined . This section compares the IO with the marketing 
to be able to utilize the concepts . The analysis includes the comparison of the objectives, 
environment, target group, and strategies of both fields.
2 “Joint Publication 3-13, Information Operations” . 11 .
3 Porche I . R . et al . Redefining Information Warfare Boundaries for an Army in a Wireless World. Santa Monica, 
CA: RAND Corporation, 2013 . https://www .rand .org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/MG1100/MG1113/
RAND_MG1113.pdf
4 “Strategy for Operations in the Information Environment” . Department of Defense, USA . June 2016 . https://
www .defense .gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/DoD-Strategy-for-Operations-in-the-IE-Signed-20160613 .pdf .; 
“Joint Publication 3-13, Information Operations” . 2 .
5 Trent, S . and Doty, J . L . “Marketing: An overlooked aspect of information operations” . Military Review 85/4 . 
2005 . 71 .
6 Kotler, P . and Keller, K . Marketing Management. 14th ed . New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 2012 . 5 .
7 Ansoff, I. H. “Strategies for diversification”. Harvard Business Review 35/2 . 1957 . 113-124 .
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Objectives
In order to understand the objective of IO, the concept itself should be elaborated and ana-
lysed. IO is currently considered the key to successful operations; it uses different activities 
and capabilities to produce the intended effect. “The target of Information Operations is 
to influence the adversary decision maker and therefore the primacy of effort will be to 
coerce that person into doing or not doing a certain action .”8 In accordance with AJP-3 .10, 
Information Operations comprise “a staff function to analyse the IE, plan, synchronize and 
assess IA to create desired effects on the will, understanding and capability of adversaries, 
potential adversaries, enemies and NAC approved audiences in support of Alliance mission 
objectives .”9 By definition, IO includes both offensive and defensive activities.10  
In general, all definitions of IO state that it aims at affecting adversaries’ (target group) 
decision-making through different capabilities to shape and influence the information envi-
ronment. It uses all means of influence so that the targeted group behaves in accordance to 
their plan .
According to Kotler, marketing is “the science and art of exploring, creating, and deliv-
ering value to satisfy the needs of a target market at a profit. Marketing identifies unfulfilled 
needs and desires. It defines, measures, and quantifies the size of the identified market and 
the profit potential.”11 Similarly, the American Marketing Association (AMA) defines mar-
keting as “the set of activities, institutions and processes for creating, communicating de-
livering and exchanging offerings that have value for customers, clients.”12 These two defi-
nitions of marketing along with the many different definitions available present four main 
activities of marketing: Creating the process, Communicating, Delivering and Exchanging 
or Influencing. 
The objectives of both fields include physical, emotional and cognitive influence of the 
targeted audience to achieve the desired mission . It includes the ABC model of attitude in-
cluding: Affective component that involves feelings and emotions, Behavioural or conative 
component, and Cognitive that involves a person’s belief about an attitude object . They are 
both directing the targeted audience to act in accordance to their views . They are both work-
ing in the same structure: Create, Communicate, Deliver, and Exchange .
Environment
Whether it is an IO or a marketing field, analysis of the environment is much needed to 
start the initiative . In order to start an operation, an analysis of the self and the other party 
is needed . An analysis of the environment is critical, execution needs to be based on the 
physical aspects within the environment, the information available, and most importantly a 
8 Armistead, L . Information Operations: Warfare and the Hard Reality of Soft Power. Washington D . C .: Brassy’s, 
2004 . 8 .
9 NATO Standardization Agency (NSA) . “AJP-3 .10: Allied Joint Doctrine for Information Operations” . 2015 .; 
“Draft MC 0422/6: NATO Military Policy for Information Operations” . Working version as of 11 Sept 2018 . 
NATO . 4 . https://shape.nato.int/resources/3/images/2018/upcoming%20events/MC%20Draft_Info%20Ops.pdf
10 Armistead . Information Operations…
11 Neeraja, B ., Chandani, A . and Mehta, M . “Marketing: Past, Present and Future Theoretical Framework” . Inter-
national Journal of Advance Research in Computer Science and Management Studies 1/6 . 2013 . 198-201 .
12 “Definitions of marketing”. American Marketing Association. https://www.ama.org/the-definition-of-marketing/
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psychological analysis of the adversary. The question is: how is the environment defined in 
both fields?
The Information Environment (IE) is the aggregate of individuals, organizations, and 
systems that collect, process, disseminate, or act on information .13 According to NATO, the 
information environment consists of three domains: cognitive, virtual, and physical . The 
cognitive domain is where decisions are made, virtual domain is where intangible activity 
occurs and technical tools facilitate communication, and physical domain is the space where 
physical activities occur . The environment goes beyond the physical dimension to reach the 
cognition and emotion of decision makers .14
Different elements are incorporated in each of these environmental domains. The 
physical environment includes human beings, command and control facilities, pa-
per-based media, info-communication assets, computers etc . The information/virtual di-
mension is based and composed of information collected, processed, stored, disseminated 
and protected . The cognitive dimension includes the minds of individuals who receive 
and respond to the information .15 Information Operations use various means of physical 
environment to shape a targeted information environment to be able to change the target’s 
cognitive dimensions .
The marketing environment is categorized in two main domains: internal and exter-
nal; the external domain includes both micro-environment and macro-environment . The 
internal environment includes personnel, money, and resources within the organization . 
The micro-environment includes the stakeholders and customers, it includes the elements 
that have direct effect on the particular organization’s operations. The macro-environment 
includes the political, economic, technological, social, cultural, and legal competition; it 
affects the microenvironment of the organizations within the same market.16  
Although the categorization and analysis of the environment in both fields seem to be 
different, they both consider the same factors. The internal environment discussed in the 
marketing environment includes the physical and mental environment of the IO; the micro 
environment encompasses the physical and information environment of the IO; and the 
macro environment includes the political, economic, technological, social, cultural, legal 
and competition factors. The two fields work beyond the physical environment to affect 
the cognition of the customers and adversaries .
Strategies
IO planning is a process that examines external and internal planning requirements; it in-
cludes steps to carry out the mission from the conception through execution and follow-up 
assessment . Steps include assessment, planning and execution .17 PSYOP uses the SCAME 
13 “Strategy for Operations in the Information Environment” . Department of Defense, USA . June 2016 . 3 . https://
www .defense .gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/DoD-Strategy-for-Operations-in-the-IE-Signed-20160613 .pdf, 
Accessed on 14 August 2019
14 “Draft MC 0422/6: NATO Military Policy for Information Operations” .
15 Haig, Z . and Hajdu, V . “New Ways in the Cognitive Dimension of Information Operations” . Revista Academiei 
Fortelor Terestre 22/2 . 2017 . 94-102 . DOI: 10 .1515/raft-2017-0013
16 Kotler and Keller . Marketing Management.
17 Nissen, T . E . Tactical Information Operations in Contemporary COIN Campaigns: research paper. Copenhagen: 
Royal Danish Defense College, 2011 . http://www .fak .dk/publikationer/Documents/Tactical%20information%20
operations%20in%20contemporary%20COIN%20campaigns .pdf
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technique to analyse the propaganda of the opponents . This includes analysing the Source 
that is the individual, organization, or government that sponsors and disseminates the propa-
ganda; the Content that includes what the propaganda message says along with the objective 
of the message; Audience or target group of the message could be apparent, intermediate or 
unintended groups; Media that is the medium used and the capacity to use the medium; and 
Effects that is the most important but most difficult aspect of the propaganda that studies the 
impact of the propaganda .
Marketing strategies are identified and plans are developed to be able to execute mar-
keting operations . These plans help identify models and ways to bring the product or ser-
vice to the market . One of the well-known models is the 4P model that has been developed 
by E . Jerome McCarthy18 . The 4Ps are the product or service, place, price and promotion. 
This helps ensure putting the right service in the right place . The strategy as such helps 
understand what the product or service can offer and how to plan for a successful product 
offering. According to this model, the customer is the focal point; the value of the product 
is measured in accordance with the customers’ perceptions and the goal is to accomplish 
customer satisfaction and loyalty .19
“They decide, detect, deliver, and assess [IO] targeting cycle is, in fact, similar to the 
process many advertising agencies use: discover, define, design, and deliver.”20 This indi-
cates similar technique in strategizing for both fields.
INFORMATION OPERATIONS BY INSURGENTS
Although IO is a term that originated for the United States Military, this paper applies the 
term for the insurgents’ operations . Insurgents use technical and psychological mechanisms 
in their operations; they have developed their own strategies that have been promoted and 
adopted by other insurgents . “Insurgents are rational, strategic actors who attempt to opti-
mize the distribution of their attacks overtime in such a manner that the insurgents preserve 
their resources while maximizing the anti-war…”21 
Insurgency is the most prevalent type of armed conflicts. “Insurgency may be defined 
as a struggle between a non-ruling group and the ruling authorities in which the non-rul-
ing group consciously uses political resources, organizational expertise, propaganda and 
demonstration, and violence to destroy, reformulate, or sustain the basis of legitimacy of one 
or more aspects of politics .”22 
Although insurgency is a political and not a military struggle, it utilizes tools of struggle 
that are relevant to the tools used by the conventional forces . The tools used by insurgents 
18 In the 1960s, the American marketeer, E . Jerome McCarthy, provided a framework by means of the marketing 
mix: the 4P’s . The 4P’s include price, promotion, product and place, which is known as the basic marketing mix . 
The publication of McCarthy’s ‘Basic Marketing’ (1960) is widely cited as a fundamental approach .
19 Perreault, W . D . and McCarthy, E . J . Basic Marketing: A Global-Managerial Approach. 14th ed . Boston: 
McGraw-Hill, 2002 .
20 Trent, S . and Doty, J . L . “Marketing: An overlooked aspect of information operations” . Military Review 85/4 . 
2005 . 70-74 .
21 Kott, A . and Skarin, B . “Insurgency and Security” . In Kott, A . and Citrenbaum, G . (eds .), Estimating Impact: 
A Handbook of Computational Methods and Models for Anticipating Economic, Social, Political and Security 
Effects in International Interventions. Boston: Springer, 2010 . 239-262 .
22 O’Neill, B . E . Insurgency & Terrorism: From Revolution to Apocalypse. 2nd ed . Washington D . C .: Potomac 
Book Inc ., 2005 . 13 .
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expand beyond political and organizational to reach propaganda and deception . They com-
pete with those used by the national forces and sometimes they even win against them . 
“Insurgency since 2001 has proven that even a non-state actor can pursue the modest goal 
of area denial against vastly superior conventional armed forces, via asymmetric warfare .”23 
The nature of insurgency has evolved due to the ever-changing environment . Currently, 
insurgencies are not the single-party organization, like that of Mao or Ho Chi Minh . Insurgent 
organizations are composed of “loose coalitions” of local and global networks .24 These organ-
izations reflect the social organizations they come from. They operate locally and globally, 
they also operate through local and transnational organizations like the Afghans who fought in 
Bosnia .25 Taliban is another example that changed from being a purely local movement into a 
global jihadist community .26 Although many insurgent coalitions share a common battle, they 
need not have the same goals, each party can fight for its own cause. In Syria insurgency coali-
tions have different objectives ranging from forming a secular government to those which aim 
at forming a strict Islamic one; however, they form coalitions of insurgents .
Insurgencies are now adapting to the changing environment; many are “transdimen-
sional and transnational .”27 They are using electronic warfare, computer network operations, 
psychological operations, and military deception . They have moved from simple communi-
cations and propaganda to online recruitment, vetting of recruits, training, and e-marketing . 
They are using the social media widely and intensively .
Insurgencies have been able to create and sustain funds for their activities . Colin Clarke 
categorizes the insurgents’ financial activities into “grey activities”28 which include diaspora 
support, charities, fraudulent businesses, front companies, and money laundering; the other 
type is the “dark activities” which include kidnapping for ransom, robbery, smuggling or 
trafficking.
Psychological operations are critical, powerful tools used by the insurgents and counter-
insurgents . They are usually seeking to expand their control of the grass-roots levels . In fact, 
in many cases psychological operations become factors that determine the results . Propagan-
da and marketing of insurgents’ cause were able to influence public opinion towards their 
cause or at least reach to a point of neutrality towards this cause . The psychological activities 
used by insurgents focus on the marketing objective discussed earlier: “exploring, creating, 
and delivering value to satisfy the needs of a target market .”29 
A battlefield is a multidimensional one, it encompasses the physical space, but it also in-
cludes cyberspace . The expansion of the Information and Communication Technology (ICT) 
development made it possible for insurgents to start cyber-insurgency . Leader of Al-Qaeda 
Ayman Zawahri stated “we are in a battle and more than half of this battle is in the media . In 
this media battle, we are in the race for the hearts and minds of our Umma .”30 The internet 
23 Mahadevan, P . “The ‘Talibanization’ of Insurgency” . Center for Security Studies . 2 April 2014 . http://www .css .
ethz .ch/en/services/digital-library/articles/article .html/178192/pdf
24 Hammes, T . X . “Countering Evolved Insurgent Networks” . Military Review 86/4 . 2006 . 18-26 .
25 Hammes . “Countering Evolved Insurgent Networks” .
26 Mahadevan . “The ‘Talibanization’ of Insurgency” .
27 Hammes, “Countering Evolved Insurgent Networks” .
28 Clarke, C . P . Terrorism, Inc.: The Financing of Terrorism, Insurgency, and Irregular Warfare. Santa Barbara: 
Praeger, 2015 .
29 Kotler and Keller . Marketing Management.
30 Zelin, A . Y . “The State of al-Qaeda” . The Washington Institute . 13 April 2015 . https://www .washingtoninstitute .
org/policy-analysis/view/the-state-of-al-qaeda
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has been used to maximize their effect and to have a greater influence. It is used for recruit-
ment, training, advertisement, marketing and propaganda, for posting videos, photos, train-
ing materials, online magazines, building networks, among other tasks . The Islamic State 
publishes an online magazine named “Dabiq”31 . Until July 31, 2017 15 issues were pub-
lished . The magazine followed the development of IS and markets its propaganda globally . 
The expansion of social media made it also possible to reach to the status of “global 
village”, where information spreads fast . It helps with the marketing process especially the 
case of Facebook, where you can use tools such as “recommended for” or “people you may 
know” . These tools reach not only local audience, but also global one; they help drive inter-
ests and link people with similar interests .
MARKET EXPANSION VS. GUERRILLA RECRUITMENT 
The recruitment strategy of insurgents is indeed a market growth strategy . This section will 
illustrate some marketing strategies while comparing them to the insurgency strategies and 
operations and more specifically to the insurgents’ recruitment. As mentioned earlier, IO 
and marketing share similar objectives, similar elements of the environment, and similar 
operational themes . An analysis of the market growth will help point out the recruitment 
strategies of insurgents .
Linking the marketing strategy to the general strategic direction is core when doing 
business or starting an IO. The Ansoff Matrix is, in fact, a strategic planning tool that links 
an organization’s marketing strategy with its general direction . It provides a framework en-
abling growth opportunities. The Ansoff Matrix was created by Igor Ansoff32 . The model 
presents four alternative growth strategies. The matrix is a 2x2 table; the first dimension 
in this matrix is the ‘products’ that could be existing or new; while the second dimension 
is the ‘markets’ that could be existing or new . According to this model, four strategies are 
presented . Market penetration uses existing products and existing markets; with this strategy 
a company seeks to increase market share, increase product usage, increase frequency of 
use, or increase quantity used . Product development strategy uses new products and exist-
ing markets; this strategy includes product improvement, product line extensions, or new 
products for the same market . Market development uses existing products and new markets 
through expanding markets for existing products, geographic expansion or target segments . 
Diversification strategy uses new products and new markets.
The Ansoff Matrix simply suggests growth strategies that helps set the direction of an 
organization, while providing marketing strategies that helps achieve them . Each strategy 
is achieved differently, and each one faces different levels of risk. The market penetration 
strategy involves selling existing products to existing markets to gain higher market share . 
Though, in some cases the market is already mature and there are no new demographic sec-
tors to target; in this case the strategy is to obtain market share from the competitors . This 
strategy carries the lowest risk compared to the other strategies . This can be achieved by 
competitive pricing strategies, advertising, and/or sales promotion .
31 “Dabiq Magazine” . Jihadology .net . https://jihadology .net/category/dabiq-magazine/, Accessed on 20 January 
2019 .
32 Igor Ansoff was a Russian American applied mathematician and business manager, he is known as the father of 
strategic manager and famous for his development of the Ansoff matrix, which he developed as a tool to plot 
generic strategies for the establishment of a company via existing or new products in existing or new markets .
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The market development strategy is about selling existing products in new markets . This 
can be achieved by opening new geographic markets or new segments of population (e .g . 
approaching women or children who haven’t been targeted before), which is associated with 
a high level of risk depending on the financial capacity and the new markets. This strategy is 
also possible through new distribution channels, such as changing street retailers to internet 
retailers to attract new customers throughout the globe or through providing services and 
products in new types of markets, which would require training of staff and developing of 
methods of distribution . 
Table 1: Ansoff Matrix for Market Growth Strategies33 
Product development strategy is about introducing new products to existing markets . 
This growth strategy needs clear knowledge of the needs of the customers to be able to satis-
fy those needs . This might require new materials or new technologies . As this requires new 
product offerings (products, services, or ideas), research and development are much needed; 
however, the risk of losing existing customers with the new product is possible . This could 
be approached by presenting a new product that is closely associated with the existing one .
Diversification is the growth strategy that is achieved by developing new products 
for completely new markets . Hence, it is associated with a very high risk because of the 
lack of experience in the new market and the new product . There are three types of diver-
sification: full diversification, backward diversification and forward diversification. Full 
diversification is a totally new product to a new, unknown market, which is a strategy with 
the highest risk. Backward diversification is when the organization decides to complement 
its existing product with one that is used in the preceding step of the production cycle . 
Forward diversification is about developing a product that is used in the following steps 
of the production cycle .
The recruitment strategy of insurgents is in fact an Ansoff matrix; it is a growth strategy 
model of operations to maintain existing members and recruit new members . It provides a 
framework enabling growth opportunities . As is the case in the market growth strategy, the 
model presents four alternative growth strategies. The first dimension in this matrix is the 
‘services’ that could be either existing or new; while the second dimension is the ‘region’ that 
33 Ansoff, I. Corporate Strategy. New York: McGraw Hill, 1965 .
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could be existing or new . According to the model, four strategies are presented: insurgency 
penetration (existing services and existing regions), insurgency development (new services 
and existing regions), insurgency expansion (using existing services and new regions), and 
insurgency diversification (using new services and new regions). Figure (2) below illustrates 
the recruitment strategy of insurgents .
The Ansoff Matrix for insurgency, named here the insurgents’ recruitment matrix, is 
a growth strategy of insurgency. Each strategy is achieved differently, and each one faces 
different levels of risk. The insurgency penetration involves promoting existing services and 
propaganda to existing regions to gain higher acceptance and loyalty amongst local commu-
nity . This targets the adversary, but most importantly targets the neutral communities in the 
region they operate . This strategy carries the lowest risk compared to the other strategies, 
as insurgents are aware of the community and the needs and interests of this community . 
This can be achieved by promoting their ideology through local media and local recruiters . 
Direct contact (face to face word of mouth or personal selling) of potential members is the 
most common method in this strategy as those members are possible to be identified by some 
surveys and intelligence .
Table 2: Insurgents Matrix for Insurgency Growth Strategies
The insurgency expansion strategy is about promoting existing services and propagan-
da in new regions . This can be achieved by expanding the ideology to new regions or new 
population segments, which is associated with a high level of risk depending on the financial 
capacity, the new regions, and the knowledge about those regions . This strategy is also pos-
sible through new distribution channels such as the cyber-insurgency; where insurgents are 
able to recruit new members through the internet . This would require high levels of trainings 
and developed skills in the use of ICT . ISIS is a good example of this since they use the in-
ternet to expand their operation and recruit new members from the globe .
Insurgency development strategy is about introducing new services to existing markets . 
This growth strategy needs clear knowledge of the needs and interests of the local communi-
ty, to be able to satisfy those needs, and provide the desired and possible new services . ISIS 
provided different services to develop their organization and expand their operations through 
recruiting new members . The organisation was able to provide medical and educational ser-
vices in a manner that fits their strategy and their ideology. 
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Insurgency diversification is the growth strategy that is achieved by developing new 
services for completely new regions . Hence, it is associated with a very high risk because of 
the lack of experience in the new region and the new service . Main examples of insurgen-
cy diversifications are the mergers of two different insurgencies in two different countries, 
for example Al-Shabab insurgent group in Somalia united with ISIS to expand and diverse 
their operations .34 Diversification is also present in insurgency through backward diversi-
fication35, this is apparent through ISIS associated places of worship that supported their 
operations in those regions . 
Insurgents usually develop highly sophisticated strategic communications campaigns, 
“this has been the pattern since Ho Chi Minh .”36 Insurgency have developed recruitment 
strategies that helped them recruit new members locally and globally through services relat-
ed directly or indirectly to their operations .
ISIS MARKET EXPANSION STRATEGY
The Islamic State in Iraq (ISI) was announced in October 2006 with the leadership of Hamid 
al Zawi (Abu Umar al-Baghdadi)37 . Al-Zawi was killed in in April 2010 and replaced by the 
current leader Ibrahim al-Badri (Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, who was announced as the Amir 
Al-Mu’mineen (commander of faith) .38
The first media product was issued by the ISI in 2012, it was a video titled “The Ex-
pedition of the Prisoners” . The video targeted Iraqi Sunni audience, and the main message 
was identifying the enemies of the ummah, including the Shiites and Americans .39 This was 
followed by a series of publications titled Salil al-Sawarem (The Clanging of the Swords) .40 
The videos ranged from violent scenes to peaceful and religious messages .41
PSYOP includes the SCAME technique to help analyse the opponent propaganda . 
SCAME is about Source, Content, Audience, Media, and Effects. The following is an anal-
ysis of the Salil al-Sawarem using the SCAME technique: 
Source: Actors in the videos were mainly ISIS people showing their activities, their 
training, their achievements, their messages and everything they do . Many of them are real 
34 Azman, N. A. and Alkaff, S. H. B. O. “ISIS in Horn of Africa: An Imminent Alliance with Al-Shabaab?” RSIS 
Commentary 282 . 30 December 2015 . https://www .rsis .edu .sg/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/CO15282 .pdf
35 Backward Diversification is when a company decides to diversify its products or services by offering a product 
or service that relates to the preceding stage of the current product or service . For example, a dairy products 
company’s backward diversification is to buy cows so that they control the raw material (that is milk).
36 Jones, C . W . “Exploiting Structural Weaknesses in Terrorist Networks: Information Blitzkrieg and Related Strat-
egies” . In David, G . J . and McKeldin, T . R . (eds .), Ideas as weapons: influence and perception in modern war-
fare. Washington D .C .: Potomac Books, 2009 . 7-12 .
37 Tønnessen, T . “Heirs of Zarqawi or Saddam? The relationship between al-Qaida in Iraq and the Islamic State” . 
Perspectives on Terrorism 9/4 . 2015 . 48-60 .
38 Barret, R . “The Islamic State” . The Soufan Group . November 2014 . http://soufangroup .com/wp-content/up-
loads/2014/10/TSG-The-Islamic-State-Nov14 .pdf
39 Hartmann, C. “Who does (not) belong to the jihadis umma? A comparison of IS’s and al Qaida’s use of takfir to 
exclude people from the Muslim community” . Journal for Deradicalization 13 . 2017 . 213-242 .
40 Zelin, A . Y . “al-Furqan Media presents a new video message from the Islamic State of Iraq: ‘Clanging of the 
Swords, part 1’” . jihadology .net . 3 June 2012 . http://jihadology .net/2012/06/30/al-furqan-media-presents-a-new-
video-message-from-the-islamic-state-of-iraq-clanging-of-the-swords-part-1/
41 Shamieh, L . and Szenes, Z . “The Propaganda of ISIS/DAESH Through the Virtual Space” . Defence Against 
Terrorism Review 7/1 . 2015 . 7-31 .
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footage, however, some are cheap visual effects. These videos are funded and produced 
mainly by individuals associated to the group .
Content: All the videos produced included a background song and music called “Salil 
al-Sawarem” . Strikingly, if you listen to the music without watching the shocking visuals, 
you will be amazed with the melody and beautiful Arabic hymn . Studying these videos 
makes the listener even start humming along . A technique that helps recruit new people 
especially the youth . The impact of those videos is enormous given the thousands of view-
ers of those videos . Those videos were organized in such a fashion that they follow similar 
structure that is able to present the objective of the video, intentions . Videos also show wit-
nesses of men who have bled and died for their beliefs, they show why “true Sunni Muslims” 
(as they call it) should follow the same path . Recruitment is based on two aspects; the right 
religion, and the strive to attack theological enemies .
Audience: The propaganda was aware of the different targets, hence they addressed each 
differently using different means, different types of videos, and even different languages, 
which enabled the global dissemination of the means .
Media: ISIS had several media strategies42; Salil al-Sawarem, was mainly videos used 
to widely disseminate the message .
Effects: The effect of the videos and the music was a cutthroat; the melody was inter-
esting even for those who tried to mock the videos and used the same music to mock the 
content . The number of viewers ranged from hundreds of thousands to millions . Although 
measuring the effectiveness of the video is difficult, however, the number of followers, likers 
and commenters gives an indication about the impact .
When Abu Baker al-Baghdadi announced Nusra Front a branch of the Islamic State 
2013, ISIS propaganda transformed to the new brand and expanded to non-Arabic speak-
ing audience . During this period, they were seeking market development by attracting new 
segments of the population . The quality of the publications advanced in this phase . 2014 
witnessed the transformation of the ISIS propaganda . They started the publication of the “Is-
lamic State News” in English . Within two years the messages changed from Arabic speaking 
media production to English and German speaking with main messages of “conquering the 
world” with its main message “baqeya wa tatamadad” (here to stay and expand) .
ISIS gained support locally and internationally, they were able to persuade audiences 
in the region along with overseas audiences, this is evident through a variety of members 
engaged from different nationalities, different regions and even different religions. They 
were able to attract audiences with little at stake in their mission to sacrifice for their cause.
ISIS markets itself as strong group supported by religious scripture . The slogan of “en-
during and expanding” enforces the group’s message of strength . It aims at establishing 
a nation-state ruled by Sharia law with an intention to return to the earliest fundamental 
sources of Prophet Mohammed, to expand it to a wide geographical are in the Middle East 
and Europe .
ISIS used the market penetration/insurgency penetration strategy by providing financial 
and sexual incentives for its existing members . They used product development/insurgency 
development through providing educational programs, health and legal services under Sharia 
cover . They used market development/ insurgency expansion through expanding presence in 
different countries. They also used backward diversification through controlling oil sources.
42 Shamieh and Szenes . “The Propaganda of ISIS/DAESH Through the Virtual Space” .
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ISIS RECRUITMENT STRATEGY 
ISIS recruitment strategy will be identified through the Ansoff strategy defined earlier as 
the insurgents’ recruitment matrix. ISIS recruitment strategy was based on two factors; the 
services they provide and the regions they are operating in or targeting potential members in .
The insurgency penetration involves promoting existing services and propaganda to 
existing regions to gain higher acceptance amongst the local communities . In Syria and Iraq 
ISIS targeted the adversaries and most importantly the neutral communities . ISIS is aware 
of the region and the needs of the people . Knowing the culture and the economic status, ISIS 
provided rewards through religious beliefs . They provided rewards and salaries for those in 
need along with sexual rewards . This was possible through promoting their ideology using 
local media and local recruiters and direct contact with potential members .
The insurgency expansion strategy is about promoting existing services and propaganda 
in new regions . ISIS achieved this by expanding their ideology to new regions . They were 
able to achieve this by new distribution channels including cyber-insurgency . ISIS was able 
to recruit new members through their chatrooms, Facebook and other social media .43 They 
promoted their utopian and religious state to the internationals using multilingual messages, 
and they were able to recruit Arabic and non-Arabic speaking members .
Insurgency development strategy is about introducing new services to existing markets . 
ISIS provided medical and educational services to the people living in the areas they con-
trol . They provided military training along with religious education . They provided medical 
services through their medical members. They also provided dispute and conflict resolution 
through sharia law and courts they established .
Insurgency diversification is the growth strategy that is achieved by developing new ser-
vices for completely new regions . Although this strategy is hard to accomplish as it entails high 
risk, ISIS was able to diversify its services . This was accomplished by the association of other 
insurgency groups to ISIS. ISIS also succeeded in accomplishing a backwards diversification, 
where ISIS controlled places of worship that was then able to feed the organization with new 
members. It was able to control financial sources as was accomplished with the oil in Iraq.
ISIS COGNITIVE DIMENSIONS IN INFORMATION OPERATIONS 
ISIS works at three environmental levels: physical, emotional and cognitive influence of the 
targeted audience to achieve the desired mission . It utilizes the ABC model of attitude in-
cluding: Affective component that involves feelings and emotions, Behavioural or conative 
component, and Cognitive that involves a person’s belief about an attitude object . However, 
the main factor motivating the different individuals and groups to participate and engage in 
ISIS is its cognitive dimension . ISIS is marketing its brand by being the ‘right Sunni’. Hence 
the war is between Sunni and the rest of the religions and sects . It is between Sunni and all 
non-Sunni, between Sunni and Shiite, between Sunni and non-Wahhabis Sunni, between 
Sunni and other Wahhabis Sunni . 
Although ISIS might be driven or even started or fed by external forces and by motives 
that are not necessarily part of the whole cognitive dimension of ISIS, the Caliphate and the 
43 Liang, C . S . “Cyber Jihad: Understanding and Countering Islamic State Propaganda” . GCSP Policy Paper 2. 
2015 . https://www .gcsp .ch/publications/cyber-jihad
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Jihadism as a tool are the core of this cognitive dimension . The Caliphate is not a new term 
or concept for them; it was the basis for Islamic rule in the early phases of Islam, but it was 
also revived by the Ottoman Empire during their rule . Currently, Caliphate is a contested 
status amongst different Sunni Islamic parties. The caliphate and jihadism as a tool are the 
core of the cognitive dimension of ISIS .
BRANDING OF ISIS
The American Marketing Association states that “a brand is a name, term, sign, symbol or 
a combination of them, intended to identify the goods and services of one seller or a group 
of sellers and to differentiate them from their competitors. In fact, ISIS is a name that is 
very well known globally. Their flag is extremely recognizable Muhammad Rasoul Allah 
(Muhammad is the prophet of God) with a black background . Their symbol is religion and 
military capability, which is used to identify their existence and to differentiate them from 
other insurgents. The name ISIS identifies itself as a state, and all their operations are execut-
ed as such; staring from the structure of the state to the currency they started and the military 
education and they are providing . “Brands distill the value of other intangible assets into one 
meaningful identity of the firm.”44
Aaker describes brand personality as metaphor which “can help brand strategist by en-
riching their understanding of people’s perceptions of and attitude toward the brand, contrib-
uting to a differentiating brand identity, getting the communication effort and creating brand 
equity .”45 ISIS has in fact understood people’s perceptions and communicated with different 
segments according to the perceptions they hold . Aaker mentioned that a brand should not 
only define its functional purpose, but also to express the brand’s higher purpose. ISIS has 
defined its functional purpose which is Islamic Sharia, it also defined its higher purpose 
which denominating the rule in the region through the Islamic caliphate . This means that by 
defining the brand purpose, the brand positioning will be achieved, the brand differentiation 
and the brand identity .
ISIS has been able to develop a nation brand . A nation brand is “the unique, multidi-
mensional blend of elements that provide the nation with culturally grounded differentiation 
and relevance for all of its target audiences .”46 This definition proposes that ISIS as a brand 
exists in the minds of the people; it is a perception of ISIS . ISIS was able to appeal diverse 
stakeholders through its nature of nation brand . It was successful to a certain point of time 
when it was able to deliver its promised values . Their laws, the religion, the social norms, 
the organizational structure all reflect and appreciate were able to attract certain groups to 
engage. The individuals recruited and the groups affiliated, all appreciated the values and 
the social and economic interactions . They are all aware of the values and all are interested 
in joining . ISIS member are all guided by the strict religious values leading to utopianism as 
they claim . Their main themes to identify their brand is brutality and belonging; ‘either you 
are with us or against us’ . Their main objective to hone their nation brand is to gain more 
power and expand the regions of control, to recruit more members, and to generate more fear 
amongst the others to be able to achieve the first two objectives. 
44 Moore, L . “The Law and the Ultimate Intellectual Asset” . Intellectual Asset Management 10/6 . 2012 . 78-84 .
45 Aaker, D . A . Building strong brands. New York: Free Press, 1996 . 126 .
46 Dinnie, K . Nation Branding: Concepts, Issues, Practice. Elsevier, UK. Amsterdam; Oxford: Elsevier, 2008 .
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ISIS was trying to hone the nation brand to be able to form a competitive identity . Hav-
ing different nationalities, ISIS members have one thing in common; they have common 
affiliations. This affiliation forms their identity. Individuals who are recruited feel they don’t 
belong to their original states or societies, they have a sense of lack of belonging . They reach 
to a point of dilemma about their identities and belonging . ISIS then works on leading them 
to a new direction; members feel ISIS the saviour . With this ISIS plays a role in making 
individuals feel they have new belonging and identities . 
ISIS was able to work on the institutional and political image, image of the ISIS services 
and image of the contacts and partners . The identity-image gap was diminishing by time 
when people faced the immense violence enacted by ISIS . With this diminishing trend ISIS 
started its diminishing phase .
ISIS: A MODERN MARKETING  
STRATEGY 
ISIS operations were based on non-traditional marketing methods . They adopted guerrilla 
marketing using innovative and creative tools and methods to achieve their goals, by using 
multilingual messages to reach as many people as possible . Guerrilla marketing techniques 
seek to maximize the surprise effect, the diffusion effect and the low-cost effect. The surprise 
effect is aimed at surprising the consumers with unexpected activities, the diffusion effect is 
to increase the number of individuals exposed to the message, and the low-cost effect is to 
achieve the surprise and diffusion at little or no cost.47 Mainly, ISIS was able to achieve the 
three effects and more, they focused on the following guerrilla marketing methods:
Viral Marketing is a marketing technique that utilizes websites or users to pass on mes-
sages to other sites or users, which enables the message to be delivered to a mass number 
of people .48 ISIS is active in this field as it focuses on publishing many videos on YouTube. 
It is very active on twitter, to the extent that many twitter accounts were closed but users 
were able to start new accounts whenever their accounts were closed . With this marketing 
strategy, ISIS was able to use the 1/9/90 rule of social media network, which posits that on a 
social media network only 1 percent of users create content, 9 percent react by sharing and 
commenting, and 90 percent watch and read without commenting .49 ISIS was able to expose 
its messages to the public; it took advantage of rapid multiplication to spread the messages 
to thousands then to millions .
Grassroots Marketing aims at winning customers on an individual basis, it focuses on 
building a lasting connection and relationship between the consumer and the brand .50 ISIS 
was able to connect to individuals, to brain wash, to build a lasting relationship with those 
members who became part of the community . They were able to maintain this relationship 
by providing services of different kinds, both financial and non-financial.
47 Hutter, K. and Hoffman, S. “Guerrilla Marketing: The Nature of the Concept and Propositions for Further Re-
search” . Asian Journal of Marketing 5/2 . 2011 . 39-54 . DOI:10 .3923/ajm .2011 .39 .54
48 Wilson R . “The six Simple Principles of Viral Marketing” . Web Marketing Today 70/1 . 2000 . 232 .
49 Rainie L ., Lenhart, A . and Smith, A . “The tone of life on social networking sites” . Pew research Center . 9 Feb-
ruary 2012 . http://www.pewinternet.org/files/old-media/Files/Reports/2012/Pew_Social%20networking%20cli-
mate%202 .9 .12 .pdf
50 Baker, M . J . and Hart, S . J . (eds .) The Marketing Book. 6th ed . Oxford: Butterworth-Heinemann, 2008 .
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Astroturfing is the marketing strategy with the highest risk . It includes fake endorse-
ments, testimonials and recommendations by individuals who are paid to convey a positive 
message .51 ISIS published several videos of people giving testimonials about the utopian 
state and idealistic life they are living . Several videos of locals presented that; along with 
videos of internationals, like the testimonials of the British hostage John Cantlie who pro-
vided a series of videos that started from describing his case until the last video that showed 
how easy it was for him to live and travel within the Islamic State territory .
Ambush Marketing is a form of associative marketing; this is done by associating the 
organization with an event or property without necessarily having a direct connection .52 In 
many cases ISIS claimed their responsibility for different events, explosions, or brutal ac-
tivities throughout the globe, though there are no proofs that they are really responsible for 
these activities .
CONCLUSION 
The war of perceptions and deceptions is more effective than the war of weapons. There-
fore, understanding the cognitive dimensions of the insurgents is important before apply-
ing new methods and techniques . In the changing security environment, it is even more 
important to understand the operational environment and the operations capacities of the 
adversaries .
In this study, the recruitment strategy of insurgents was compared to the Ansoff growth 
matrix. Four recruitment strategies were identified on the basis of the services the insurgents 
provide and the regions they operate in . The model shows that it is possible with the diver-
sification of services that insurgents are able to recruit new members locally or globally, 
whether affiliated to the ideology or even not related to the ideology.
ISIS marketing strategy was analysed through understanding its brand . Its market ex-
pansion strategy was also analysed . It showed ISIS focus on the target group to achieve 
attitude change . It also showed that with the proper use of marketing campaigns, insurgents 
are able to recruit neutral members easily .
Insurgency can blend in easily with the surrounding environment through their mar-
keting strategy; thus, an analysis of this strategy helps counter the actions and results . Un-
derstanding this strategy helps exploit communication and information rather than the uti-
lization of traditional war and mass killing . Since insurgent strategies focus on political 
and psychological operations, the counterinsurgents should act similarly . Countering the 
insurgency should be through the Ansoff matrix; it should counter their penetration, expan-
sion, development and diversification strategies by controlling the geographic expansion 
and limiting the insurgents’ capability to provide services . It should counter the local and 
global messages using information and communication technology . It should be focused on 
the brand by diminishing the gap between its image and the real identity . Most importantly, 
it should focus on the message delivered to the neutral population .
51 Jacobs, J. “Faking it: how to kill a business through astroturfing on social media”. Keeping Good Companies 
64/9 . 2012 . 567-570 .
52 Chadwick, S . and Burton, N . “Ambushed! Sponsors pay a lot to link their brands to sporting events . Then there 
are those who get those links for nothing” . Wall Street Journal, 25 January 2010 . https://www .wsj .com/articles/
SB10001424052970204731804574391102699362862
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ABSTRACT: Pursuant to UNSC Resolution 1244, following the war and the NATO bomb-
ing campaign, Kosovo was placed under an international administration, by the Unit-
ed Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). After the end of the war, 
the course of the security policies in Kosovo was directed mainly by international actors. 
Basically, the security sector was non-existent, whereas the international military and ci-
vilian presence was responsible for the security of Kosovo’s borders and the protection of 
public order. The responsibility for security thus belonged to the international community 
and was progressively transferred to the Kosovo security institutions. While in the begin-
ning, the takeover of security by the international community was a necessity in order 
to provide peace and stability, the prolongation of the delegation of ownership to local 
institutions created disadvantages in terms of timely and professional development. Dur-
ing international administration, the undefined political status of Kosovo influenced the 
security sector as an area reserved for the international community. 
KEYWORDS: International Organisations, security, policy, peace, stability 
INTRODUCTION 
Given that in 2001 the final status of Kosovo was not resolved yet, based on United Nations 
Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1244 (1999) of June 10, 1999, Regulation 2001/9 on 
establishing a Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government in Kosovo was 
promulgated for the purposes of developing an essential but provisional self-government . 
Through this constitutional framework, UNMIK delegated significant responsibilities to 
the local institutions in “the legislative, executive and judicial field through the participa-
tion of the people of Kosovo in free and fair elections .”1 However, some very important 
areas, including the security sector, continued to be the direct authority of the international 
presence in Kosovo, namely UNMIK . 
The inclusion of Kosovo institutions in the security sector started after the commence-
ment of the security sector review process . 
1 “UNMIK/REG/2001/9 . On a Constitution Framework for Provisional Self-government in Kosovo” . 15 May 
2001 . http://www .unmikonline .org/regulations/2001/reg09-01 .htm, Accessed on 16 July 2019 .
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The Kosovar Centre for Security Studies defines three key periods of Security Sec-
tor Reform (SSR) along with overall political developments .2 The first period entails the 
years 1999-2005 and it signifies the Security Sector Building (SSB) phase which includes 
the efforts made towards building security institutions such as the Kosovo Police Service 
(KPS), Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC) and other relevant bodies .3 This is the period 
where security related responsibilities were reserved for the Special Representative of the 
Secretary General whilst only limited responsibilities were vested to locals . The second 
period, covering the end of 2005 till the beginning of 2008, notes the beginning of the 
handover of responsibility from the international community to the locals .4 In this period, 
the major significance lies with the Internal Security Sector Review (ISSR) as it notes 
not only the creation of the new security architecture, like the establishment of two rather 
relevant ministries, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of Justice in Kosovo, 
but it also assesses the state of play of the security sector of that time . The third period is 
related to the declaration of Independence as well as the entry into force of the Consti-
tution of the Republic of Kosovo indicating that the new security architecture in Kosovo 
permits the creation of new security institutions such as the Kosovo Security Force (KSF), 
Kosovo Security Council (KSC), Kosovo Intelligence Agency (KIA), including police 
reform, and establishment of emergency services . Furthermore, the SSR referred to the 
gradual transformation of the KSF into the Kosovo Armed Forces (KAF) whose mission 
will be the protection of the territorial sovereignty and integrity of Kosovo, whereas the 
MKSF will be turned into the Ministry of Defence (MoD) that will exercise civilian and 
democratic control of the KAF .5  
The role of international organizations in the creation and structuring of the security 
mechanisms has been indispensable while the local ownership was evidently deficient. The 
shaping and direction of the security policies in Kosovo after the end of the war was con-
ducted mainly by the international actors as responsibility for security belonged to the inter-
national community and was progressively transferred to the Kosovo security institutions . 
While the takeover of security from the international community was a necessity in order to 
provide peace and stability, the prolongation of the transfer of ownership to the local institu-
tions created disadvantages in terms of timely professional development . 
According to the US State Department, Diplomacy in Action – International Support for 
Kosovo, the US is committed to work with the Government of Kosovo and the European 
and international partners for the continued progress and development of Kosovo for the 
benefit of its citizens while amongst others, identifying the following organizations: United 
Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), International Civilian Office 
(ICO), OSCE Mission in Kosovo (OMIK), NATO’s Kosovo Force (KFOR) .6 Each of these 
organizations has a particular role and will be analysed mainly from security perspective and 
the impact they had in building the security architecture, legislation and policy . 
2 “Chronology of Security Sector Reform in Kosovo” . Kosovar Center for Security Studies (KCSS) . Pristina, 
2009 . http://www.qkss.org/repository/docs/Chronology_of_Security_Sector_Reform_in_Kosovo_609982.pdf
3 “Chronology of Security Sector Reform in Kosovo” .
4 “Chronology of Security Sector Reform in Kosovo” .
5 “Chronology of Security Sector Reform in Kosovo” .
6 “International Support for Kosovo” . U .S . State Department of State . https://2009-2017 .state .gov/p/eur/ci/kv/
c27789 .htm, Accessed on 12 July 2019 .
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UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN KOSOVO
Following NATO’s military campaign in 1999, the UNSC adopted Resolution 1244, au-
thorizing UNMIK to start an extensive process of building peace, democracy, stability and 
self-government in Kosovo .7 
It is important to emphasize that Resolution 1244 presents one of the most disputable 
and paradoxical resolutions of the UN for many scholars . I consider that one of the strongest 
arguments to put forward is that since the FRY ceased to exist, this makes Resolution 1244 
extraneous and consequently it makes Kosovo independent by default . 
In accordance with Resolution 1244, the Constitutional Framework and the original 
standards statement, approved by the Security Council, a policy document under the name 
“Standards for Kosovo” was developed . This document set out a number of standards that 
Kosovo had to accomplish . As Bernard Knoll indicates, “These standards reinforce Koso-
vo’s parallel progress towards European standards in the framework of the EU’s Stabilisa-
tion and Association Process, based inter alia on the Copenhagen criteria . The standards 
describe a multi-ethnic society where there is democracy, tolerance, freedom of movement 
and equal access to justice for all people in Kosovo, regardless of their ethnic background” .8 
Since summer 2002, UNMIK has submitted regular baseline reports on standards imple-
mentation to the UNSC . Knoll describes that “since early 2003, the benchmarking process 
has been reinforced by the Tracking Mechanism for Kosovo, through which the European 
Commission tracks the development of standards and provides sector-specific recommen-
dations for different policy areas. Under the Tracking Mechanism, Kosovo is obliged to 
gradually bring its legislation and institutions into line with the EU acquis, and receives 
access to the EU market in return .”9 Despite the fact that these mechanisms were set long 
time ago, still, to this day, Kosovo lags way behind the countries of the region in terms of 
EU integration process .
The unrest of March 2004 certainly presented a drawback in the process . Furthermore, it 
damaged the reputation and the credibility of UNMIK and KFOR . The inter-ethnic violence 
of March 2004 was a clear indicator that proved that the international community’s efforts 
to create a harmonious multi-ethnic society in Kosovo had failed, or as the report on the in-
ternational commission in the Balkans puts it: “A multi-ethnic Kosovo does not exist except 
in the bureaucratic assessments of the international community . The events of March 2004 
amounted to the strongest signal yet that the situation could explode .”10 Certainly, this situ-
ation made the UN rethink its approach and take steps towards the change of the status quo.
Consequently, on 23 May 2005, Secretary General Kofi Annan appointed Mr. Kai Eide 
of Norway as a Special Envoy to undertake a comprehensive review of the situation in 
Kosovo in order to assess if the conditions are ready to start the political process that would 
determine the future status of Kosovo . He concluded that although the standards implemen-
7 You may access the resolution in the official UN language in the following link: “Security Council Resolution 
1244 (1999) on the situation relating Kosovo” . United Nations Peacemaker . https://peacemaker .un .org/koso-
vo-resolution1244, Accessed on 16 February 2019 .
8 Knoll, B . “From Benchmarking to Final Status? Kosovo and The Problem of an International Administration’s 
Open-Ended Mandate” . European Journal of International Law 16/4 . September 2005 . 4-12 .
 DOI: 10 .1093/ejil/chi140
9 Knoll . “From Benchmarking to Final Status? . . .”
10 International Commission on the Balkans. The Balkans in Europe’s Future. Sofia: Secretariat Centre for Liberal 
Strategies, 2005 . 19 .
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tation in Kosovo had been uneven, the status quo was unsustainable and the time had come 
to move to the next phase of the political process and launch negotiations on the future status 
of Kosovo .11
On 1 November 2005, Kofi Annan appointed former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari 
as a Special Envoy to lead the political process that would resolve the future status of Koso-
vo . Martti Ahtisaari’s appointment signalled the commencement of the last part of the inter-
national administration of Kosovo in its present form, furthermore it signalled that the time 
for the European Union’s intense involvement in this issue had come .12
On February 2nd, 2007 UN Secretary-General’s Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari present-
ed the plan for the future status process of Kosovo . According to this proposal, the minority 
communities will be granted special protection while the municipalities will undergo a pro-
cess of decentralisation in order to ensure that the rights and interests of non-Albanian com-
munities are protected . In this light, Kosovo would govern itself under international supervi-
sion but would have the right to enter into international agreements, including membership 
of international bodies . The Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon considered the proposal as fair 
and balanced . Additionally, the proposal entailed the deployment of an international civil 
and military presence that would supervise the new arrangements and ensure peace and sta-
bility . A European Union (EU) Special Representative would act as an International Civilian 
Representative, with ultimate supervisory authority over the civil aspects of the settlement, 
including the power to annul laws and remove officials whose actions are determined to be 
inconsistent with it .13
On April 3, 2007 Ahtisaari presented to the UNSC his final package of proposal rec-
ommending that Kosovo should become an independent state with a period of international 
supervision . Kosovo accepted the proposal while Serbia rejected it . Throughout April-July, 
2007, a number of draft resolutions based on Ahtisaari’s plan were rejected by Russia in the 
UNSC . Consequently, Ban Ki-Moon authorized a time-limited round of negotiations be-
tween Pristina and Belgrade led by an EU/US/Russian Troika . The unsuccessful diplomatic 
efforts of the Troika to bridge the gap between the parties on Kosovo’s status eventually led 
to the unilateral declaration of independence but in coordination with the major powers . 
In addition to having a paradoxical and disputed mandate, UNMIK also had policies 
which have been widely and deeply criticized as having had detrimental effects on Kosovo 
and its society . It is arguable that the status quo that was maintained by this organization did 
not allow the proper maturation of Kosovo institutions and was not working to achieve its 
goals within the society, but rather had built a hostile tension that culminated with the 2004 
unrest, proving the administration was far from what it proclaimed and was not succeeding 
at all in its mandate . Another policy is that of the decentralization, which was supposed to 
increase the security of the non-majority communities in Kosovo but arguably yielded a very 
different result. Decentralisation turned many cities in Kosovo into ethnically homogenous 
11 Annan, K . A . “Letter dated 7 October 2005 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security 
Council” . 7 October 2005 . https://www .securitycouncilreport .org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3- 
CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Kos%20S2005%20635 .pdf, Accessed on 12 July 2019 .
12 “Secretary-General Appoints Former President Martti Ahtisaari of Finland as Special Envoy for Future Pro-
cess for Kosovo” . United Nations . https://www .un .org/press/en/2005/sga955 .doc .htm, Accessed on 16 February 
2019 .
13 “Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement”. United Nations Office of the Special Envoy for 
Kosovo (UNOSEK) . 2 February 2007 . http://www .kuvendikosoves .org/common/docs/Comprehensive%20Pro-
posal%20 .pdf
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spaces, where previously there had been multi-ethnicity, in turn creating enclaves where 
the Serbs constituted a majority . Such a constitution brought about a total ethnic separation 
between the Albanians and the Serbs, who now could very easily avoid frequenting the areas 
where the other ethnic group was a majority . While how such a process contributed to the 
physical security of the Serb population in the decentralized enclaves is vague and incon-
clusive to say the least, it did a great deal to contribute to an array of other insecurities, with 
economic insecurity being at the very top . For a country where employment opportunities 
are weak for many groups even in the largest cities, to find such opportunities in enclaves 
or villages is imaginably even more unlikely . In addition to economic insecurity, decen-
tralization made cultural exchange between the Albanian majority and Serbian minorities 
extremely difficult. Instead of natural encounters between the two populations who previ-
ously lived in the same cities, this exchange now had to be “facilitated” by international 
actors through workshops and other artificially stimulated conditions. Moreover, this very 
process helped create an atmosphere of insecurity in the country, by sending the message 
that the minorities had to be protected from some sort of threat, which was also unfair to the 
majority . With a lack of such encounters and exchange extreme narratives about the other 
risk to grow, increasing hostilities between the communities, and ultimately contributing to 
overall insecurity .
INTERNATIONAL CIVILIAN OFFICE 
The International Civilian Office (ICO) had a significant impact on building important 
segments of the security architecture in Kosovo . ICO was in charge of the supervision 
of the implementation of the Comprehensive Settlement Proposal, widely known as the 
Ahtisaari Plan, by the Government of Kosovo . The ICO was led by the International Ci-
vilian Representative (ICR), Pieter Feith, appointed by the ISG. The ICO finished its work 
in Kosovo in September 2012 and presented a rather unique international body because 
unlike other international organizations, it was not status neutral and did not have UNSC 
limitations, but was independence-supportive and as such, created solid ground and polit-
ical basis for the state-building in Kosovo .14 This rather contextual and precise approach 
of ICO however, presented some sort of paradox and inconsistency on the ground, espe-
cially after the decision for the deployment of the EULEX mission based on the UN’s 
six-point plan . The main fundamentals of the plan presented on the Secretary-General’s 
report covered: Police, Customs, Justice, Transport and Infrastructure, Boundaries and 
Serbian Patrimony .15
This plan was not supported by the local authorities namely the president and the prime 
minister, but they were in favour of the EULEX deployment . The six-point plan also trig-
gered protests with the motto “Against the six points, for sovereignty,”16 which were organ-
ized by several non-governmental organizations, including the movement Vetevendosje! . 
The protestors blamed the government for not firmly refusing the six-point plan but silently 
14 I worked for ICO during 2008–2009 as a Religious and Cultural Policy Officer.
15 “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo: S/2008/692” . 
UN Security Council . 24 November 2008 . https://www .refworld .org/docid/492e79152 .html, Accessed on 16 
July 2019 .
16 “Kosovo Protests UN Six-Point Plan for EULEX” . Balkan Insight, 2 December 2008 . http://www .balkaninsight .
com/en/article/kosovo-protests-un-six-point-plan-for-eulex, Accessed 21 February 2019 .
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implementing it thus allowing the return of Serbia .17 The deployment of EULEX followed 
the presidential statement at the UN Security Council based on Resolution 1244 .18 While 
there were protests against the mandate of EULEX as an outcome of the above mentioned 
six-point plan, this affected the mandate of ICO as well. The latter was expected to cooperate 
and monitor EULEX’s work in accordance with the laws of the Kosovo Constitution based 
on Ahtisaari’s plan, therefore locals expressed concerns about potential problems regarding 
the oversight of the EULEX in terms of legal framework. ICO on the other hand was firm 
about its mandate, claiming that regardless of the six-point plan EULEX operation is based 
on UNSC 1244 while ICO will continue to supervise the implementation of the Ahtisaari 
Plan and cooperate with the Government of Kosovo . According to them, the six-point agree-
ment of New York-Belgrade-Brussels for the reconfiguration of the international civilian 
presence in Kosovo was an interim agreement that will serve to pave the way for the deploy-
ment of the EULEX mission .19
From security point of view, the protection of Serb religious and cultural heritage, as 
set in Annex V of the Ahtisaari’s Comprehensive Proposal, had a special attention .20 The 
protection of the Serbian religious and cultural sites shall constitute a special operational 
task of the KPS . The ESDP Rule of Law mission, in consultation with the International 
Military Presence (IMP), shall monitor, mentor and advise the KPS in the implementation 
of this task .21 In fact, Serbs even before the independence had set out their conditions for the 
Serbian Patrimony which were then embodied in the status proposal of Ahtisaari, for which 
Kosovo not only agreed but also made commitments to comply fully . The protection of the 
religious sites was a core responsibility of KFOR, EULEX and Kosovo Police, which was 
gradually handed over to the local institutions as the security situation improved . The deci-
sion taken by North Atlantic Council in March 2010, for the protection of one of the most 
important monuments for the Serb heritage – Gazimestan – to be handed over from KFOR 
to the Kosovo Police presented an advancement of the responsibility as well as reflected the 
confidence that NATO and KFOR contributing partner nations have in the capability of the 
Kosovo Police to perform this task .
In regards to the legislative agenda that contributed to the security development, the 
ICO Planning team provided a vast technical assistance . Based on this assistance the Assem-
bly of Kosovo adopted 19 laws that entered into force on 15 June 2008 in the Constitution 
of Kosovo .22 This preliminary package contained important security laws such as: Kosovo 
Police, Kosovo Police Inspectorate, Ministry for the Kosovo Security Force, Kosovo Secu-
rity Force – that laid the foundation for the security architecture of the state . However, from 
security point of view, the situation on the ground was very complex both internationally 
and domestically. UNMIK was regarded as a mission that had fulfilled its mandate once the 
17 Vetevendosje! is currently one of the biggest opposition parties in Kosovo that has been constantly vocal against 
international and local deals that would in one way or another affect territorial integrity and sovereignty of 
Kosovo .
18 “Declaration by the Presidency on behalf of the European Union on the deployment of EULEX” . Council of the 
European Union . http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_PESC-08-147_en.htm, Accessed on 21 February 2019 .
19 Peci, E . “EULEX-i neutral (s’)kërcënon mandatin e ICO-së” . Radio Free Europe . https://www .evropaelire .
org/a/1354530 .html, Accessed on 21 February 2019 .
20 “Comprehensive Proposal for Status” . 37-38 .
21 “Comprehensive Proposal for Status” . 37-38 .
22 State Building and Exit: The International Civilian Office and Kosovo’s Supervised Independence 2008–2012. 
Pristina: ICO, 2012 . 8 .
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country was declared independent while “the EU was on the verge of launching its most am-
bitious security and defence mission, EULEX, an arrangement that would not see Belgrade’s 
cooperation anytime soon” .23
The security situation in North Mitrovica deteriorated with violence when on 17 March, 
2008 members of the Serb community protested against the declaration of independence of 
Kosovo . Subsequently, they took over an empty UN courthouse building . Even though this 
violent confrontation lasted for several hours, UN Police and KFOR soldiers overmastered 
the courthouse building . Following this event, UN and Kosovo Police as well as KFOR 
withdrew from the north . Their withdrawal created a security vacuum in an area where 
criminal activity was widespread . This period was a test for the dynamics amid UNMIK, 
ICO, KFOR, Kosovo Police and other international actors who were monitoring a tense 
and uncertain situation . The international community was not in unison nor spoke in one 
voice as to finding the right approach to the north to impede any further deterioration of the 
situation .24 From my personal experience working with ICO, I could notice that even within 
ICO there were divergences particularly over North Mitrovica, which led to the eventual 
withdrawal of ICO from there .
Another remarkable contribution of ICO in terms of security development, was the suc-
cessful conclusion of the border demarcation between Kosovo and Macedonia . ICO played an 
essential role that had an impact amongst others on border security and stability . After a couple 
of years of difficulty to demarcate the border of Kosovo with Montenegro due to the refusal 
by the opposition, the demarcation ICO undertook, is recalled as a very successful exercise .
Lastly, ICO is appraised for two distinct stages, first for its focus on stabilization through 
establishment and consolidation of the main state institutions and the second the enhance-
ment of local ownership through transferring of responsibilities to the Kosovo authorities 
and the EU . 
As Peter Feith puts it: “Our relationship to the political elite was based on equal part-
nership, rather than on intrusive international scrutiny that Kosovo had experienced during 
the preceding decade,”25 and having worked in this organization and for almost a decade 
in other international organizations in Kosovo, I could not agree more . However, while the 
role of ICO must be appraised for the partnership approach and assistance in state building 
process and for what was elaborated above, its mandate inopportunely remained unfulfilled 
from the security point of view given that the Ahtisaari Plan endured unenforced in the north 
of the country, a challenge that ICO foresaw and the consequences of which are distressing 
the sovereignty and security situation of the country to this day . 
ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE 
MISSION IN KOSOVO
The OSCE Mission in Kosovo (OMiK) was established in 1999 and it is the second largest 
field operation. It is the only international civilian organisation that is present in the entire 
territory of Kosovo and that monitors political and institutional developments as well as the 
23 State Building and Exit… 13 .
24 State Building and Exit... 14 .
25 Feith, P . “Overseeing Kosovo’s Conditional Independence” European Council on Foreign Relations, Commen-
tary” . https://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_overseeing_kosovos_conditional_independence, Accessed on 21 
February 2019 .
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developments in the field of security. In terms of institution building, the Mission has been 
engaged in establishing many key institutions, like the Assembly of Kosovo, the Ombuds-
person Institution, the Central Election Commission, the Office of the Language Commis-
sioner, municipal community protection bodies, etc .26 The mandate of the mission is deter-
mined by UNSC Resolution 1244 based on Decision 305 of July, 1999 of the Permanent 
Council of the OSCE . 
In terms of security, OMiK supports ministries and law enforcement agencies to review 
strategies and action plans regarding the fight against different security threats such as or-
ganized crime, violent extremism, terrorism, etc ., as well as the strategies on intelligence-led 
policing, community policing and safety . It works on expanding police-public partnerships 
through fostering dialogue between the communities and police . It has established a number 
of community safety forums through which the security issues are addressed while working 
to establish new ones in the northern part of Kosovo . OMiK works towards increasing the 
representation of communities and gender in police and other managerial positions . Police is 
also monitored for the compliance with human rights .27 Hence, OMiK still has an important 
role in the security sector development and advancement .
The functional mandate of OMiK’s thematic departments derives from the OSCE’s 
General Council Decision no . 305,28 approved on 01 July 1999, which explicitly refers to 
UNSCR 1244, thus the mandate of the OSCE is defined directly through this Resolution 
and it constitutes one of UNMIK’s main pillars . This decision mandates OMiK with a lead-
ing role in institution building, democratisation and human rights . Through this reference, 
OMiK extends its mandate from one year to the other while the relations with Kosovo are 
quite paradoxical due to the obsolete authorisation of its mandate . This presents one of the 
main obstacles for the coordination, planning and identification of the needs of the Republic 
of Kosovo vis-a-vis OMiK’s programs .
This does not in any way mean that many of these programs and institutions, which have 
been established by OMiK, are not suitable; on the contrary, many of them have laid grounds 
for respect for human rights such as the Ombudsperson, the rule of law efficiency, police 
academy then affirmation of institutions from modern media standards to accommodating 
minority rights in the Republic of Kosovo and as such have contributed to the security sector 
development . However, OMiK’s referral to 1999’s decisions and the completely new situ-
ation created in the Republic of Kosovo (especially after the declaration of independence, 
and the great advancement of the fundamental definition of the subjectivity and sovereignty 
of the state of Kosovo in the international sphere) are not in line with the priorities of the 
institutions of the Republic of Kosovo . Consequently, this approach clearly shows there is 
a lack of coordination with OMiK’s programmatic work in Kosovo that in an ideal scenario 
should take into consideration the needs of the Kosovo institutions and involve them in the 
planning process and not only in the implementation phases .29
26 “Mission in Kosovo” . Factsheet . Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) . Pristina, 2017 . 
https://www.osce.org/mission-in-kosovo/143996?download=true
27 “Mission in Kosovo” .
28 “Decision No . 305 . PC .DEC/305 .” Permanent Council of Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe 
(OSCE) . PC Journal 237 . Agenda item 2 ., 1 July 1999 . Parag . 6 . https://www.osce.org/pc/28795?download=true
29 Coordination of Priorities and a Coordinated Technical-Content Modality with OMiK and Proactive Approach 
to OSCE Member States. Internal Draft Concept Document of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Department for 
NATO and Security Policies: Pristina, 2018 .
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In the political sphere, in the framework of relations with the Permanent Council and 
the OSCE Secretariat,30 Kosovo is regrettably formally addressed in full reference to Reso-
lution 1244 and the Decision 305 of 1999 of the OSCE . As indicated above, not only with 
regards to the relations with OMiK but also when ministerial meetings of the member states 
are concerned, starting from the OSCE Permanent Council to the lowest level fora, the entire 
correspondence related to Kosovo including official documents does not mention Kosovo in-
stitutions while uses the asterisk that refers to UNSCR 1244 . There are cases when discussions 
in meetings exceed OMiK’s respective content, especially through non-recognizing states, pri-
marily by Serbia and Russia, which also serve to create an opinion about the image and situa-
tion in Kosovo by voicing issues of daily politics and processes outside the contextual mandate 
of OMiK. Thus, Kosovo is not allowed to participate during the OMiK Chief of Staff semester 
reporting to the OSCE’s Permanent Council which is not the case for example with the UNSC 
when reporting about Kosovo, where the Kosovo Government is present and reports .
Therefore, Kosovo does not participate in any formal OSCE activities even though 
OMiK is the second largest mission – out of the 16 existing OSCE field missions. Even 
though the scope of the mandate encompasses the security sector and particular security 
institutions from various perspectives, OMiK has the tendency to run its own programs 
without consulting Kosovo institutions for their needs . This is best illustrated by the OSCE 
Programme Outline 2019 SEC .GSL/65/18 for the OSCE missions,31 where in the part for 
Kosovo in the first paragraph it is stated that the new strategic framework will take into 
consideration the specific role and expertise of the mission that has been realized over years 
and will aim to further clarify the mission’s focus in the fields where the OSCE possesses 
added values . The role and the expertise of the mission should go hand in hand with the de-
velopment needs of the Kosovo institutions which in fact should present the core reasons of 
OMiK presence in Kosovo . Furthermore, the respective document indicates that the OSCE 
will continue to implement its activities in coordination with the international community 
without mentioning or referring to the institutions of Kosovo . Hence to prove this point or 
rather the concerns raised by the Kosovo side, even this very important document about the 
work of the OSCE does not refer directly to the consultations with the Kosovo institutions or 
to a formal orientation along priorities of the Government of Kosovo which are covered by 
OMiK .32 While acclaims for some segments of security sector development are undeniable, 
still they tend not to go in a two way direction .
To this end, membership in the OSCE is one of the long-term aims of Kosovo . Yet, 
Kosovo should persuade member states for new forms of cooperation that goes beyond the 
obsolete documents of 1999 and at the same time lobby and “convince” them about the ben-
efits of its membership, from the security point of view in particular. Kosovo’s membership 
would have resolved the problems of interaction and as well definition of programs deriving 
from the necessities of the institutions would have been more adequate . This certainly will 
depend on the dynamics of the geopolitics circumstances but one thing is for sure, it would 
have contributed to the overall security in the region and advancement of the security insti-
tutions of Kosovo .
30 The Secretariat consists of 57 member states, where over half of them have recognised the independence of the 
Republic of Kosovo .
31 “OSCE–2019 Programme Outline” . SEC .GAL/65/18 . Restricted Document . Organization for Security and 
Co-operation in Europe . 2018 . 10 .
32 “OSCE–2019 Programme Outline” . 10 .
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THE ROLE OF NATO IN KOSOVO – SECURITY  
AND BEYOND
Since June 1999, NATO, namely Kosovo Force (KFOR) has been leading a peace-support 
operation in Kosovo as the main supporter of wider international efforts for peace and sta-
bility . KFOR was established after the air campaign against Milosevic’s regime . This air 
campaign was launched by the Alliance in March 1999 to stop the humanitarian catastrophe 
that was then unfolding . The mandate of KFOR derives from United Nations Security Coun-
cil Resolution (UNSCR) 1244 of June 1999 and the Military-Technical Agreement between 
NATO and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Serbia . KFOR operates under Chapter 
VII of the UN Charter and, as such, conducts a peace enforcement operation .33 
KFOR’s mandate is to deter renewed hostility and threats against Kosovo by Yugoslav 
and Serb forces; establish a secure environment and ensure public safety and order; demili-
tarize the Kosovo Liberation Army; support the international humanitarian effort; and coor-
dinate with, and support, the international civil presence . KFOR continues to help “maintain 
a safe and secure environment and freedom of movement for all people and communities in 
Kosovo .”34
Martin A . Smith and Paul Latawski claim that the NATO air operations against the 
government of Milosevic have been among the most controversial aspects of the Alliance’s 
involvement in South East Europe since the end of the Cold War . Many critics and scholars 
qualified the military intervention in different ways, such as ‘humanitarian war’, ‘virtual 
war’, intervention and ‘humanitarian intervention’ . Nonetheless, the debate over the use of 
force was mainly concerned with the legality and legitimacy as well as the ethic basis and its 
impact on the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of states. They further argue 
that these conceptual debates are important not only within the context of European security 
but for the international system as a whole .35 
Certainly, the rationale of NATO and its member states was clear, first, all diplomatic 
efforts and actions were exhausted and second, there were imperative humanitarian consid-
erations . Military power was employed to support the political aim, as the Serbian actions 
were in breach of the core values and norms embraced by the “Atlantic Community” namely 
NATO .36  
With the passage of time, as the security situation has improved, NATO has been 
gradually adjusting KFOR’s posture towards a smaller and more flexible force with few-
er static tasks . The North Atlantic Council decides about all adjustments to the KFOR 
posture conditional to the evolvement of the security situation on the ground . KFOR co-
operates and coordinates with the United Nations (UN), the European Union (EU) and 
other international actors to support the development of a stable, peaceful, democratic and 
multi-ethnic Kosovo .37 
33 “NATO’s role in Kosovo” . North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) . 29 November 2018 . https://www .nato .
int/cps/en/natohq/topics_48818.htm, Accessed on 21 February 2019 .
34 NATO’s role in Kosovo” .
35 Latawski, P . and Smith, M . A . The Kosovo crisis and the evolution of post-Cold War European Security. Man-
chester: Manchester University Press, 2003 . 165 .
36 Latawski and Smith . The Kosovo crisis… 165 .
37 Latawski and Smith . The Kosovo crisis… 165 .
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Figure 1: NATO Kosovo Force United in Commitment 
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The role of NATO in Kosovo was multifaceted while its operations evolved from the air 
war to humanitarian assistance to peacekeeping and peace building .38 As such, some of the 
units, such as civil affairs, significantly extended the mission in support of peace operations. 
Thus, civil affairs soldiers were out every day working with UNMIK to help set up local 
governments and restore electricity, water and telephone service . KFOR operates under the 
auspices of the UNSCR 1244 and through its military ensures peace and also supports UN-
MIK, the EULEX Civilian Crisis Management Operation as well as other international or-
ganisations . KFOR enjoyed and enjoys respect not only from Kosovo’s institutions but also 
from its citizens because of its role in maintaining peace, security and stability in Kosovo . 
Another importance of the role of NATO in Kosovo other than its contribution to the peace 
and security through the mission of KFOR is its impact in the establishment, consolidation 
and functionalization of the KSF . 
Currently, in Kosovo there are around 3,600 NATO troops run by KFOR, from 28 states 
(20 NATO members and 8 NATO partners), which continue to contribute to the maintenance 
of a safe and secure environment for all citizens . 
CONCLUSION
The role of international organisations was indispensable in Kosovo both for providing secu-
rity and creating its security architecture . The progression of the security policies in Kosovo 
since the end of the war has been handled and guided mainly by the international actors . 
Essentially, the security sector did not exist whereas the international military and civil pres-
ence was responsible for securing the borders of Kosovo as well as providing public order . 
This brings us to a rather oxymoronic situation if we consider the fact that most of the re-
ports released by the organizations examined in this chapter are very critical to the public 
institutions of Kosovo while these same organisations were involved in the institution and 
capacity building of these very institutions . This situation ultimately suggests that part of the 
responsibility lies on the respective international organisations as well .
Rebecca J . Cruise and Suzette R . Grillot argue that the role of the international commu-
nity is not over, claiming that the EU, NATO and the OSCE must continue to enhance the 
communication and collaboration at the elite-levels . According to them, these organizations 
must also continue and build up their pledge to funding and supporting local community 
through the project development with a special focus on those projects that intend to bridge 
ethnic divergences through an increased interaction .39 I agree that there is still a need for the 
international organisations’ support given the fragility of the institutions, inner politicization 
and also external influences primarily of Serbia. Ethnic divergence is not as big as it is por-
trayed by the international organisations, most of the time it is an outcome of the political 
interference that comes from Serbia . In this light, Kosovo should be proactive and more 
inclusive and work very closely with the local Serbs . The constitution of Kosovo generously 
grants them all rights and other affirmative actions in line with international standards and as 
such they should take their fates in their own hands and make decisions without interference 
from Belgrade . Once an extensive local ownership of all communities living in Kosovo is 
38 Wentz, L . K . “Introduction” . In Wentz, L . K . (ed .), Lessons from Kosovo: The KFOR Experience. Washington, 
D .C .: CCRP, 2002 . 3-7 .
39 Cruise, R . J . and Grillot, S . R . “Regional Security Community in the Western Balkans: A Cross-Comparative 
Analysis” . Journal of Regional Security 8/1 . 2013 . 21 .
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reached, the level of accountability will be increased along with the reduction of eventual 
divergences. Sonja Stojanovic Gajic rightly finds that in the initial two phases of SSR the 
coordination of the international community was much better and this is attributed to the 
executive role of the UN mission as a main pillar that managed to integrate major intergov-
ernmental actors such as the OSCE, the EU and KFOR and more openly defined the distri-
butions of tasks between them . However, in regard to capacity building that would lead to an 
increased local ownership, there was no coherence in terms of transferring articulate models 
to local authorities . Much of the work was undertaken by the contingents of the member 
states or senior representatives of the international organizations, which resulted in the ap-
plication of their respective national models .40 She further claims that the partial engage-
ment of local actors in security governance during the stabilization and demobilization phase 
precluded the development of local ownership .41 However, after the inclusion of Kosovo 
institutions in the security sector, the commencement of the security sector review process 
developed accordingly along with the overall political developments . Throughout this pro-
cess the most significant development was the Internal Security Sector Review (ISSR) that 
gave way to the creation of the new security architecture in Kosovo and most importantly 
the establishment of two important ministries, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the Min-
istry of Justice . Finally, in the new security architecture in Kosovo the new institutions were 
created: KSF, KSC, KIA including reforms in police and emergency services . What is most 
important, the SSSR referred to the gradual transformation of the KSF to the Kosovo Armed 
Forces (KAF), whose mission will be the protection of the territorial sovereignty and integ-
rity of Kosovo whereas the MKSF will be turned into the Ministry of Defence (MoD), which 
will exercise civil and democratic control of the KAF . All these developments happened 
with support and mentoring and international supervision which leads to the conclusion that 
the role of international organizations in the creation and structuring of the security mech-
anisms has been indispensable . However, the question to ask is: what is the exit strategy for 
the international organisations in Kosovo? What benchmarks determine their continuation 
of operation in Kosovo or redefinition of their mandates, which as examined in this chapter, 
should be in line with the needs of the Kosovo institutions . The response though politically 
very complex, is very simple: peace, stability, sustainable development can only be ensured 
once Kosovo becomes member of the Euro-Atlantic structures and this is what actually sets 
the basis for the withdrawal of the international organizations from Kosovo . 
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ABSTRACT: For a long time, the Central Mediterranean migration route was the most pop-
ular among those which went to the European Union from Africa. However, data from 
2018 show that the trend is about to turn, and the Western Mediterranean route to Spain 
is about to become the most popular. Changes in Italy, the entering point to Europe pre-
sumably means changes in the African internal routes as well. This article intends to track 
the reasons which could affect the migratory pattern to the EU. The research focuses on 
the condition changes along the Central Mediterranean route, from Italy, to Mali. The ar-
ticle aims to sum up both the political and security domains, including the CSDP missions 
and operation from the southern border of the EU to the heart of West Africa. 
KEYWORDS: international migration, Central Mediterranean route, Italy, Libya, Mali, Niger, 
West African route 
INTRODUCTION 
In 2018 the whole European Union turned its eyes towards Italy . The reason: the parlia-
mentary elections . As in one of the biggest migration transit and receiving countries, inter-
nal political changes in Italy are expected to influence the migration flows of the Central 
Mediterranean route . The rising popularity of the League and the Five Star Movement 
(M5S) foreshadowed radical changes in Italy’s migration policies . New approaches on the 
European side are likely to influence changes in the migration patterns in Africa as well. 
The biggest North-African transit country, Libya is experiencing years-long fight for na-
tional power, which took another violent turn in April 2019 . The events in Libya possibly 
affect the migration flows, discouraging people to choose the Central Mediterranean route. 
As a result of growing insecurity and jeopardy during the travel, migratory routes can 
change to directions which are assessed to be cheaper or safer . Additionally, in 2017 the 
former Italian government also managed to secure a deal with Libyan tribal leaders to seal 
the borders, which also affected migration routes.1 The possible consequence is a change 
in the migratory pattern between Africa and Europe .
1 “Italy brokers deal with Libyan tribes to curb migrant influx”. https://www .euractiv .com/section/politics/news/
italy-brokers-deal-with-libyan-tribes-to-curb-migrant-influx/, Accessed on 12 May 2019 .
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Map 1: Geographical overview
In addition to the changes in Italy and Libya, Mali is experiencing a further deterioration 
in the country’s internal security. The ongoing conflict in the Northern part of the country 
and the escalation of ethnic tension in the Center, can also affect migration patterns. The 
political and security changes could affect the migrants’ choice, on which route they prefer 
to use, let it be intra- or inter-African . However, these changes do not necessarily result in 
changing patterns. To assess what is behind the figures on the Central- and Western Mediter-
ranean route, I will examine both the developments in the political situation in Italy, and the 
evolution of the security situation in Libya and Mali . I also used data analysis to examine if 
the change of the figures in the Central and Western Mediterranean routes means a change 
in the migration flow as well.
MEDITERRANEAN MAYHEM
In 2018, we could see significant changes in the migration policies of the EU’s southern 
flank. The result of the Italian elections predestined the changes. The far-right League and 
the anti-establishment M5S parties formed the new government .2 The parties gained pop-
ularity because of the existing economic problems, the failed growth, and the long-lasting 
pressure of irregular migration flows from Libya, and their dissatisfactory management. In 
parallel, trust decreased towards the EU and its institutions . With this background, it was not 
a surprise, that one of the main policy changes occurred in the field of migration. The new, 
more radical approach discontinued the practice of the former government in supporting the 
presence of the NGO boats in the Mediterranean . Instead, it insisted on the closure of the 
Italian ports to migrants .3 This step did not come unexpectedly, since earlier Italy heavily 
criticised the NGO activity in the Mediterranean . NGO vessels could use Libyan coastal 
2 Kirchgaessner, S . “Italy’s president invites populist coalition to form government” . The Guardian, 23 May 2018 . 
https://www .theguardian .com/world/2018/may/23/italys-president-invites-populist-coalition-to-form-govern-
ment, Accessed on 4 May 2019 .
3 Molnár, A . “Olaszország biztonsági kihívásai és stratégiai irányai” [Italian Security Challenges and Strategic 
Directions] . Felderítő Szemle 17/3 . 2018 . 91-111 . http://knbsz .gov .hu/hu/letoltes/fsz/2018-3 .pdf, Accessed on 4 
May 2019 .
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waters, while the EUNAVFOR MED ships could not, and were able to transport the stranded 
directly to Italian or Maltese ports .4
Because of the growing migratory pressure, and the lack of burden sharing, the 
South-European border countries, namely Malta and Italy closed their ports to NGO res-
cue ships . The most well-known case is the Aquarius, which was forced to detour to Spain 
with rescued asylum seekers on board . Therefore, since 26th August 2018 the rescue ships, 
which are operating in the Mediterranean have not had a clear guideline where to disem-
bark with the rescued migrants .5 The decision of Italy and Malta to keep their ports closed 
to vessels which are carrying saved migrants on board also changed the attitude of cargo 
ships . These vessels started to neglect their duty to save people in distress because of the 
fear of economic loss .6
Italy’s first attempt to gain more control over NGOs was made in 2017, when the 
government passed a code of conduct for NGOs, who run migrant rescue ships in the 
Mediterranean . The 12-point code includes limitations, such as banning NGO ships to 
enter Libyan territorial waters and calls for closer cooperation with the police .7 The code 
was presented to around nine NGOs which were threatened with being barred from Ital-
ian ports in case of refusal .8 It was, however, not the final step by Italy in restricting 
migration policies . On 24th September 2018, the Council of Ministers approved a decree 
which restricts access to asylum, protection, and increases detention .9 The notorious law, 
advocated by Interior Minister Matteo Salvini (League), was approved on 29th November 
2018 .10 The new legislation does now allow to give protection on humanitarian grounds . 
This means that those who are not eligible to asylum, but had serious reasons of human-
itarian nature to flee their home countries are no longer entitled to get asylum status.11 It 
also extended the time limitation for keeping migrants in detention centres . Besides this, 
the withdrawal of the already granted protection became easier . A list of various crimes, 
from thefts to violence to public officials, was identified, for which asylum seekers can 
be expelled from Italy . The new law also weakens the integration program, the Protection 
System for Asylum Seekers and Refugees (SPRAR) . This step will possibly lead to an 
4 Molnár, A. “Az EUNAVFOR MED Sophia műveleti” [The EUNAVFO MED Operation Sophia]. In Molnár, A. 
and Komlósi, O . (eds .) Az Európai Unió mediterrán térséggel összefüggő kapcsolata. Budapest: Dialóg Campus, 
2019 . 95-121 . https://akfi-dl.uni-nke.hu/pdf_kiadvanyok/Web_PDF_Az%20EU_mediterran_terseggel_osszef-
uggo_kapcsolata.pdf, Accessed on 4 May 2019 .
5 Tondo, L . and McVeigh, K . “No NGO rescue boats currently in central Mediterranean, agencies warn” . The 
Guardian, 12 September 2018 . https://www .theguardian .com/world/2018/sep/12/migrant-rescue-ships-mediter-
ranean, Accessed on 4 May 2019 .
6 Schmeer, L . “Migration in the Mediterranean: between Myth and Reality” . https://eyes-on-europe .eu/migra-
tion-mediterranean/, Accessed on 19 September 2019 .
7 Zalan, E . “NGOs divided by Italy’s new rescue code” . https://euobserver .com/migration/138656, Accessed on 19 
September 2019 .
8 Balmer, C . “Italy drafts contested code of conduct for NGO migrant boats” . https://www .reuters .com/article/
us-europe-migrants-ngos/italy-drafts-contested-code-of-conduct-for-ngo-migrant-boats-idUSKBN19X2U1, 
Accessed on 19 . September 2019 .
9 Sunderland, J . “New Low for Italian Migration Policies” . https://www .hrw .org/news/2018/09/26/new-low-ital-
ian-migration-policies, Accessed on 4 May 2019 .
10 Scherer, S . “Italy’s Salvini gets win with new asylum and security rules” . Reuters . https://www .reuters .com/ar-
ticle/us-italy-politics-immigration-security/italys-salvini-gets-win-with-new-asylum-and-security-rules-idUSK-
CN1NY1JN, Accessed on 11 May 2019 .
11 Torrisi, C . “The Italian government has approved a new bill targeting migrants” . https://openmigration .org/en/
analyses/the-italian-government-has-approved-a-new-bill-targeting-migrants/, Accessed on 4 May 2019 .
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increase in the number of those who are in an irregular situation . In parallel with this, the 
legislation strengthens the police through increasing funds .12 
Meanwhile Malta, with no EU agreement on search and rescue cooperation, follows the 
migration policy, which has the widest support throughout the EU, namely the fortification 
and externalisation of Europe’s border control . Besides this, Malta is an active participant 
in training the Libyan Coast Guard, and views the North African country as a partner in the 
EU’s external border management .13 
However important, these Member State responses cannot influence migration flows 
in the Mediterranean in themselves . The EU has a mission and an operation under the 
Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) in the Mediterranean . The mission is the 
European Union Integrated Border Management Assistance Mission in Libya (EUBAM 
Libya), which is a civilian mission . Its task is to “support the Libyan authorities in con-
tributing to efforts to disrupt organised criminal networks involved notably in smuggling 
migrants, human trafficking and terrorism.” It started in 2013, and “supports the Libyan 
authorities in the areas of border management, law enforcement and criminal justice .”14 
The EUBAM Libya has always had a difficulty to conduct its tasks. The deterioration of 
the security situation drove the mission out of the country in July 2014, and for the second 
time in 2019 . Mainly because of these negative circumstances the mission reduced its 
activities in Libya .15
The operation, the EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia, is more interesting. The first 
phase of the operation was launched on 22nd June 2015, with a focus on “surveillance and 
assessment of human smuggling and trafficking networks in the Southern Central Med-
iterranean . The second stage of the operation provided search and, if necessary, seizure 
of suspicious vessels .”16 In 2017 the Council extended the mandate of the operation with 
two additional tasks, “with the training of the Libyan Coast Guard and Navy, and with the 
contribution to the implementation of the UN arms embargo on the high seas off the coast 
of Libya .”17
As the operation is part of the EU’s comprehensive approach to migration, and its head-
quarters is located in Rome, the expiration of its mandate on 31st December 2018, provided 
Italy with an opportunity . Italy had enough of receiving migrants in the shape of letting 
NGO vessels into its ports and having the EUNAVFOR MED ships rescuing the stranded 
as well . Therefore, the newly elected government, pushed for changing the rules to be able 
to redistribute rescued migrants in November 2018 . Interior Minister Matteo Salvini even 
threatened with closing up the operation, if there is no consensus on the proposed relocation 
system, which would ease the pressure on Rome . Other options emerged, one of them to shut 
12 Matamoros, C . A . “Italy’s new security decree clamps down on immigration” . https://www .euronews .
com/2018/11/29/italy-s-new-security-decree-clamps-down-on-immigration, Accessed on 4 May 2019 .
13 “Cherry-picking Europe: Migration and economic management in Malta” . European Council on Foreign Relations . 
https://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_cherry_picking_europe_migration_and_economic_management_in_
malta, Accessed on 12 May 2019 .
14 “EU Integrated Border Assistance Mission in Libya (EUBAM Libya)” . https://eeas .europa .eu/sites/eeas/
files/20190319_eubam_libya_factsheet_march_2019_en.pdf, Accessed on 12 May 2019 .
15 EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia Official. Personal interview. 17 June 2019.
16 “Council launches EU naval operation to disrupt human smugglers and traffickers in the Mediterranean”. https://
www .consilium .europa .eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/06/22/fac-naval-operation/, Accessed on 04 May 2019 .
17 “Story” . https://www .operationsophia .eu/about-us/#story, Accessed on 4 May 2019 .
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down Operation Sophia, and another is to launch a new mission in Tunisia, with the focus on 
training the Libyan Coast Guard .18
Meanwhile it does not serve entirely the Italian interests to close Operation Sophia . 
It is an operation led by Italy, with an HQ located in Rome, and it gives prestige to the coun-
try .19 It would also put more responsibility and financial burden on Italy if Operation Sophia 
ends . Rome would have to handle migration in the Central Mediterranean alone, if the mi-
gration flows from Libya increase.20 Not to mention Italian ties with Libya, which would 
further erode with finishing up the operation. Keeping these in mind, Italian Prime Minister 
Giuseppe Conte proposed a three months technical elongation to the operation . During this 
timeframe Italy aimed to achieve its originally proposed conditions .21
The new timeframe was not enough for successful negotiations and reaching consensus in 
the EU . Moreover, Italy’s decision to close its ports, and refuse to allow EUNAVFOR MED 
ships to disembark rescued migrants can easily lead to further conflicts within the EU. The first 
sign of it was when Germany decided to withdraw its naval units form Operation Sophia .22
Because of the lack of consensus, in March 2019, the Political Security Committee of 
the EU agreed on a six-month-long elongation of the operation, with a rather interesting 
solution . France proposed to temporarily suspend the deployment of naval assets of the EU-
NAVFOR MED, allowing only the air component to conduct surveillance tasks . In parallel 
with this, the EU reinforced the support to the Libyan Coast Guard .23 
The current Italian struggles to reduce the number of migrants arriving in the Central Med-
iterranean are, however, not the first attempts to reduce migration flows. After the EU-Turkey 
deal in 2016, the EU was keen to reach agreement with Libya as well, securing the communi-
ty’s southern borders . Thus, negotiations started in early 2017 between EU and North-African 
representatives .24 Italy took the leading role in the negotiations soon . Then Interior Minister 
Marco Minniti announced on 02nd April 2017, that after three days of negotiations behind 
closed doors, 60 tribal leaders from Libya agreed to secure the country’s vast southern borders . 
The deal included the deployment of a Libyan border patrol unit to the 5,000 kms long south-
ern border area. Besides this, various tribes agreed to monitor different sections of the border. 
The deal not just aims to reduce migration flows, but also to reduce criminal activity in the 
region: people, drugs, weapons smuggling . It also calls for job training programmes, in order 
to provide young people with other options than joining criminal groups .25
18 Barigazzi, J . “EU diplomats tentatively agree to extend Operation Sophia” . https://www .politico .eu/article/eu-
rope-migration-refugees-diplomats-agree-to-extend-operation-sophia/, Accessed on 12 May 2019 .
19 Taylor, P . “Salvini’s Sophia soapbox” . Politico, 12 March 2019 . https://www .politico .eu/article/italy-matteo-sal-
vini-sophia-soapbox/, Accessed on 12 May 2019 .
20 Barigazzi, J . “EU diplomats tentatively agree to extend Operation Sophia” . https://www .politico .eu/article/eu-
rope-migration-refugees-diplomats-agree-to-extend-operation-sophia/, Accessed on 12 May 2019 .
21 “Italy extends Operation Sophia for three months” . https://www .infomigrants .net/en/post/13824/italy-ex-
tends-operation-sophia-for-three-months, Accessed on 12 May 2019 .
22 “German Navy drops out of Mediterranean Sea operation Sophia” . https://navaltoday .com/2019/01/23/ger-
man-navy-drops-out-of-mediterranean-sea-operation-sophia/, Accessed on 12 May 2019 .
23 Barigazzi, J . “EU diplomats tentatively agree to extend Operation Sophia” . https://www .politico .eu/article/eu-
rope-migration-refugees-diplomats-agree-to-extend-operation-sophia/, Accessed on 12 May 2019 .
24 “European, North Africa ministers seek to curb Libya migrant flows”. https://www .euractiv .com/section/jus-
tice-home-affairs/news/european-north-africa-ministers-seek-to-curb-libya-migrant-flows/, Accessed on 12 
May 2019 .
25 “Italy brokers deal with Libyan tribes to curb migrant influx”. https://www .euractiv .com/section/politics/news/
italy-brokers-deal-with-libyan-tribes-to-curb-migrant-influx/, Accessed on 12 May 2019 .
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The deal, agreed with the help of Italian Interior Minister Minniti, proved to be suc-
cessful in reducing the migration flows. By September 2017, the figures decreased dramat-
ically on the Central Mediterranean route . However, rumours started, that Italy induced 
Libyan tribes and militias to end their illicit activities, especially people smuggling and 
human trafficking. Paired with the Libyan Coast Guard playing more active role in rescu-
ing migrants .26
Map 2: Influx of refugees and migrants to Europe  
Source: https://erccportal.jrc.ec.europa.eu/getdailymap/docId/2707, Accessed on 4 May 2019.
According to Map 2. the decline in the migratory figures started in mid-June 2017, 
continued throughout 2018, and the decrease sustained steadily in 2019 as well, as it is clear 
from Map 3 . Translating it to numbers, around 24,000 migrants arrived in Italy in June 2017, 
which dropped back to less than 5,000 monthly arrivals in 2018,27 and less than 300 in the 
first two months of 2019.28 
26 Wintour, P . “Italian minister defends methods that led to 87% drop in migrants from Libya” . The Guardian, 7 
September 2017 . https://www .theguardian .com/world/2017/sep/07/italian-minister-migrants-libya-marco-minniti, 
Accessed on 12 May 2019 .
27 “Influx of refugees and migrants to Europe”. https://erccportal .jrc .ec .europa .eu/getdailymap/docId/2707, 
Accessed on 4 May 2019 .
28 “Influx of refugees and migrants to Europe in 2019”. https://erccportal .jrc .ec .europa .eu/getdailymap/docId/2839, 
Accessed on 04 May 2019 .
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Map 3: Influx of refugees and migrants to Europe in 2019: map  
Source: https://erccportal.jrc.ec.europa.eu/getdailymap/docId/2955, Accessed on 18 July 2019.
However, the conflict in Libya did not continue as peacefully as it was expected in 
2019. To follow up the rather peaceful period of 2017-2018, when different armed groups 
secured their territorial gains, in the end of 2018 General Khalifa Haftar started his southern 
campaign with the Libyan National Army (LNA) .29 His aim was to secure oil fields and fight 
terrorist groups . The operation, which lasted for almost seven weeks, ended on 02nd March 
2019 .30 With this step, General Haftar gained control over the key oilfields in Libya. Besides 
the oilfields, General Haftar went into a territory, which was involved in the EU’s external 
border control, therefore the Italian deal, made in 2017, possibly fell victim of General 
Haftar’s southern campaign . The Tobruk based LNA gained control just over the oil, but not 
the revenues . The Libyan oil should be sold by the National Oil Corporation (NOC), and the 
payments are received by the Central Bank of Libya . These institutions, besides they both 
are headquartered in Tripoli, are declared as neutral . However, NOC condemned the LNA’s 
militarisation of two facilities . The move resulted in the open support of LNA from the east-
ern NOC subsidiaries. Thus, General Haftar still needs to control Tripoli to influence the rev-
enue allocation .31 Economic considerations, years-long intent to take Tripoli, and possibly 
29 Marsai, V. “Elemző tanulmány a 2019. március 14. és 23. közötti Líbia migrációs kutatásához”. http://kozerthe-
totudas .hu/2019/04/11/marsai-viktor-elemzo-tanulmany-a-2019-marcius-14-es-23-kozotti-libiai-migracios-ku-
tatasahoz/, Accessed on 19 September 2019 .
30 Binnie, J . “LNA advances across southwest Libya” . Jane’s Defence Weekly 56/11 . 2019 . 16 .
31 Smith, R. and Pack, J. “Oil revenue access drives conflict”. https://www .petroleum-economist .com/articles/pol-
itics-economics/middle-east/2019/oil-revenue-access-drives-conflict, Accessed on 19 September 2019 .
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some international suggestions led to General Haftar’s next step, the offensive against Trip-
oli . On 03rd April the LNA started its advancement towards the country’s capital .32 It became 
obvious soon, that capturing Tripoli will not be an easy task for the LNA, and by the end 
of April a house-to-house fight was unfolding.33 The protracted battle for Tripoli will soon 
affect migration as well. When the fights started there were approximately 140,000 migrants 
in Tripoli, who were in need for protection .34 According to IOM, Libya has a migrant stock 
of about 820,000 people, mainly from Syria and sub-Saharan Africa .35 The Libyan Ministry 
of Interior, however, estimates the number of irregular migrants in the country around 1 .5 
million, but we have to take in consideration, that there is no reliable data from Cyrenaica 
or Fezzan .36 The population in Tripoli, local and migrant, are both in a volatile situation, 
and will likely seek the opportunity to flee Libya to safer countries if the situation does not 
change in the short-term . With Libya becoming an unsafe country to reach, the protracted 
situation can affect migration patterns in the mid-term from the sub-Saharan region, to adapt 
to the new situation . The second part of the article investigates the possibility of Mali be-
coming a migration hub due to the changes in the situation in Libya and the Mediterranean .
MALI MISFORTUNE 
To be able to place Mali and assess its status on the West African migration route, the security 
situation in the country must be analysed . In 2012, a Tuareg insurgency started in the northern 
region of the country, aiming to liberate Azawad, a Tuareg state . Bamako could not handle the 
situation in the north, and a coup d’état, led by military officers, made the situation more com-
plex in the country . The coup de grâce came in April 2012, with the Islamist groups taking the 
lead in the Tuareg insurgency . In 2013, an international intervention started in the country, and 
in 2015 the insurgency was supposed to end when a peace agreement was signed between the 
warring parties, namely the Mali government, the Platform, and the Coordination of Azawad 
Movements (CMA) .37 However, the conflict de-escalated, it has not ceased but remained at 
low-middle intensity .38 After the Peace Agreement was signed, despite the heavy international 
presence in the country, the government was not able to consolidate the situation . Jihadist at-
tacks remained a problem throughout the years, not just in the northern region of Mali, but in 
the whole country . The presence of multiple groups even threatens with the possibility of the re-
gionalisation of the conflict, with a spill-over to Niger and Burkina Faso. Now, in 2019, besides 
the radical Islamism, Bamako has to face escalating ethnic tensions in the central region of the 
32 “Eastern Libyan commander orders forces to move on Tripoli” . Reuters . https://www .reuters .com/article/us-libya-se-
curity/eastern-libyan-commander-orders-forces-to-move-on-tripoli-idUSKCN1RG0RT, Accessed on 12 May 2019 .
33 “Libyan forces push back against Haftar in house-to-house battles” . Reuters . https://www .reuters .com/article/
us-libya-security/libyan-forces-push-back-against-haftar-in-house-to-house-battles-idUSKCN1S40Q8, Access-
ed on 12 May 2019 .
34 Peyton, N . “Migrant women, children denied shelter in Libya’s battleground” . Reuters . https://www .reuters .
com/article/us-libya-security-migrants/migrant-women-children-denied-shelter-in-libyas-battleground-idUSK-
CN1SG1PV, Accessed on 12 May 2019 .
35 “Migration Data Portal” . IOM . https://migrationdataportal.org/?i=stock_abs_&t=2019&cm49=434, Accessed 
on 19 September 2019 .
36 Marsai. “Elemző tanulmány a 2019. március 14. és 23. közötti Líbia migrációs kutatásához”.
37 Vecsey, M . “Maliból jelentik” [Reported from Mali] . In Kaló, J . (ed .) Napjaink biztonsági kihívásai, veszélyei és 
fenyegetései. Budapest, NKE Szolgáltató Nonprofit Kft., 2016. 129-143.
38 “Conflict Barometer 2016”. Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research. 76. https://hiik .de/con-
flict-barometer/bisherige-ausgaben/?lang=en, Accessed on 1 October 2017 .
107International security
country . With such a background it is a rightful question to ask how Mali could possibly apply 
for the position of a migration hub . The answer can lie in the local patterns . Mali is already the 
part of a rather busy regional migration system, specifically the West African one. Migration 
within the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) region is mainly labour 
migration of various kinds: seasonal, temporary or permanent . Mali and Niger, the well-known 
migration hub, are both countries of origin and destination in this complex . Mobility within the 
ECOWAS is easy, since it is a visa-free movement area . Therefore, changes in the migration 
routes would not demand further documentation, other than a passport . However, the use of 
smugglers is common, especially when the aim is to exit the free movement area .39
In 2017, Mali hosted about 384,000 Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and refugees .40 
The number changed during 2018 . By the middle of the year only 238,000 IDPs and refugees 
were officially reported from Mali.41 In March 2019 this figure reached 372,000 again.42 As 
these data show, the migration stock can change drastically in Mali during a couple of months’ 
time . But in a country marred with insurgencies, violent extremism, and ethnic tensions, mi-
gration stock and flows are rather fluid, and changing rapidly, depending on the situation.
Map 4: Mali Regional Crisis 
Source: https://erccportal.jrc.ec.europa.eu/getdailymap/docId/2771, Accessed on 4 May 2019.
39 “World Migration Report 2018” . IOM . http://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/wmr_2018_en.pdf, Accessed 
on 12 May 2019 .
40 “International Migration Report 2017: Highlights” . 26 . https://www .un .org/en/development/desa/population/mi-
gration/publications/migrationreport/docs/MigrationReport2017_Highlights.pdf, Accessed on 12 May 2019 .
41 “Mid-Year Trends 2018” . UNHCR . 38 . https://www .unhcr .org/statistics/unhcrstats/5c52ea084/mid-year-
trends-2018 .html, Accessed on 12 May 2019 .
42 “Mali Humanitarian Crisis” . https://erccportal .jrc .ec .europa .eu/getdailymap/docId/2918, Accessed on 13 May 2019 .
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The European Union deployed two missions to Mali, to help Bamako to consolidate the 
situation in the country . The EUTM Mali started in 2013, with the aim to provide training to 
the Malian Armed Forces (MAF), and to advice on “command and control, logistical chain, 
and human resources” together with educating MAF on human rights, and protection of 
civilians as well . The mission also got a task to conduct its tasks in close coordination with 
other actors in the country, UN peacekeeping mission MINUSMA, and ECOWAS .43 The 
original mandate only changed in 2016, when it had to add another coordinating partner, the 
G5 Sahel .44 Supporting G5 Sahel Joint Task Force means that the EU is supporting a home-
grown African solution to the regional crisis in the Sahel .
The EUCAP Sahel Mali started in 2014 . The main tasks of this civilian mission were to 
help Malian authorities to “restore and maintain constitutional and democratic order and the 
conditions for lasting peace, state authority and legitimacy in the territory of Mali .” Most 
importantly, the mandate of the mission includes the obligation to establish contacts among 
the EU missions from Mali to Libya .45 The following mandate extensions reinforced these 
tasks and obligations . In this way, Mali served as an incubator of the use of the EU’s com-
prehensive and integrated approach in practice .
The EU missions in Mali are supporting the interests of the European community . 
With the help of the EU to consolidate the situation in Mali, strengthen state legitimacy 
and training the security forces, a stable democratic country can emerge . Stable countries 
are generally not countries of origin of the migration process, so the stabilisation of the 
country is in line with the EU’s Global Strategy to build resilient states in the south down 
to Central Africa .46 
However, the situation is not favourable to achieve these optimistic goals . As the situa-
tion in the northern region has remained practically the same since the summer of 2013, and 
inter-ethnic tensions have escalated in central Mali, stability has remained a dream . Because 
of this, migration flows can be expected to change. Instead of becoming a major transit coun-
try, Mali can be again a country of origin .
Data, collected in the first half of 2019 testify, that outgoing flows were more significant 
than the incoming migration flows. Nearly half of the outgoing migration flows are Malians, 
but Guineans, Ivoreans, Senegalese, Nigeriens, and Gambians were also observed to cross 
Mali . The collected information also shows, that Spain is the most popular European target 
country, followed by Italy and France . Since the second half of 2018, Spain has replaced 
Italy as the most popular destination .47, 48, 49, This new popularity resulted in a steep increase 
43 “Council Decision 2013/34/CFSP” . https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32013D0034, 
Accessed on 04 May 2019 .
44 “Council Decision (CFSP) 2016/446” . https://publications .europa .eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/
f521b2e0-f18c-11e5-8529-01aa75ed71a1/language-en, Accessed on 04 May 2019 .
45 “Council Decision 2014/219/CFSP” . https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX-
:32014D0219&from=PT, Accessed on 04 May 2019 .
46 “Shared Vision, Common Action: a Stronger Europe, a Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and 
Security Policy” . 9 . http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/top_stories/pdf/eugs_review_web.pdf, Accessed on 25 
September 2017 .
47 “Mali: Flow Monitoring Report 36: January 2019” . IOM . https://migration .iom .int/reports/ma-
li-%E2%80%94-flow-monitoring-report-36-january-2019, Accessed on 12 May 2019 .
48 “Mali: Flow Monitoring Report 37: 1-28 February 2019” . IOM . https://migration .iom .int/reports/mali-
%E2%80%94-flow-monitoring-report-37-1-%E2%80%94-28-february-2019, Accessed on 12 May 2019 .
49 “Mali: Flow Monitoring Report 38: 1-31 March 2019” . IOM . https://migration .iom .int/reports/mali-
%E2%80%94-flow-monitoring-report-38-1-%E2%80%94-31-march-2019, Accessed on 12 May 2019 .
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in the migration flows towards Spain from Africa. However, this number did not exceed or 
even reach the figures which have been observed in the Central Mediterranean route just 
two years ago, in 2017 .50 In the first two months of 2017 roughly 14,000 migrants arrived in 
Italy from Libya, and 5,000 in Spain .51 In the following year, the same reporting period Italy 
received 5,200 migrants, while Spain 3,200. 2019 was the first year which started with vis-
ible differences in the favour of Spain. 11,138 people used the West-Mediterranean route to 
get to Europe, while only 2,160 choose the Central Mediterranean .52 To assess if this change 
in the figures means a shift in the migration pattern, I followed the method which had been 
used in an earlier research on the shift of the migration patterns . According to this research, 
the arrivals of those nationalities who used the Central Mediterranean route most commonly 
must be analysed .53
I used data collected by FRONTEX on ‘illegal border-crossings statistics’ to show data 
on the number of arrivals by nationality, using data from 2015 to May 201954 To reveal the 
possible differences between the figures of detected arrivals and asylum applicants I used 
EUROSTAT data from 2017 to June 2019 .
Data on detected border-crossing show that the main counties of origin changed over 
time regarding the Central Mediterranean route (Table 1) on a larger scale than on the West-
ern Mediterranean route (Table 3). In 2015, Eritrea, Gambia, Nigeria, Somalia and Sudan 
were the top 5 source countries of the Central Mediterranean route, while by 2019, seven 
more countries had been added to the list at least temporarily. In the first months of 2019, the 
main nationalities who used the Central Mediterranean route, were mainly from the Middle 
East and North-Africa (MENA) region, however, Eritrea and Nigeria remained among the 
top sending countries over the examined period . Besides the changes in the main national-
ities, data show a sharp decrease in the use of this route, from 90,570 people in 2015 from 
the top 5 sending nations to 1,209 in the first 5 months of 2019. In parallel with the detected 
arrivals, EUROSTAT collects data which show how many people want to legalise their sit-
uation in the host countries . Table 2 shows the main nationalities who applied for asylum in 
Italy from 2017 to June 2019 .55 The data comparison of the two tables shows gaps both in 
the number of applicants and their nationalities . Most of the countries present here as main 
senders appear in the FRONTEX dataset as well . Bangladesh, Côte d’Ivoire, Gambia, Mali 
and Nigeria are present in both tables . Senegal and Morocco, however, are not considered as 
main countries of origin, according to FRONTEX data . It is also visible that some nationals 
are not keen to legalise their situations in Italy. Among them we can find Eritreans and Guin-
eans. I assume, that the difference between the figures can be interpreted as a delay between 
the time of the detected arrival and the actual time of the application, which possibly means 
months-long delays .
50 “Europe Monthly Report” . UNHCR . March 2019 . 1-2 . https://data2 .unhcr .org/en/documents/download/68983, 
Accessed on 04 May 2019 .
51 “Influx of refugees and migrants to Europe”.
52 “Influx of refugees and migrants to Europe in 2019”.
53 Brenner, Y ., Forin, R . and Frouws, B . “The ‘Shift’ to the Western Mediterranean Migration Route: Myth or Reali-
ty?” . http://www .mixedmigration .org/articles/shift-to-the-western-mediterranean-migration-route/, Accessed on 
04 May 2019 .
54 “Detections of illegal border-crossings statistics download: updated monthly” . https://frontex .europa .eu/assets/
Migratory_routes/Detections_of_IBC_2019_07_05.xlsx, Accessed on 30 July 2019 .
55 “Asylum and first-time asylum applicants by citizenship, age and sex, monthly data (rounded)”. https://ec .eu-
ropa .eu/eurostat/data/database, Accessed on 14 May 2019 .
110 HUNGARIAN DEFENCE REVIEW, Special Issue 2019, Vol. 147, Nr. 1–2
Table 1: Detected arrivals on the Central Mediterranean route by nationality  
(Data collected from FRONTEX)
Detected arrivals on the Central Mediterranean route by nationality
Year 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019*
Eritrea 38,791 20,721 3,529
Nigeria 21,914 37,554 18,163 1,262
Somalia 12,430
Sudan 8,916 2,037 229
Gambia 8,519 11,929
Guinea 13,550 9,714 
Côte d’Ivoire 12,399 9,509
Bangladesh 9,009 193
Mali 7,119
Tunisia 5,182 347
Pakistan 1,513 232
Algeria 208
* Data collected until M05
Table 2: Asylum and first-time asylum applicants by citizenship in Italy (rounded)  
(Data collected from EUROSTAT)
Asylum and first-time asylum applicants by citizenship in Italy (rounded)
Year 2017 2018 2019
Nigeria 25,500 6,970 1,180
Bangladesh 12,445 5,410 1,060
Gambia 8,875 2,270 320
Senegal 8,455 3,060 595
Côte d’Ivoire 8,440
Mali 2,465
Morocco 510
* Data collected until M06
Table 3: Detected arrivals on the Western Mediterranean route by nationality (Data collected from 
FRONTEX)
Detected arrivals on the Western Mediterranean route by nationality
Year 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019*
Guinea 1,946 2,184 3,283 12,233 191
Algeria 1,193 1,698 4,293 4,349 324
Cameroon 843
Morocco 684 722 4,704 11,881 1,970
Côte d’Ivoire 609 1,646 3,517 4,045
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Detected arrivals on the Western Mediterranean route by nationality
Year 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019*
Gambia 899 2,660
Mali 10,747 191
Senegal 117
* Data collected until M05
The main senders regarding the Western Mediterranean route changed less over time . 
Here North-African and West African countries dominate among the top 5 countries of ori-
gin from 2015 to May 2019. On this route it is visible, that in 2018 the figures rose to 39,210 
detected arrivals from 5,275 in 2015 regarding the top 5 senders . Therefore, we can state that 
this route became the more popular, but the examination of these data is not enough to verify 
if the migration pattern changes or not because it just shows how the top 5 senders varied 
over the examined timeframe . Thus, I created a list of West African countries, collecting 
them from the main countries of origin over time on the Central Mediterranean route, to ex-
amine the detected arrivals of their nationals from 2015 to 2018 . The selected countries are 
Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea, Mali and Nigeria . To get a wider picture, I added 4 more West African 
countries, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Niger and Senegal to the examination . Senegal was added 
because it appeared as a main country of origin on the West African route, and I assumed 
that this country’s nationals use traditionally the West African route . The other 3 countries 
were chosen, because, however they are not main sending countries, they can provide further 
context on the intra-African patterns .
The first result, which is visible is, of course, the significant decrease in the figures since 
2018 . The further examination showed, that Senegalese, whom I expected to prefer the 
Western route, used mainly the Central Mediterranean between 2015 and 2017, and chang-
es occurred only in 2018 . Table 4 shows, that the selected country nationals preferred the 
Central Mediterranean route from 2015 to 2017. In 2018, the pattern changed significantly 
regarding the examined nationals . The Western Mediterranean route was preferred during 
2018 in a large extent for almost all nationalities, save Nigerians . Even such nations as Ni-
ger, for whom the Central Mediterranean route is geographically closer, started to use the 
Western route on a greater scale .
Figures also show, that the number of detected arrivals by nationality on the West-
ern Mediterranean route exceeds the figures in the Central Mediterranean route on such a 
scale, which means the change of the preferred routes . For example, in 2017, 68 Ghanaians 
and 624 Malians used the Western route, while 3,909 of Ghanaians and 7,119 Malians the 
Central . However, these numbers changed to 461 Ghanaians and 10,747 Malians using the 
Western route in 2018, while only 218 Ghanaians and 915 Malians reached Europe via the 
Central Mediterranean route . 
According to the scale of the difference on the figures, it is visible, that the Western 
Mediterranean route replaced the Central route in 2018 . There are nationalities, which still 
prefer to use the Central Mediterranean route despite the emerged difficulties along it. To 
assess its causes, another research is needed on the available migrant stock of those nation-
alities in the main African transit countries .
112 HUNGARIAN DEFENCE REVIEW, Special Issue 2019, Vol. 147, Nr. 1–2
Ta
bl
e 
4:
 D
et
ec
te
d 
ar
ri
va
ls
 b
y 
na
ti
on
al
it
y 
(d
at
a 
co
ll
ec
te
d 
fr
om
 F
R
O
N
T
E
X
)
20
15
    
    
    
   2
01
6 
    
    
    
  2
01
7 
    
    
    
  2
01
8
BU
RK
IN
A 
FA
SO
20
15
    
    
    
   2
01
6 
    
    
    
  2
01
7 
    
    
    
  2
01
8
GH
AN
A
20
15
    
    
    
   2
01
6 
    
    
    
  2
01
7 
    
    
    
  2
01
8
COˆ
TE
 D
’IV
O
IR
E
20
15
    
    
    
   2
01
6 
    
    
    
  2
01
7 
    
    
    
  2
01
8
GU
IN
EA
W
es
te
rn
 ro
ut
e
Ce
nt
ra
l r
ou
te
20
15
    
    
    
   2
01
6 
    
    
    
  2
01
7 
    
    
    
  2
01
8
M
AL
I
20
15
    
    
    
   2
01
6 
    
    
    
  2
01
7 
    
    
    
  2
01
8
N
IG
ER
20
15
    
    
    
   2
01
6 
    
    
    
  2
01
7 
    
    
    
  2
01
8
N
IG
ER
IA
20
15
    
    
    
   2
01
6 
    
    
    
  2
01
7 
    
    
    
  2
01
8
SE
N
EG
AL
D
et
ec
te
d 
ar
ri
va
ls
 b
y 
na
ti
on
al
it
y
466 315
418
331
456
609
1646
3517
4045
24
68
461
1946
2184
3283
12 233
97
125
624
10 747
35
10
78
77
56
28
30
185
20
19
90
1891
52
1055
656
54
3756
12 399
9509
1194
4357
5629
3909
218
2716
13 550
9714
840
5756
10 008
7119
915
151
694
432
16
21 914
37 554
18 163
1262
5821
10 329
6000
437
113International security
SUMMARY 
The reported numbers and visible patterns of migration flows in the Mediterranean can sug-
gest that now we are experiencing a change in the migration routes to the European Union . 
Based on the results of the research it can be stated that the changes in the migration pattern 
are not necessarily visible if the research focuses only on the biggest sending country nation-
als . With including multiple countries from West Africa in the data analysis, the changes in 
the pattern can be detected . Although some countries, like Nigeria and Eritrea still prefer the 
Central Mediterranean route, most of the West African nationals have preferred to use the 
Western Mediterranean route since 2018. The general figures show a significant decrease of 
the migration flow to Italy, which is expected to continue during 2019.
The decreasing numbers of crossings on the Central Mediterranean route are originating 
from the agreement between Italy and the Southern-Libyan tribes, to control sub-Saharan 
African migration flows. Additionally, Italian political changes made the Southern Europe-
an country less appealing to migrants from Africa . In 2018 Italy also restricted its asylum 
policy, which possibly had a further discouraging effect on migrants. Besides this, suspend-
ing the activities of naval assets of EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia made the journey 
particularly dangerous. General Haftar’s offensive against Tripoli, which proved to be a 
protracted situation, displaced Libya from its previous position of the biggest transit country 
of the North-African region . Mali also experienced the escalation of ethnic tensions in its 
central region, while radical groups are still present and active in the whole country .
It is also important to note, that in spite of the relatively large number of migrants, who 
reaches the EU, it is now visible, that most of the African migrants remain on the African 
continent . Additionally, there is a growing tendency among young Africans to choose Asia 
over Europe when deciding about the destination . An increasing number of people choose 
China, whose Africa policy is far more welcoming than that of the EU .56 
The use of information technology, which helped to organise the events of the Arab 
Spring in 2011, now supports those sub-Saharan Africans, who are planning to leave their 
countries of nationality . Therefore, the news on unfavourable policy changes, developing 
anti-immigrant attitude are getting to those, who want to reach the EU . It might be also 
discouraging, that the EU has still not finished the reform of the Dublin system. Potential 
migrants can also gather information on the rapidly changing security situation in transit 
countries . Thanks to the internet, all this earlier mentioned information can reach the people 
on the move relatively fast to discourage them to start a perilous journey to the European 
Union, which is ever more difficult to reach through countries which have a rather hostile 
environment .
The change of the migration patterns is the result of complex, interconnected events . 
Policy changes in one country cannot realistically influence the directions of entire mi-
gration routes, but a series of events along a formerly popular migration route can be an 
effect multiplier. On the Central Mediterranean route multiple changes took place, in-
cluding both policy, and security changes, which was apparently enough to encourage 
migrants from sub-Saharan African countries to choose routes different from that of their 
predecessors .
56 Tarrósy, I. “‘Kik és hányan kopogtatnak ajtóinkon onnan Délről?’: az afrikai migráció valóságának sok szí nű-
ségéről”. Magyar Tudomány 180/1 . 2019 . 79-89 . DOI: 10 .1556/2065 .180 .2019 .1 .7
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Éva Fábián:
FRENCH PARTICIPATION IN EUNAVFOR SOMALIA 
DOI: 10.35926/HDR.2019.1-2.9
ABSTRACT: Piracy, once a novel phenomenon in the already altered security environment 
along Somali coasts following the millennium, has become a factor threatening the 
stability of the region. This is despite the fact that along African coastlines steady inter-
national military presence has always been ensured, since 70 percent of the European 
Union’s sea trade is conducted through this region. France – putting into action both 
its political and military powers – has actively participated in the fight against piracy in 
the region by providing continual as well as situational aid, which in my opinion proves 
both France’s interest in the region as well as their aspiration to be an all-time leading 
power in Europe. Moreover, demonstrating and analysing France’s participation might 
also contribute to pre-planning future naval operations as regards asymmetric conflicts. 
KEYWORDS: France, Somalia, piracy, European Union Naval Force–Somalia (EUNAVFOR), 
French navy, Gulf of Aden 
REASONS FOR AND BACKGROUND OF PIRACY  
IN THE HORN OF AFRICA
First of all, historical reasons behind piracy in this region must be explained . In 1960, So-
malia was established by uniting territories formerly belonging to British as well as Italian 
colonies . Alluding to its geographical location, the country is generally referred to as the 
Horn of Africa, where a civil war broke out in the mid-80s overthrowing former dictator 
Mahammad Siyaad Barre and his regime, who had seized power in 1969 by staging a coup1 
following a short-lived democratic government . After a series of coups d’état in the late 
1980s and early 1990s it was by no means possible to establish a stable political system, and 
the different political powers have so far been incapable of creating a separation of powers. 
Following the commencing of armed fights among the clans, the country began to decline 
not only politically, but also economically . As a result, due to a lack of centralized power the 
area today has become a state suffering from the battles of its warlords. Previously termed a 
‘failed state’2, today it is most commonly called a ‘fragile state’ . In 2018 it came in second 
1 Kiss, Á. P., Besenyő, J. and Resperger, I. Szomália: Országismertető. Budapest: Honvéd Vezérkar Tudományos 
Kutatóhely, MH GEOSZ, 2014 . 40 .
2 Failed states; according to the definition, born at the end of the Cold War, a failed state is a state which is inter-
nationally acknowledged as a sovereign state, yet has no functioning central governing power, thus cannot attend 
to the most basic tasks in international context. Hegedűs, K. “Tizenhárom év anarchia: Szomália a hidegháború 
után” . Külügyi Szemle 4/1–2 . 2005 . 37–62 .
 https://kki.hu/assets/upload/KULUGY_KulugyiSzemle_2005__1-2hegedus.pdf
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on the Fragile States Index by 113 .2 points, indicating a state that is still weak and presents 
security risks .3 
Figure 1: Fragile States Index 2018 
Source: “Fragile States Index”. The Fund for Peace. http://fundforpeace.org/fsi/; “Fragile States 
Index: Global Data”. The Fund for Peace. http://fundforpeace.org/fsi/data/, Accessed on 14 May 
2018. (Edited by Eva Fabian)
3 “Fragile States Index: Global Data” . The Fund for Peace . http://fundforpeace .org/fsi/data/, Accessed on 14 May 
2018. “The Fragile States Index is based on a conflict assessment framework – known as “CAST” – that was 
developed by FFP nearly a quarter-century ago for assessing the vulnerability of states to collapse . The CAST 
framework was designed to measure this vulnerability in pre-conflict, active conflict and post-conflict situations, 
and continues to be used widely by policy makers, field practitioners, and local community networks. The meth-
odology uses both qualitative and quantitative indicators, relies on public source data, and produces quantifiable 
results. Twelve conflict risk indicators are used to measure the condition of a state at any given moment.” “Frag-
ile States Index: Indicators” . The Fund for Peace . http://fundforpeace .org/fsi/indicators/, Accessed on 14 May 
2018 . The indicators used both in the CAST framework and also in the Fragile States Index are as follows: Se-
curity Apparatus, Factionalized Elites, Group Grievance, Economic Decline and Poverty, Uneven Development, 
Human Flight and Brain Drain, State Legitimacy, Public Services, Human Rights and Rule of Law, Demographic 
Pressure, Refugees and IDPs, External Intervention . “Fragile States Index and Cast Framework Methodology” . 
The Fund for Peace . 13 May 2017 . http://fundforpeace .org/fsi/2017/05/13/fragile-states-index-and-cast-frame-
work-methodology/, Accessed on 14 May 2018 .
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In the instability after the civil war and in the absence of central political control, pirate 
fishing got underway, which particularly posed a problem for those living along the coast-
line, for whom fishing was almost the only way of making a living. The first of the pirates 
were fishermen who meant to drive away directly competing foreign ships from their waters. 
This affair increased in intensity when warlords of the Somali coastline saw it as an opportu-
nity to make money, and therefore set up their own militias . Although it was not until April 
2005 that the first large foreign ship was attacked, this incident was soon followed by a great 
number of such attacks. In conclusion, the sea-bandits’ gangs consisted of former fishermen, 
seamen as well as recruited members of military groups4. The first raids were conducted in 
and around the Gulf of Aden – where the annual traffic of about 20,000 commercial ships is 
managed, and which is also considered the most important transport route between Asia and 
Europe – though by now the piracy hotspots have relocated to the waters further out .5 Piracy 
in the area undoubtedly became socially accepted . It is no great surprise that pirates grew 
in strength and organization and called themselves coast guardsmen rather than pirates .6 In 
general, each pirate group has their own set of rules regarding recruitment, treatment of hos-
tages as well as division of the spoils . Although we consider them to be several rival groups 
of pirates, their methods as well as structural hierarchy are practically identical . Most of 
them – being former fishermen – have a significant amount of local knowledge, yet the small 
fishing boats they used at first are constantly modernized.7 Their weaponry is obtained in 
Mogadishu black markets as well as in Yemen, applying the informal, trust-based, traditional 
hawala mediator system .8 
STEPS TAKEN BY THE INTERNATIONAL  
COMMUNITY 
The humanitarian disaster urged the United Nations to launch humanitarian operations . The 
United Nations Operation in Somalia I and then II (UNISOM) took place alongside the US-
led international United Task Force (UNITAF). Blue Helmets first arrived there in September 
1992, and their numbers grew rapidly owing to the increasingly disastrous conditions . The 
International Committee of the Red Cross as well as other aid organizations conducted hu-
manitarian actions in the area, which – at least at the time – were regarded as the largest of 
their kind since World War II. The course of events significantly changed in July 1993. Upon 
overthrowing Barre’s regime, the country’s two most powerful figures were Ali Mahdi, an 
influential businessman, and General Aideed, who nevertheless never managed to reach an 
4 Pirates are divided into three categories. There are one-time fishermen, who also know the sea inside and out. 
There are former militiamen, who used to fight for the clan of a warlord, and there are technology experts, who 
are computer-literate, and have knowledge of various high-tech devices and can handle GPS, satellite phones and 
the like . “Lutter contre la piraterie” . France, Ministry of Defence . https://www .defense .gouv .fr/lutterContrePi-
raterieWeb/, Accessed on 3 June 2018 .
5 “Lutter contre la piraterie” . France, Ministry of Defence . https://www .defense .gouv .fr/lutterContrePiraterieWeb/, 
Accessed on 3 June 2018 .
6 Hunter, R . “Somali pirates living the high life” . BBC . http://news .bbc .co .uk/2/hi/africa/7650415 .stm, Accessed 
on 20 December 2010 .
7 “Lutter contre la piraterie” . France, Ministry of Defence . https://www .defense .gouv .fr/lutterContrePiraterieWeb/, 
Accessed on 3 June 2018 .
8 Mayyasi, A . “Hawala: The working Man’s Bitcoin” . Priceonomics . https://priceonomics .com/hawala-the-work-
ing-mans-bitcoin/, Accessed on 22 April 2017 .
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agreement and actually divided the capital city of Mogadishu into two parts. Both made efforts 
to extend their control over other areas in Somalia. The fight previously between the latter war-
lord and United Nations (UN) as well as the United States (US) troops resulted in turning the 
clans controlling Mogadishu against the foreign troops, so the operation went amiss . Somalia’s 
self-appointed president Mohamed Farrah Aideed’s militiamen began combating American 
soldiers . Because of this failure and pressure from the general public, then US President Bill 
Clinton had withdrawn the American troops – sent by George H . W . Bush – from the area by 
spring 1994, whilst the UN mission was obliged to cease its operation in March 1995 .9 
Adverse changes in the 1990s led to the establishment of several separatist state forms in 
the Horn of Africa, which all took advantage of the weakness of the central administration . 
One of these areas was Puntland, established in 1998, where the majority of Somali pirates 
originated . Due to the present state of the country the various territories are functioning 
autonomously, making their own political decisions . Following the 2012 elections it was 
generally thought that the ‘federal system had found a way in Somalia, creating hope for the 
formation of would-be federal member states in which law and order can be restored at the 
grass root level .’10 Nevertheless, as Viktor Marsai expressed in a 2017 article, since the ‘fed-
eral member states have fallen into the hands of wrangling clans and sub-clans, some people 
describe Somali federalism as the Balkanization of the country’11 . In his opinion, during the 
last (i .e . 2016) elections the clans, which – according to several experts, international public 
figures, as well as the Somali themselves – serve as the foundation of the Somali political 
establishment, as well as the Somali elite, some foreigners, and al-Shabaab all played major 
parts in the political dynamism .12 
After the discontinuation of the central governmental power, the influence of Islamic 
law (also known as Sharia) increased . In 2000, 11 Mogadishu courts were united, establish-
ing the Islamic Courts Union (ICU)13, which was to join with different Islamic movements 
in the whole of Somalia . One of their strongest military groups is Al-Shabaab . ICU’s sphere 
of action covered the whole of Mogadishu by 2006, as well as most of South and Cen-
tral Somalia, yet it was overthrown by the Ethiopian army in January 2007 .14 Al-Shabaab 
launched guerrilla activities . With UN authorization, in February 2007 the peacekeepers of 
the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) commenced their activities in Somali 
territories and managed to push Al-Shabaab forces out of the larger cities .15 Al-Shabaab has 
since then been continually attacking both army and civilian targets throughout Somalia, 
Kenya, and Uganda . Their main goal is to overthrow the internationally supported federal 
government of Somalia . The mission of AMISOM has not achieved all that was expected: 
the counterinsurgency operations of the African Union troops and Somali government forces 
9 Kiss, Besenyő and Resperger. Szomália… 52–53 .
10 Tawane, A . A . “Federalism in Africa: The case of Somalia” . Pambazuka News . 6 April 2017 . https://www .pam-
bazuka .org/governance/federalism-africa-case-somalia, Accessed on 23 October 2018 .
11 Marsai, V . “Somali elections in 2016-2017 – Business as usual or a new hope?” . Center for Strategic and Defense 
Studies Analyses 14 . 2017 . 1–12 . http://archiv.netk.uni-nke.hu/uploads/media_items/csds-analyses-2017-14-so-
mali-elections-in-2016-2017-marsai-v .original .pdf, Accessed on 4 November 2018 .
12 More of this analysis in Marsai, V . “Somali elections in 2016-2017 – Business as usual or a new hope?” . Center 
for Strategic and Defense Studies Analyses 14 . 2017 . 1–12 . http://archiv.netk.uni-nke.hu/uploads/media_items/
csds-analyses-2017-14-somali-elections-in-2016-2017-marsai-v .original .pdf, Accessed on 4 November 2018 .
13 Midowga Maxkamadaha Islaamiga
14 The US was in favour of this operation, since they assumed close connection between the ICU and al-Qaeda .
15 “Brief History” . AMISOM . http://amisom-au .org/about-somalia/brief-history/, Accessed on 30 October 2017 .
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have failed to blunt Al-Shabaab’s capacity to inflict heavy civilian and military casualties.16 
This fact along with the weakness and low public acceptance of the federal government ex-
plain why the armed group has been gaining territories in the area in the past few years . Still, 
the group neither entertains global terrorist ambitions nor has such capacities . Al-Shabaab 
was also able to step up its deadly actions despite a greater frequency of United States drone 
attacks since President Trump’s inauguration .17 Altogether 10,535 Africans lost their lives 
because of militant Islamists’ actions between May 2017 and May 2018, which is – while 
greater than the number of fatalities in the previous 12 months – definitely lower than it was 
in 2015 .18  
16 Adan, A . M . “Al-Shabab ranked as deadliest terror group in Africa” . Hiriaan . https://www .hiiraan .com/
news4/2018/May/157875/al_shabab_ranked_as_deadliest_terror_group_in_africa.aspx, Accessed on 23 Octo-
ber 2018 .
17 Since the beginning of 2017 .
18 There were 18 .728 deaths in total in 2015 . Adan, A . M . “Al-Shabab ranked as deadliest terror group in Africa” . 
Hiriaan . https://www.hiiraan.com/news4/2018/May/157875/al_shabab_ranked_as_deadliest_terror_group_
in_africa.aspx, Accessed on 23 October 2018 . Nevertheless, the 2015 mortality rates – even compared to those 
Figure 2: Somalia Federal States map 
Source: “Somali update, latest Somalia news and analysis”. Africa news online. http://www.
africanews.online/somalie/somali-update-latest-somalia-news-and-analysis-2/, Accessed on 23 
October 2018.
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DIRECT ANTECEDENTS, FORMATION, AND RUNNING  
OF OPERATION ATALANTA
Modern-day piracy has become a problem of globalization which the international com-
munity has had to tackle to an ever-greater extent . France realized this long before NATO, 
and before the launch of the all-European cooperation . On 10 July 2007, indicating 
their despair, the World Food Programme (WFP) and the International Maritime Bureau 
(IMB)19 appealed to the general public in a call for international cooperation against pi-
racy along the coastline of the Horn of Africa as well as for protecting humanitarian aid 
to Somalia . As a response, on 25 September, during the 62nd Session of the UN General 
Assembly, President Nicolas Sarkozy announced that France would send a warship to 
protect WFP ships . On 16 November 2007 Operation Alcyon commenced . The task was 
taken over on 2 February 2008 by the Danish Navy, and numerous nations joined the 
initiative . On 15 September 2008, following France and Spain’s suggestion, the Council 
of Europe in Brussels decided to establish the European Union Naval Coordination Cell 
(EUNAVCO), in the framework of which a European commercial ship was first escorted 
through the Gulf of Aden by a French warship on 12 October 2008 . EUNAVCO served as 
the European coordination network of the fight against piracy at sea. Among its tasks, it 
partly coordinated measures taken by member states within their national missions with 
regard to the battle against piracy, and also informed European ship-owners about military 
assets . Within its framework France made it possible for 20 commercial ships altogether 
to safely pass the Gulf of Aden . The Coordination Unit ceased to exist once Operation At-
alanta was launched, with no legal successor .20 On 24 October of the same year, Operation 
Allied Provider was launched, being the first NATO operation in the fight against Somali 
pirate activities .21
The UN-mandated EUNAVFOR, commonly known as Operation Atalanta, was 
launched on 8 December 2008 by the EU as the first European operation at sea with the hope 
of successfully countering, preventing, and tackling piracy and armed robbery along the So-
mali coastline . Their mandate was for a one-year period, which has been prolonged several 
times . The event itself was preceded by an Action Plan approved on 10 November 2008 in 
the Council of the European Union regarding the launch of the first naval operation of the 
of 2011 – were much better, for which Viktor Marsai in a 2015 article of his provides a less scientific but even 
more interesting and telling example: ‘…in January 2013 an al-Jazeera journalist interviewed gravediggers 
from Mogadishu . One of them, Ali Hassan took up this profession in 1991 . (…) In 2011 there were still 14 
gravediggers in the cemetery called Abdirrashid Ahmed Sharmake in the capital, working seven days a week, 
whilst today only two of them are still doing the job, Hassan and another undertaker . The decreasing number 
of the deceased – also meaning less income for the undertakers – is reported by other providers in the funeral 
and related services, such as textile sellers, who sell white caftans to wrap the deceased with .’ Marsai, V . 
“A szomáli szövetségi kormány első két éve és az al-Sabáb elleni katonai műveletek 2012-2014. (I.)”. Nemzet 
és Biztonság 8/1 . 2015 . 72 . http://www.nemzetesbiztonsag.hu/cikkek/nb_2015_1_08_marsai.pdf, Accessed 
on 4 November 2018 .
19 You can read more about the IMB on their official website. “International Maritime Bureau”. ICC CSS. 
 https://www .icc-ccs .org/icc/imb, Accessed on 2 June 2018 .
20 “L’action de la France dans la lutte contre le piraterie” . France, Ministry of Defence . 12 July 2010 . https://www .
defense .gouv .fr/operations/operations/piraterie/dossier-de-presentation-des-operations/l-action-de-la-france-
dans-la-lutte-contre-la-piraterie, Accessed on 2 June 2018 .
21 “Operation Allied Provider” . NATO Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe . https://shape .nato .int/
page13984631, Accessed on 2 June 2018 .
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integration . The latter was backed by the UN Security Council as closely related to their 
resolutions (numbers 1814, 1816, 1838, 1846 and 1851) regarding the fight against Somali 
piracy . Among the aims of Operation Atalanta are listed the protection of WFP and other 
ships22 in danger which navigate in the Gulf of Aden as well as off the Somali coasts and 
near the Seychelles Islands, the prevention of and measures taken against pirate activities 
and armed robberies along the coastline, as well as controlling fishing along Somali coastal 
areas . EUNAVFOR became the integral part of the European integration’s security and de-
fence policy . Another goal is to support other EU missions and international organizations 
that aim to promote maritime security and strengthen capacity in the region . Regarding the 
operation’s mandate, apart from protecting the WFP, AMISOM and commercial ships, the 
participants were authorized to employ any means – including armed force – to attain the 
above-mentioned goals only and exclusively in the zone where these activities are carried 
out . Numerous countries – based on their military potential – participated in the opera-
tion, namely: the Netherlands, Spain, Germany, France, Greece, Italy, Sweden, Belgium, 
Luxembourg, and Estonia – indicating that Atalanta is indeed a European military action . 
Moreover, on 3 January 2014, a Ukrainian frigate joined the operation . The French have 
been present from the very beginning in the EUNAVFOR units, continuously represented by 
one frigate23 and occasionally dispatching their Atlantique 2 maritime patrol aircraft, based 
in Djibouti, where the Joint Force Command Headquarters is located . The French assist in 
the operation’s success with the logistics base in Djibouti, too .24 The Area of Operations 
covers the southern territories of the Red Sea, the area of the Gulf of Aden and part of the 
Indian Ocean, including the Seychelles Islands . EUNAVFOR units deter attacks and show 
military presence in the Area of Operations and Somali coastal waters, as well as constantly 
escort ships, in accordance with the UN Security Council’s relevant regulations . Naturally, 
in the area in question several nations’ navies are operating, with which EUNAVFOR has 
developed a broad network of connections by now .25
22 For example, consignments launched by AMISOM as well as commercial and passenger ships .
23 On 1 July 2009, the French (at the request of a group of ship-owners) established the so-called onboard protec-
tion teams (EPE – équipes de protection embarquées) Seychelles mission, with the help of which French fishing 
boats are directly protected on board, when they operate along the Seychelles . The number of states involved in 
the EPE as well as their operational area has increased year by year . In June 2011 Estonia joined the EPE which 
has contributed to the success of Operation Atalanta since November 2010 . “Atalante: les équipes de protection 
embarqués, image de la cooperation européenne” . France, Ministry of Defence . 3 August 2011 . https://www .
defense .gouv .fr/operations/operations/piraterie/actualites/atalante-les-equipes-de-protection-embarquees-im-
age-de-la-cooperation-europeenne, Accessed on 19 February 2018 .
24 “Opération EU NAVFOR Somalia/Atalante” . France, Ministry of Defence . https://www .defense .gouv .fr/oper-
ations/operations/piraterie/dossier-de-presentation-des-operations/operation-eu-navfor-somalie-atalante, Accessed 
on 15 March 2017 .
25 Since the end of 2008 more and more countries have been sending battleships to the Gulf of Aden as well 
as to the Somali coasts, which do not belong to any multinational forces, yet closely cooperate with the EU-
NAVFOR . It means about 10-15 battleships . “Opération EU NAVFOR Somalia/Atalante” . France, Ministry 
of Defence . https://www .defense .gouv .fr/operations/operations/piraterie/dossier-de-presentation-des-operations/
operation-eu-navfor-somalie-atalante, Accessed on 15 March 2017 .
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Figure 3: Fight against Somali piracy – Area of Operations 
Source: Maritime security chart: Q6099: Red Sea, Gulf of Aden and Arabian Sea. UK 
Hydrographic Office. https://www.admiralty.co.uk/AdmiraltyDownloadMedia/Security%20
Related%20Information%20to%20Mariners/Q6099_A4.pdf, Accessed on 23 October 2018.
In June 2010 the EU Foreign Affairs Council somewhat altered the concept of the op-
eration, requiring states in the region to actively participate in restoring order and peace in 
the vicinity of the Horn of Africa. Another significant development was the extension of the 
Area of operations both eastward and southward, and to address the roots of the problems 
the European Union Somalia Training Mission (EUTM)26 had also been launched, which 
26 In the battle against modern-day piracy, relying only on high-tech navy forces is not sufficient; efficient maritime 
and air force cooperation with the local armed forces is more and more necessary . The mission’s mandate was 
prolonged until 31 August 2018 .
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was expected to reinforce security forces in Somalia .27 Besides particularly representing 
the member states’ economic interests in the area, the operation also served humanitarian 
purposes in the form of humanitarian aid transferred by sea .28
The two following tables’ data on the EU Naval Force – Somalia clearly show that the 
political, legal, diplomatic, and military efforts have been fruitful. The number of pirate 
attacks has significantly decreased, the route of commercial ships in the region has become 
more secure, and owing to the extended alarm system and offers of the European Union and 
the IMB, they are more prepared against attacks .
Table 1: EU Naval Force Somalia – Operation Atalanta 
CURRENTLY HELD BY PIRATES
Vessels Held* Hostages Held**
0 0
SINCE 2009
WFP Vessels Protected 438
AMISOM Vessels Protected 139
Tonnes of Food/Aid Delivered by WFP 1,726,497***
Pirates Transferred to Competent Authorities with a View 
to their Prosecution
Total
166
Remanded
6
Convicted
145
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 166 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Suspicious Events 8 59 99 166 74 20 5 1 2 6 1
Total Attacks 24 163 174 176 34 7 2 0 1 7 1
Of Which Pirated**** 14 46 47 25 4 0 0 0 0 2 0
Disruptions***** 0 14 65 28 16 10 1 0 0 2 0
*    Plus, an unknown number of unreported/unconfirmed dhows and smaller vessels
**  Estimated
***   Reported metric tonnes of food/aid delivered to Somali ports by World Food Programme shipping protected 
by EU NAVFOR
****   TOTAL ATTACK is the combined number of all attacks mounted by suspect pirates; those repelled/aborted 
and those leading to ships being in pirate hands and crews taken hostage
*****  An action that renders a pirate group incapable of further pirate operation
Source: “Key facts and figures”. EU Naval Force Somalia. http://eunavfor.eu/key-facts-and-
figures/, Accessed on 3 June 2018
27 “European Union Training Mission Somalia” . https://www .eutm-somalia .eu/, Accessed on 2 June 2018 .
28 “EU NAVFOR: Proud to have protected by sea over 1 .5 million tonnes of WFP humanitarian aid for people 
of Somalia” . EU NAVFOR Somalia . 4 July 2017 . http://eunavfor .eu/eu-navfor-proud-to-have-protected-by-sea-
over-1-5-million-tonnes-of-wfp-humanitarian-aid-for-people-of-somalia/, Accessed on 2 June 2018 .
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Table 2: Latest piracy incidents 
Latest Piracy Incidents
Date Type of 
Vessel
Approximate 
Position of 
Incident
Attack or 
Suspicious 
Event
BMP PASC Unknown Pirated/
Safe
2018/03/08 Cargo 
Vessel
Suspicious 
Event
X X Safe
2018/02/22 Chemical 
Tanker
Somali Basin Attack X X Safe
2017/11/22 Bulk 
Carrier
Suspicious 
Event
X Safe
2017/11/18 Fishing 
Vessel
Suspicious 
Event
Safe
2017/11/18 Container Attack X Safe
BMP: Best Management Practises
PASC: Private (armed) Security Company
Source: “Key facts and figures”. EU Naval Force Somalia. http://eunavfor.eu/key-facts-and-
figures/, Accessed on 3 June 2018.
THE FRENCH CONTRIBUTION AND SUCCESSES  
IN THE FIGHT AGAINST PIRATES
According to French opinions, the success story of EUNAVFOR really began in March 
2010 .29 In February 2010 the frigate Nivôse joined the operation, replacing another vessel of 
the same class Surcouf, serving till then along the East-African coastline and in the Gulf of 
Aden . First and foremost, it was ordered to provide protection – correspondingly – for com-
mercial, WFP and AMISOM ships as well as participate actively in the fight against pirates. 
Soon after it began its mission, the Nivôse and its crew achieved success as on 5 March 2010 
they successfully fended off two separate attacks. On 6 and 7 March, just off the Somali 
coast, some participating EUNAVFOR units with French leadership foiled an attack on ei-
ther day . The results at that time, however, amounted to something much greater than ever 
before. Within the course of three days, altogether 35 pirates, five mother ships and eight 
boats were taken hold of . The action executed on 7 March proved just how essential the na-
val power provided by the participating European states was in the fight against piracy, when 
applied in a combined, concerted way . The united action executed by the Nivôse, together 
with the Etna, the flagship of the operation since December 2009, their helicopters as well 
 
29 French authorities can only come to help against pirate attacks if the given vessel is flying a French flag and 
operates in a French economic sector, or if it belongs to the especially endangered ships that are protected in 
the framework of Operation Atalanta . In such cases the ships under protection must agree to change course, and 
also have to share costs regarding their safety . When a French ship is attacked, or there are French sailors and 
passengers among the pirates’ hostages, France may consider dispatching warships . “Lutter contre la piraterie” . 
France, Ministry of Defence . https://www .defense .gouv .fr/lutterContrePiraterieWeb/, Accessed on 3 June 2018 .
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as Spanish Navy reconnaissance aircraft guaranteed the eventual success . The helicopters 
played a significant role in spotting the pirates’ boats and the mother ship. Warning shots 
encouraged the African pirates to lay down their weapons, and then following their capture 
they were – together with their boats – taken on board the ships participating in the action . 
The pirates’ mother ship was, as always, sunk on the spot .30
The story, however, did not and could not end here . A great number of successful ac-
tions had justified the participation of French forces, too. On 14 August 2010 France took 
command of Operation Atalanta for four months under the leadership of Rear Adm . Philippe 
Coindreau .31 Consequently, beside their frigate and naval reconnaissance aircraft, France de-
ployed a warship to the operation . During the French leadership, the French frigate de Grasse, 
joined by the frigate Floréal on 6 September 2010, and accomplished several successful 
actions against the pirates in the Somali Basin . Within the four months of French command, 
over 120 suspected pirates were captured in over 20 actions . Coindreau handed over the 
command of the operation to the Spanish Rear Adm . Juan Rodriguez Garat in Djibouti on 10 
December 2010 .32 In the end of March 2012, France made another warship available for Op-
eration Atalanta . Between 7 April and 6 August 2012, France again commanded the operation 
under the leadership of Rear Adm . Dupuis, who handed over the command of the operation 
to his Italian colleague Enrico Credendino . For some months after 12 April 2012, four French 
vessels were involved in Operation Atalanta . On 6 December 2013, in Djibouti, France – for 
the third time – took over the command of the operation’s Task Force (TF) 465 under the 
leadership of Rear Adm . Hervé Bléjean for another four months .33 Under French leadership, 
the Amphibious Landing Dock (ALD) Siroco’s multinational staff proved to be able to suc-
cessfully cope not only with combating the pirates, but also the training of personnel from 
African states that cooperated with EUNAVFOR, showing that both the European operation 
as well as the French naval forces in the region are capable of development and renewal . This 
has been proven to date by countless examples . The French frigate La Fayette, currently serv-
ing under the ALINDIEN34, contributed to the success of Atalanta – through the suppression, 
deterrence, and prevention of piracy – in the Indian Ocean .35
For the forces taking part in the national and international cooperative effort, special 
watercraft is needed to bring firepower top bear, and prevent the pirates from succeeding 
or to attempt to free hostages . Arresting pirates, bringing them to justice and sentencing 
them appear to be complicated even today, despite the fact that there is now an international 
30 “Atalante: 35 pirates interceptés en trois jours par la frégate Nivôse” . France, Ministry of Defence . 3 July 2010 . 
https://www .defense .gouv .fr/operations/operations/piraterie/actualites/07-03-10-atalante-35-pirates-interceptes-
en-trois-jours-par-la-fregate-nivose, Accessed on 19 February 2018 .
31 “Atalante: la France prend le commandement de la force maritime européenne: vidéo” . France, Ministry of De-
fence . 17 August 2010 . https://www .defense .gouv .fr/operations/operations/piraterie/actualites/atalante-la-france- 
prend-le-commandement-de-la-force-maritime-europeenne-video, Accessed on 19 February 2018 .
32 “Atalante: la France rend le commandement de la force de l’opération” . France, Ministry of Defence . 18 Decem-
ber 2010 . https://www .defense .gouv .fr/operations/operations/piraterie/actualites/atalante-la-france-rend-le-com-
mandement-de-la-force-de-l-operation, Accessed on 19 February 2018 .
33 “Piraterie: la France prend le commandement de la force Atalante” . France, Ministry of Defence . 6 December 
2013 . https://www .defense .gouv .fr/operations/operations/piraterie/actualites/piraterie-la-france-prend-le-com-
mandement-de-la-force-atalante2, Accessed on 19 February 2018 .
34 Amiral commandant de la zone maritime de l’océan Indien et les forces maritimes de l’océan Indien .
35 “Opération Atalante: la frigate La Fayette reçoit le commandant adjoint de l’opération” . France, Ministry of 
Defence . 18 April 2018 . https://www .defense .gouv .fr/operations/operations/piraterie/actualites/operation-atalan-
te-la-fregate-la-fayette-recoit-le-commandant-adjoint-de-l-operation, Accessed on 3 June 2018 .
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agreement that makes it possible . On 6 March 2009, the EU and Kenya signed an agreement 
ordering persons accused of piracy in the framework of Operation Atalanta to be taken to 
Kenya and be tried in court there . The Seychelles Islands can also be counted on in this re-
gard, although pirates are often set free there36 . In the battle against piracy the most common 
strategy is eliminating the mother ship . There seem to be some options for commercial ships, 
too . They can, for instance, increase speed, or can attempt to cross the danger zone when 
strong wind is producing high waves that set the pirates back. Some shipping offices have 
begun to employ armed security guards, and there is also an interesting method that could 
be called maritime electric fences . This device surrounds the body of the ship and causes an 
electric shock, which may offer efficient protection. If, despite all precautions, the pirates’ 
attack is successful, ransom negotiations begin and may take weeks, even months . The ran-
som may be dropped with a parachute but if food and fuel also feature among the negotiated 
claims, it can be delivered by ship . The most important factor during a negotiation is to 
guarantee safety for the crew and the passengers, i .e . human life, which the pirates also take 
advantage of .37
For decades France has been maintaining constant military presence in the Indian Ocean, 
whilst in the Gulf of Aden the country is active in the frameworks of both national and mul-
tinational operations . ALINDIEN is in charge of the command of naval forces in the Indian 
Ocean maritime zone which extends from the Red Sea and West Africa to the Philippines as 
well as East Vietnam . Apart from military control these forces actively provide intense de-
fence diplomacy . The active participation of the French Navy in the Indian Ocean increased 
in the Gulf War of the 1990s and has not ceased since. The fight against Afghan terrorism 
also took place in this context, as well as aiding the victims of the tsunami that occurred on 
26 December 2004 . After December 2001, on the basis of the report by Control Naval Vo-
lontaire,38 France set in motion an information channel for ships, battleships and their crews 
in the Pacific and Indian Oceans. By promoting interactions between the civilian sphere and 
the military, this helps avoid potential threats or efficiently tackle them. The idea was also 
adopted by EU Operation Atalanta, which launched the Maritime Security Center – Horn 
of Africa (MSCHOA) with Northwood, UK, as its headquarters; they can offer help to all 
vessels in the zone and a kind of passive protection, thanks to its website . The MSCHOA 
has proven to be useful: due to their advice a huge percentage of ships have avoided pirate 
attacks when crossing the high-risk territory .39 
CONCLUSION
After the turn of the millennium the EU appeared as a new player in international crisis 
management . The EUNAVFOR operation, launched in December 2008, can be considered 
as one of the largest-scale military operations of the EU as I view it . The success of the in-
tegration’s foreign and defence policy was particularly palpable in this operation, in which 
36 Moreover, besides these two countries EUNAVFOR, during their operations, is already cooperating with Tanza-
nia, Uganda, Djibouti, Oman, Madagascar and Mauritius .
37 “Lutter contre la piraterie” . France, Ministry of Defence . https://www .defense .gouv .fr/lutterContrePiraterieWeb/, 
Accessed on 3 June 2018 .
38 Voluntary Navy Control (VNC)
39 “Maritime Security Centre - Horn of Africa” . MSCHOA . http://www .mschoa .org/on-shore/about-us, Accessed 
on 3 June 2018 .
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France had an important role from the very outset, and according to relevant literature: the 
French state viewed itself as one of the most decisive participants in it . Apart from the EU 
integration’s operation France flourished in the region on its own, too – for instance, within 
the framework of the above-mentioned ALINDIEN . In addition, in the course of the EU-
NAVFOR, France took initiative on several occasions and proved to be successful, showing 
that France prefer(red) to go its own separate ways from their European partners (too) . As 
an example of the latter, they launched an information channel for ships, naval vessels and 
their crews in the Pacific and Indian Ocean after December 2001, on the basis of which the 
still active and successfully operating MSCHOA was introduced; or another example is the 
EPE Seychelles mission .
In light of the above we can state that in the course of the multinational naval operation 
of the European integration not only military but also diplomatic and legislative means were 
used to fight the Somali pirates. With its naval forces France successfully participated in the 
operation – due to its nature, often in an unorthodox manner – in order to fight the asymmet-
ric challenge of the day in a greatly altered security environment .
When talking of today’s Somalia, it is no longer pirate attacks that come to our mind, 
since piracy as such has shifted to the region of the Gulf of Guinea and Southeast Asian 
waters . Nonetheless, in my opinion it is indisputable that as long as there is a chance for 
piracy to occur in the African continent, as it occurred in the case of Somalia, there will be 
pirates as well .
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ABSTRACT: The core interests, strategic guidelines of the United States and the priorities 
of the American president are also elaborated and expressed in the key documents of 
National Security and Defence Strategy, which are accurately scrutinized and analysed 
both by the allied and rival, challenging powers of the United States. Following the rather 
passive and restrained interest assertion of the Obama administration’s foreign and se-
curity policies, the incumbent Trump presidency tends to show more power, resoluteness 
as well as quite unpredictable measures and controversial strategic framework in the ev-
er-changing arena of international affairs. Many analysts claim that the new American 
administration tends to focus primarily on preserving the relative American economic 
and absolute military primacy, and the global status quo without any clear future vision 
or strategic set of objectives that would be desirable from a super-power. A question quite 
frequently emerges whether a Trump-doctrine is due to get into shape or it is rather total-
ly out of scope for the time being?
KEYWORDS: American National Security and Defence Strategy, Trump, strategy, global af-
fairs 
“As long as I am President, the servicemen and women who defend our 
Nation will have the equipment, the resources, and the funding they need to 
secure our homeland, to respond to our enemies quickly and decisively, and, 
when necessary, to fight, to overpower, and to always, always, always win.”
President Donald J . Trump1 
SETTING THE STRATEGIC AGENDA 
Without doubt the Americans are considered to be masters of strategy making as well as of 
efficient implementation of theory in practice, as their militant historical records have signif-
icantly manifested it along the past centuries . The primary set of political thoughts and the 
important repository of special guidelines which would determine the national security con-
cerns, the foreign political span as well as the various sector-driven professional military ob-
jectives are supposed to be elaborated and projected through the National Security Strategy 
1 President Trump’s declaration from December, 2017, as also cited in the National Security Strategy of the United 
States. Washington D.C.: The White House Press Office, 2017. 24. https://www .whitehouse .gov/wp-content/
uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905 .pdf, Accessed on 12 September 2018 .
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(hereinafter, NSS) and the National Defence Strategy (NDS) of the American government . 
Furthermore, as far as military affairs are concerned, the National Military Strategy as the 
document of key military doctrines is of outstanding importance as well, though for the time 
being, the Trump administration has not presented a document of this kind, yet . The deliv-
ery of the forthcoming and similarly important legislatively mandated Quadrennial Defence 
Review2 has also seemed to be delayed for the time being ever since 2018 by the incumbent 
Trump administration, which might as well reflect a certain level of vague reluctance from 
the part of the Defence community of the American administration .
The primary intention of this paper is to provide a brief analytic overview of the 
above-mentioned two key strategic documents and the intellectual setting behind them as 
well as to put their contents into the context of international affairs and security studies, 
concerning the position of the United States in the 3rd millennium . Moreover, we would like 
to inquire whether the decisions made in the foreign and security political dimensions of the 
new American administration may outline the formation of some sort of intellectual strategic 
framework that may be labelled as a new doctrine or it is just an exaggerated assumption, a 
perception without any sensible fundament .
A nationwide grand strategy, as Sir Basil Liddell Hart3 put it aptly, serves the long-term 
interest of any nation accumulating and aligning all the necessary resources for achieving 
the primary set of objectives of the strategy, elaborated by the civilian government and, 
nonetheless if necessary assisted and carried out by the military . Strategy, though its ancient 
Greek term “stratégos”4 derives from the context and sphere of military science, cannot 
be separated or analysed solely in itself without the broader dimensions of political sci-
ence, international affairs, and security studies. As the two ancient Greek fathers of military 
historiography, Thucydides and Xenophon had already stated in their much-revered works 
from the 5th century B .C ., without a solid strategy and political, military plans no state can 
exist or even survive . Based on their intellectual setting, according to many political realist 
theoreticians and strategists the rights of the states and their citizens derive basically from 
their power projection abilities, which implies the effective combination of political will and 
military might .5  
This stance and condition have not changed significantly ever since the early times of 
humanity, when the first state formations got into shape about 5 thousand years ago in ancient 
Egypt, China or Mesopotamia up to the emergence of real global powers, like the British 
Empire, the Soviet Union, or predominantly the United States . Based upon the commonly 
shared neo-realistic political attitude as well as the classical idea of anarchistic global theatre 
determined by sovereign powers on the stage of international relations, the current position 
and strategic dimension of the United States deliberately fits into this old-new state-cen-
tric paradigm . Namely, the United States of America managed by the Trump administration 
tends to emphasize her inherent, primordial right and duty to protect and assert her genuine 
own economic and political interests through all means available and feasible . 
2 Quadriennial Defence Review. U .S . Department of Defense . https://dod .defense .gov/News/Special-Reports/QDR/
3 Hart, B .L . Strategy, London: Tannenberg, 2016 . 490 .
4 Greek term of military scientist often used by Thucydides in his master work . Thucydides . The History of the 
Peloponnesian War. London: Penguin, 1973 .
5 Moran D . “A stratégiaelmélet és a hadviselés története” . In Bayliss, J . et al . (eds .) . A stratégia a modern korban: 
bevezetés a stratégiai tanulmányokba. Budapest: Zrínyi, 2005 . 30-35 .
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The new American national security and defence strategies were revealed during the 
first and second year of the incumbent Trump presidency, mostly reflecting the visions and 
strategic guidelines of the top American executives, think tanks in the new Republican gov-
ernment of Donald Trump, whose rather strident and scandalous presidential style has rung 
quite many bells among the military and national security leaders – also called as the com-
munity of intelligence services . As it is well known, the big news of the 2018 Christmas sea-
son from Washington proved to be that the outstanding “Triade of Generals”, as they were 
labelled by the media6, came to an end in the Trump administration with the rather forced 
resignation of General James Mattis, the former powerful Secretary of Defence of the US, 
also following the departure of general H .R . McMaster from the National Security Council, 
and of general John Kelly from the Chief of Staff position of the White House. Without any 
further investigation of the details and causes of their resignations, it can obviously be stated 
that the above-mentioned outstanding military leaders and scholars manifested enormous 
intellectual impact as well as practical importance in elaborating the above mentioned key 
national security and military documents of the United States . 
Strategy analysis classically proves to be of outstanding importance in order to obtain a 
deeper insight into the thoughts, visions and presumably of the future measures of any coun-
try or organization, not to mention a super-power, such as the United States . Perhaps, when 
President Trump, before saying farewell to his top general advisors and secretaries, may 
have read about the famous witty remark attributed to former French president Clemenceau 
that strategy is much more important than to be allowed only for generals to deal with it .7 
Among many others, even the great Prussian war strategist von Clausewitz confirmed that 
politics permeates the military, warfare and strategy making as well, essentially it is part of 
the political sphere, so, evidently it is not supposed to be the task of military leaders, either 
primarily or exclusively .8  
The US proves to be a strategy-driven nation and this prevailing national trait presumably 
stems from the missionary Puritan tradition of many Americans, as well as their pragmatism of 
living up to certain objectives along clear-cut values and core interests . The extensive Ameri-
can state administration abounds in various national and sector-specific strategies. For instance, 
since 2005 even the large and highly influential Intelligence Community of the US, consisting 
of 17 different agencies and institutes, has had its own strategic document, the globally unique 
National Intelligence Strategy9 of the US, compiled by the Director of National Intelligence . 
The primary role of the Office of the DNI is to coordinate and adjust the operation of the var-
ious agencies in accordance with the previously elaborated strategic framework, similarly to 
the task of the Chairman of the Committee of Joint Chiefs of Staff (Gen. Joseph F. Dunford) 
to elaborate and implement the rather restricted operational guidelines of the National Military 
Strategy10 also outlined broadly and more overtly in the National Defence Strategy of the US .
6 Johnson-Freese, J . “Too Many Generals in the Trump administration?” . Breaking Defense. 7 August 2017 . 
 https://breakingdefense .com/2017/08/too-many-generals-in-trump-administration/, Accessed on 10 December 
2018 .
7 Brodie, B . War and Politics. London: Pearson, 1973 . 12 .
8 Clausewitz, C . On War. Princeton: Princeton U . P ., 1989 . 28-30 .
9 National Intelligence Strategy of the United States. Washington D . C ., 2005 . https://www.dni.gov/files/docu-
ments/CHCO/nis .pdf, Accessed on 12 September 2018 .
10 Mehta, A . “The Pentagon’s National Military Strategy is done, and it’s unclear if the public will ever see it” . 
Defence News . 13 February 2019 . https://www .defensenews .com/pentagon/2019/02/13/the-pentagons-national-
military-strategy-is-done-and-its-unclear-if-the-public-will-ever-see-it/, Accessed on 1 April 1 2019 .
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Notwithstanding, reading both recent American strategies, they quite share an abun-
dance of much-quoted Trump remarks in first person singular and more than rhetoric 
guidelines, similarly to the famous 2002 America strategy, a collection of thoughts deeply 
influenced by president George W. Bush and his hawkish, belligerent neoconservative 
consultants . Compared to the blatantly militant administration of President George W . 
Bush, and the much more reserved, softer and even disoriented strategy of president Oba-
ma, the foreign political thinking of Donald J . Trump seems to be more realistic, pragmat-
ically transactionist, as his critiques would put it aptly from an American, business-ori-
ented point of view . The missionary and rather messianic Wilsonian idea of “making the 
world safe for democracy” and of spreading the American values and lifestyle seems to 
be neglected if not totally abandoned by the new American president, who is considered 
to be an outsider from the centuries old bi-partisan Establishment of Washington D .C . as 
well as quite an alien from the neoconservative, over-ideologized, even religious zeal of 
President Reagan and of George H . W . Bush .11 Obviously, Donald Trump proves to be ut-
terly different from his predecessors, not only in style and rhetoric but also in handling the 
state affairs of the United States, nevertheless, the set of priorities and strategic objectives 
for the state he presides seem to be remaining unvaried . Consequently, we can assert that 
the new, 21st century American strategic repositioning of the United States can be derived 
personally from the thoughts, political visions, and agenda of President Donald Trump as 
well as from the military expertise and academic education of his top general aides just 
recently abandoned . Taken into account the rhetoric manners of several presidents from 
the last century, the much cited catchy yet rather controversial and protectionist slogan of 
Trump, namely to “Make America Great Again” and “America First” actually proved to be 
the primary concern and political grand strategy of all American presidents in the 20th cen-
tury, only not so much conspicuously or sometimes even frantically emphasized as done 
by President Trump . Moreover, his blunt remarks since October 2018 on the probability 
of a reinvigorated arms race as well as of nuclear missile build-up among the USA, China 
and Russia also reflect his resolute willingness to involve the US into a controversial and 
costly challenging game for global supremacy against his rivals .12 
It is also noteworthy that despite the prevailing decline theory, particularly popular 
among neoliberal economists and challenging rival powers of the US – that would evidently 
include China, Russia or even the EU – in terms of global military power projection, politi-
cal and even economic output and importance America is still the undisputed leading super 
power, also keeping the 20th century wisdom still valid that in global affairs no one can do 
politics without or against the will of the United States .13 
11 Schmitz, D . F . Brent Scowcroft: Amerika a nemzetközi arénában Vietnám után. Budapest: Antall József 
Tudásközpont, 2017 . 270 .
12 Watkins, E . and Vazquez, M . “Trump threatens nuclear buildup until other nations ‘come to their senses’” . CNN . 
24 October 2018 . https://amp .cnn .com/cnn/2018/10/22/politics/donald-trump-russia-china-inf/index .html, Ac-
cessed on 10 March 2019 .
13 Nye, J . S . Véget ér-e az amerikai évszázad? Budapest: Antall József Tudásközpont, 2017 .
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THE ‘OLD-NEW’ STRATEGIC GOVERNING PRINCIPLES  
OF THE UNITED STATES
In the next pages we are going to scrutinize briefly the present and foreseeable future theory 
and practice of the American national strategies, considered to be the intellectual guidelines 
as well as the national security and military frameworks of the 21st century American global 
positioning, determined by the visions of the Trump administration .
Naturally, many international and domestic analyses have already dealt with presenting 
the detailed content-driven and semantic structure of the American strategies,14 thus in the 
forthcoming pages as projected above, we would like to focus on the strategic, national 
interest-centric analysis of these key documents in the matter, obviously with their global 
outlook and possible implications .
As also stated before and emphasized by many analysts and critics so far dealing with 
examining the foreign and security political agenda of the Trump administration, at first 
sight it seems to be a rather isolationist and protectionist policy reflected primarily in the 
renegotiated and reshaped American trade agreements with the European Union, Canada, 
Mexico and, most importantly with the great rival power, China . 
However, taking a deeper and closer glimpse into the American stance and attitude in 
this respect, it might reveal that most of the reset deals and treaties were justified and nec-
essary steps for asserting and protecting the core American interests . Naturally, the contro-
versy arises as soon as we start to discuss about the nature of core interests of a super-power 
the size and influence of the United States, involving the abundance of versatile interests, 
political agenda and objectives . 
According to several professional academic analysts out of the White House perimeter, 
like the outstanding liberal political scientist and security strategy analyst Barry Posen at 
MIT, the Trump administration is outlining the framework of a basically new kind of foreign 
and security policy paradigm, with new style and category without the ideological load and 
content and even visionary objectives of the previous American administrations . It may be 
too early to refer to this paradigm as Trump doctrine, though academics like Posen tend to 
label it, rather sarcastically as Trumpean “illiberal American hegemony” .15 Naturally, this 
political paradigm tends to rely on and stem from the odd, narcissistic personal features and 
the rather unique business-like attitude of the president, furthermore it is also based on the 
fundaments of the previous administrations strategic foreign policy objectives with slightly 
restructured and repositioned priority ranks . Nevertheless, following the observation and 
thoughts of Posen on the new, post-modern American illiberal hegemony, it also suggests the 
idea that the United States reshaped by President Trump still wants to preserve the status of 
singular though pragmatic hegemon of the world without the ideological burden of the con-
servative Republicans, the missionary zeal of the neocons, or even much less of the liberal 
internationalist cosmopolitanism embodied by the leftist American Democrats . 
14 See also among others the author’s recent comparative analysis of the American strategies, Csutak, Z . “Az 
Egyesült Államok helye a világban az új amerikai biztonsági és védelmi stratégiák tükrében” . Hadtudomány 
2018 . http://mhtt.eu/hadtudomany/2018/2018_elektronikus/2018ecsutak.pdf, Accessed on 10 December 2018 . 
DOI 10 .17047/HADTUD .2018 .28 .E .257
15 See Posen, B . R . “The Rise of Illiberal Hegemony . Trump’s surprising Grand Strategy” . Foreign Affairs 
97/2 . 2018 . 20-27 . https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2018-02-13/rise-illiberal-hegemony?fa_antholo-
gy=1123571, Accessed on 10 December 2018 .
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Furthermore, many strategic analysts like professor Posen and even the neocon ideol-
ogist William Kristol also assert that the military development projects of the incumbent 
administration as well as the newly shaped trade deals only tend to solidify and stabilize the 
present status quo and nothing else, without any clear-cut set of future strategic goals and, 
what is even more important, without visions for a 21st century United States . This argument, 
oddly enough, also nestles to the intellectual framework of the popular decline-theorists, 
who claim that the “Make America Great Again”-project basically deals with preserving and 
stabilizing the slow but sure decline of the United States, primarily in the global economic 
and political arena against the rising global powers of the East and the South . 
The global direction of the American military and economic power projection seems 
to be consequently and increasingly significant as far as geopolitics is still concerned in the 
new era of global affairs. The old-new challenges and security threats posed by the rising 
powers of the East, namely by the global player China and the rogue state of North Korea 
with nuclear capabilities must be evidently addressed, strengthening the existing American 
ties with China’s rivals – India, Japan and naturally, Australia . Therefore, no doubt the im-
portance of the Indo-Pacific region is emphasized and ranked as a key priority region also 
in the NSS,16 since the decades-old power shift from the West to the East is also manifested 
in the hot zone of the South China Sea, which proves to be a potential future conflict-driven 
area between the US and China . Taken into account the rather tensed conditions prevailing 
in that busy and strategically important geographic region, almost all factors are set for a 
direct or indirect kinetic conflict to burst out between the facing big powers any time in the 
near future . In other words, the actual assertiveness and power status of America will be 
most presumably directly tested and challenged, so the emphasized presence of the US as a 
game-changer power shield cannot be decreased or pulled back without extremely negative 
and irreversible consequences for her Far Eastern allies (Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and 
even The Philippines) as well as for the global American power status and position .17
Similarly, the NSS also emphasizes the rehashed importance of the European arena 
– nota bene it was quite considerably neglected by the Obama administration – where the 
American power positions seem to have been critically challenged recently by the mus-
cled-up, rather expansionist Russia of president Putin, particularly in the East European re-
gion, stretching down from Estonia, the Baltic Sea, to Romania and to the Balkan peninsula 
with Turkey and the land-locked Black Sea around . Decision makers in Washington tend 
to realize that for the safety and security of the United States, it is quite important that the 
countries along the globally expanded American frontier regions in the Far East or Eastern 
Europe must have confidence in the shield and might of the United States. This feeling of 
security and feasible perception of power, especially of hard, deterring – military – power 
must be built up, maintained and demonstrated both for the allies and particularly for the 
opponent forces . All it takes is a considerable amount of money and time . From this respect, 
the Trump administration reversed the gradual withdrawal strategy from Europe of president 
Obama and initiated a quite significant military build-up project in Central and Eastern Eu-
rope covered by the European Deterrence Initiative (EDI) project, with an estimated annual 
16 National Security Strategy . . . 45 .
17 See Nye, J . S . Véget ér-e az amerikai évszázad? 70-75 . and Mitchell, A . W . and Grygiel, J . J . The Unquiet Fron-
tier: Rising Rivals, Vulnerable Allies and the Crisis of American Power. New York: Princeton University Press, 
2017 . 260-264 .
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budget of USD 7-9 billion for 2019,18 which is a bigger amount than the combined Defence 
budget of the three Baltic and three Central European NATO member states in a year (with 
the only exception of Poland) . From this vast closing-up military allocation the Ukrainian 
forces alone are expected to receive a 200-million-dollar grant for military gear development 
in 2019 . Initially, the European Reassurance Initiative program from 2016 aimed at only 
softly containing Russia’s expansion in her near-neighbourhood, former Soviet republics 
like Ukraine . Yet, the new American NDS also highlights the increased importance of im-
proving and developing the deterring and rather lethal striking combined force capabilities 
of the American military in all key regions, such as Eastern Europe . All the same, many 
strategists and critics of the growing EDI claim that the American military build-up in Eu-
rope basically weakens and even jeopardizes the development of the European allies’ own 
military capabilities . Following this claim, the rich and developed small and medium-size 
countries, apart from Germany and Poland, continuously and predominantly fail to comply 
even with their decades-old NATO obligation of 2% GDP Defence budget allocation .19 This 
is, naturally a quite disillusioning fact that provides justified ground for the rather harsh, 
outspoken Trump arguments and critical remarks on the unwillingness and meek attitude of 
the European NATO allies to invest into their own defence projects . 
As we referred to it, the personality and political philosophy of the president deeply 
affects the primary strategic guidelines and global positioning roadmap of the United States 
in many respects, thus it is advised to take into account the basic traits of President Trump, 
as well. From a military point of view, President Trump fits into the row of rather militant 
Republican presidents sharing their high respect and esteem towards the uniform and glori-
fication of the American military achievements, nevertheless his presidential tenure seems 
to be overwhelmed by his defining trade-driven businessman-like attitude. Though the pres-
ident used to be a very popular and even group-leader cadet in the prestigious New York 
Military Academy boarding school during his adolescence in the 1960’s20, he definitely lacks 
the highly appreciated military field practice experience – unlike the revered war hero Bush 
family, with both father and son military pilots and American presidents . That fact provid-
ed enough room for several defamatory media speculations21 and various gossiping in the 
Washington Establishment on his strategic decision making skills as commander-in-chief of 
the mightiest military force in the world . 
As for his latest, the quite drastic and controversial order of partial withdrawal of the 
American ground forces from Syria and Afghanistan may not have been the best decision 
concerning the long-term American strategic interests in those war-stricken countries . For-
mer Secretary of Defence Mattis also gently expressed his covert disapproval with??? the 
rather hurried executive order from December 2018 on the American troops’ withdrawal 
lacking strategic reasoning and even forsaking key strategic partners of the US, like the 
18 Judson, J . “Funding to Deter Russia reaches $6 .5B in FY19 defense budget request” . Defense News . 12 Febru-
ary 2018 . https://www .defensenews .com/land/2018/02/12/funding-to-deter-russia-reaches-65b-in-fy19-defense-
budget-request/, Accessed on 20 December 2018 .
19 Posen . “The Rise of Illiberal Hegemony…”
20 See Robinson, M . “Trump says this private boarding school gave him more military training than the Army 
could — take a look” . Business Insider, 15 December 2016 . https://www .businessinsider .com/donald-trump-at-
tended-new-york-military-academy-2016-12, Accessed on 2December 2018 .
21 Hart-Hunter, M . “What does ‘Cadet Bone Spurs’ mean? Trump’s nickname was coined by Sen . Tammy Duck-
worth” . 7 February 2018 . https://www .bustle .com/p/what-does-cadet-bone-spurs-mean-trumps-nickname-was-
coined-by-sen-tammy-duckworth-8150101, Accessed on 27 December 2018 .
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Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces group in Northern Syria .22 Acts like this do not real-
ly serve the amical trust building perception among the allied partners of America, small 
but really important they might be, especially in key war-torn regions . As General Mattis 
proclaimed, reasserting President Trump’s well-known view that America should not and 
cannot be the world’s policeman, yet the US “must be resolute and unambiguous” towards 
opponent and allied powers, as well .23 However, typically to the rather contradictory presi-
dential tweets the pompous proclamation on social media that “I will make our Military so 
big, powerful & strong that no one will mess with us” following his inauguration in January 
2016 conveys the assumption of President Trump that the US would remain the “sheriff in 
town” the unchallenged strongman of the world, who cannot and, basically does not intend 
to get rid of this role .24
When discussing grand strategies at national level and the ramification of the defined set 
of goals down to tactical and implementation levels, it is important for the decision makers 
to be consistent and reliable, otherwise it might result in strategic or operational malfunction 
and disorder . You cannot befriend with someone, even at state-level, whom you try to con-
tain, deter and oppose at the same time, as it seems to be the case regarding the controversial 
relations of President Trump with Russia and even with some of her allies, not to mention 
the case of Syria and Afghanistan, without a clear strategic roadmap outlined for the United 
States .
As for the 21st century technological revolution and the expansion of the much-cited 
American frontier reaching up into the space, the festive proclamation of vice president 
Mike Pence as of August 27, 2018 about the inauguration of the American Space Force and 
the revitalization of the National Space Council was meant to be a noteworthy moment .25 Al-
though many experts regard the event as merely a symbolic act facing the future challenges 
from space posed by China and Russia rather than an effective and lethal 6th service branch 
of the American military as White House officials initially tended to label it. Nevertheless, it 
is a really significant step forward in transforming the military strategic thinking and focal 
points for the new, 21st century challenges, in accordance with the paradigm of Revolution 
in Military Affairs stating that non-kinetic power projection can be as important and efficient 
as the kinetic forces of conventional military units . The NDS as well as the NSS26 emphasize 
the importance of new warfighting domains and types of warfare, such as cyberspace with 
electronic and cyber warfare, and the real space domain (which starts from an altitude of 
100 km) around the globe, aiming to improve the competitive edge and deterrence, coun-
ter-strike operability of the American armed forces . Although the militarization of space de 
jure has still been illegal under the international Outer Space Treaty since 1967, practically 
22 Mattis, J . N . “Jim Mattis’s letter to Trump” . New York Times, 20 December 2018 . https://www .nytimes .
com/2018/12/20/us/politics/letter-jim-mattis-trump .html, Accessed on 27 December 2018 .
23 Breuninger, K . “Mattis’ Letter to Trump” . CNBC . https://www .cnbc .com/2018/12/20/read-james-mattis-letter-
to-trump-resigning-as-defense-secretary .html, Accessed on 27 December 2018 .
24 Trump, D . J . “@realDonaldTrump: I will make our Military so big, powerful and strong that no one will mess 
us” . Twitter, 24 January 2016 . https://twitter .com/realdonaldtrump/status/691276412666261504, Accessed on 10 
November 2018 .
25 Lewin, S . “Plans for Space Force Laid Out at National Space Council Meeting” . https://www .space .com/42237-
national-space-council-space-force-meeting .html, Accessed on 2 December 2018 .
26 National Defense Strategy of the United States. Washington D .C .: Department of Defense, 2018 . https://dod .
defense .gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary .pdf, Accessed on 12 Sep-
tember 2018 . 4-5 . and National Security Strategy  . . . 31-32 .
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no state authority can really control or supervise outer space, de facto both the real as well 
as the cyber space domains are allegedly militarized and dominated by the three most sig-
nificant global powers, namely the USA, China and Russia. Moreover, the elaboration and 
development details of the brand new space command or would-be 6th service branch are 
still unfolding with various pro and con arguments coming from the military command cen-
tres as well as from the Pentagon in this matter .
Another outstanding strategic defence issue concerns the modernization and develop-
ment project initiative of the American nuclear triad, particularly of the quite sizable stock-
pile of obsolete, half-century-old Minuteman intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) as 
well as the reinvigoration of the operational deployment of short and medium-range tactical 
ballistic missiles, also galvanized by the Chinese and Russian build-up in this regard .27 The 
Trumpean trend of the relentless renegotiation of trade deals as well as of defence-related 
treaties also affects the 1987 Soviet – American Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty 
(INF) . Since the American capabilities in this branch show considerable handicaps against 
the rising rival powers, this problem should be properly addressed from the perspective of 
revisited American security concerns . The treaty as considered de facto obsolete and ineffec-
tive was actually phased out in July, 2019 both by the US and Russia .
FINAL THOUGHTS
Despite the rhetoric arguments and shifts in the political trend, the Trump administration’s 
national security and Defence strategies show basic consistency with the guidelines of the 
previous executive documents of the Obama administration, although reflecting some sig-
nificant alterations and shifts in priority ranking as well as in the emphasized military capa-
bility build-up and technological development projects . According to the initial campaign 
slogans and preliminary political vision of Donald J . Trump, his presidency tends to preserve 
the core values and interests of the United States as a super-power, by putting it on the top 
of the priority list by “making America great again”, a message which unintentionally reas-
serts and suggests the declining power theory-concept of the liberal opponents of President 
Trump . In many respects the United States needs serious refurbishment, rejuvenating de-
velopment projects, particularly in domestic infrastructural and economic areas, which are 
all considered to be national security priorities and concerns according to the trade-centric 
attitude of the president reflected in the NSS, too.28 Furthermore, strengthening the vast 
American frontier-line stretching from the East European peripheries through the Far East-
ern South-China Sea and even up to space is considered to be of outstanding importance 
in the 21st century, since protecting the American interests should start at the peripheries, 
as President Trump’s former under-secretary for Central and East European affairs Wess 
Mitchell pointed out remarkably .29 The classic, 19th- and 20th-century defence strategic idea 
of the two-ocean shield is not sufficient and, as also proclaimed in the NSS, the “home 
country is not a sanctuary, either” anymore, especially after 9/11, and particularly with the 
27 Johnson, J . “China’s missile build-up: a threat to U .S . bases in Japan: likely a key factor in Trump plan to exit 
INF” . The Japan Times 22 October 2018 . https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2018/10/22/asia-pacific/russia-
blamed-china-real-reason-u-s-inf-exit/# .XCyHoVzQjDc, Accessed on 29 November 2018 .
28 National Security Strategy  . . . 16 .
29 Mitchell and Grygiel . The Unquiet Frontier... 220-223 .
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rise of cyber-age threats .30 According to this paradigm, enhancing the military capabilities 
and boosting the home country economy go hand in hand, these measures strengthen and 
promote each other . On the other hand, this seems to be enough just for preserving the tran-
sient power balance and the status quo and not for setting a new agenda and future vision 
for the United States . That is the reason why the above mentioned critiques of the Trump 
presidency and analysts of his core security documents tend to emphasize and pinpoint the 
lack of coherence and long-term strategic vision presented to the nation . As the much-quoted 
MIT professor Posen put it bluntly “President Trump’s grand strategy is about preserving 
American hegemony without a purpose” .31 Obviously, being only at the mid-term of the 
Trump presidency, perhaps time is not ripening for making a statement on the existence of a 
possible Trump doctrine . Furthermore, other policy analysts like professor Brands from the 
Johns Hopkins University claim that the grand strategy of President Trump is basically the 
one also applied by his predecessor President George W . Bush and even partly by President 
Obama only in a much different political manner and coverage.32 Altogether, the new Amer-
ican strategies tend to reiterate and share the classic idea of peace and American prosperity 
through power as well as power-balancing by preserving American supremacy against the 
rising challengers from the Asia-pacific mega region.
From all aspects taken into account, we can firmly concur that the utmost priority of the 
Trump administration both in its security and foreign political strategy relies on the quest 
for preserving the political, economic as well as military primacy of the United States on the 
world stage, where the only real challenger in all terms proves to be China . As the Beijing 
bureau chief of The Economist, David Rennie tweeted aptly from the 70th anniversary of 
the Chinese Navy: “After millennia as an agrarian civilization that saw the sea as a source 
of threats, China is becoming a maritime power . That could help shape this century .”33 This 
kind of strategic presumption also defines the re-orientation of the American defence and 
foreign political focus into the fermenting Indo-Pacific region.
All the same, considering the presidential decisions made, the strategic guidelines pre-
sented through the core national documents, the renegotiated deals and a plethora of rather 
contradictory presidential tweets, we can assert that, typically to Donald Trump’s personality 
features as a leader, his doctrine is basically not to have one and to reject any constraints in any 
matter and policy, making his allies and, especially his adversaries constantly feel unease and 
adapt to the pace and rhythm set by his presidency. This rather flexible, dynamic and transac-
tionist business-type leadership attitude also genuinely reflects the postmodern, ever-changing 
and flexible fashion of international relations in the new cyber-era. Nevertheless, the classic 
wisdom of the great leader Napoleon Bonaparte should not be neglected by President Trump, 
either, namely that “You can lead a nation if you provide them a vision of the future; the Leader 
must provide hope and clear goals.” As we could realize, the popular yet rather superfluous 
slogan of “America First” and “Make America Great Again” may be sufficient on presidential 
election campaign trail, yet might not be enough to fulfil the role of this kind of strategic set of 
vision and objectives for a super power nation like the United States of America…
(The analysis manuscript was closed in July, 2019)
30 National Security Strategy . . . 12-14 .
31 Posen . “The Rise of Illiberal Hegemony…”
32 Brands, H . American Grand Strategy in the age of Trump. Washington D . C .: Brookings Inst ., 2018 . 65-70 .
33 Rennie, D . “@DSORennie: After millennia as an agrarian civilisation…” . Twitter, 26 April 2019 . https://twitter .
com/DSORennie/status/1121686136244408320, Accessed on 27 April 2019 .
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Cpt Éva Dudás – 2nd Lt Nóra Pákozdi – Cpt Róbert Stohl:
REPOSITORY OF CAPABILITIES: REPORT ON 
THE NON-KINETIC CAPABILITY DEVELOPMENT 
CONFERENCE OF THE HUNGARIAN DEFENCE 
FORCES
It has become almost a cliché to remark that our international environment and, in line with 
it, the tools of modern warfare have been undergoing changes . The need for modernization 
and development of the forces is constant, the technological transformation of defence capa-
bilities is continuous, but in the interconnected world the scientific and analytical-assessing 
capacities essential for understanding the strategic environment are under pressure . The de-
velopment and interconnection of non-kinetic capabilities and their influence on the security 
of certain countries, regions and federal systems are sometimes in line with the effects of 
traditional military interventions, thus the development of effective responses, technologies 
and strategies has become a top priority. The scientific conference entitled “Operational 
Success without Arms: Expanding Non-Kinetic Capabilities of the Force”, held on Novem-
ber 07-08 2018 organized jointly by the Honvéd General Staff’s Scientific Research Centre 
of Preparatory and Training Command and Szent István University of Gödöllő, provided an 
opportunity to gain an insight into a vital segment of changes and the modern trends of their 
practical implementation .
The primary goal of the conference was to highlight the fact: our strategic vision should 
be based on data as reliable as possible and information gained from primary sources with 
the use of modern technologies in line with the knowledge of non-kinetic warfare tools . The 
intentional online presence, following the tendencies of non-kinetic abilities and the contin-
uous development of our existing capabilities both in cyberspace and in reality, comprises 
important cornerstones of the success of the defence sector, they will contribute to our ability 
to effectively accomplish our tasks, to raise the level of understanding between the civil and 
military sectors and the ongoing and future co-operation to the highest possible level .
In his welcome speech Mr Pál Kádár, PhD, State Secretary of the Ministry of Defence, 
stressed that the changes taking place in the international security situation make it neces-
sary for us not only to respond to the challenges, but also to proactively prevent them . A fo-
rum like this will offer a good opportunity to do so. In his view, the “system of the national 
defence is not capable of standing on its own feet, it is not sufficient to develop the military 
capabilities in order to defend the country . It is a complex system, some of its elements do 
not fall within the competence of the Ministry of Defence but the innovative solutions and 
the ideas this sector is supposed to provide will help the entire national defence to build its 
capabilities” .
In his opening address Lieutenant General Gábor Böröndi, PhD, the Deputy Chief of 
Staff of the Hungarian Defence Forces, stressed that the resilience of a state and society is 
best illustrated by the success of its diplomacy, the strength of its economy, and the effective-
ness of its intelligence and army . Therefore, in hybrid warfare, the attackers target the popu-
lation to discourage them from following their leaders . He recalled the operational achieve-
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ments of the Hungarian Defence Forces, which had been accomplished without fighting, 
such as the performance of border guard duties that started in 2015, in which the Defence 
Forces CIMIC and PSYOPS and military intelligence capabilities were largely involved as, 
due to their activities, the Hungarian society supported the work of the Hungarian Police and 
the Defence Forces . Although this work was not of a showy kind, it greatly contributed to 
the success of the operation .
In the opening remarks, Ferenc Magyar, the Chancellor of Szent István University, em-
phasized the close ties between the University and the Hungarian Defence Forces stretching 
back decades, which is further strengthened by the ongoing research programmes . He em-
phasized that the concept of security is now more broadly understood and goes far beyond 
the political, military and social approaches and is complemented, for example, by the secu-
rity of the sustainable environment, economy, food and water. At the same time, he defined 
the task to establish the security as a common social interest, in which all actors must be 
involved; the Hungarian Defence Forces will rely on the knowledge accumulated by civilian 
research centres and universities .
The first plenary lecturer, Major General Prof. József Padányi, DSc, analysed the impact 
of climate change on the military forces (“The impact of climate change on military force”). 
He explained how some armies contributed to global warming, and he also reviewed that 
the challenges and tasks the environmental changes pose to the troops are not purely mil-
itary in nature . As a second plenary lecturer, Colonel Imre Porkoláb, PhD, addressed the 
relationship between the innovation and non-kinetic capabilities of the Hungarian Defence 
Forces (“Innovation and the development of non-kinetic abilities in the Hungarian Defence 
Forces”). The last plenary lecturer was Colonel Tibor Rózsa, PhD, who discussed one of 
the most complex forms of the non-kinetic warfare of our time (“Theory and Evolution of 
Information Operations”) . He presented the theory and evolution of information operations 
in detail, as well as the influence operations in this context, then he covered the topic of the 
future challenges the information operations will face .
The first of a series of lectures in the special area of competence was held jointly by 
Lieutenant Colonel Gábor Hangya, PhD, and Major Ferenc Soucz (“Non-kinetic Abilities 
from the Perspective of Hungarian Defence Forces – Correlation of Theory and Practice”). 
They studied the concept of non-kinetic abilities from the perspective of the Hungarian 
Defence Forces and the international (primarily allied) conceptual approaches, and demon-
strated the possible utilization of the abilities at national level through the work of the HDF 
Civil-Military Collaboration and Psychological Operations Center by showing practical ex-
amples. Then Ferenc Mező, PhD, Head of the Institute of Psychology of Eszterházy Károly 
University, spoke on the realization of a possible civil-military cooperation and its benefits 
gained from the database of psychological operations he had developed (“An example of 
psychological warfare – roaming through the war, psychology paths, mazes of history”). 
Major Márta Pákozdi, researching the career choice motivations of the health care profes-
sionals and staff serving in military health system, has shown that, in addition to a secure 
livelihood, professional and moral appreciation can play a role in the development of the 
labour force maintaining capability of the Defence Forces . In her lecture (“The motivation 
of career choice of the professionals and staff serving in the military health system”), she 
highlighted that the career development support in high-quality work continues to play a 
key role .
Subsequent lectures explored the various aspects of security and the factors influencing 
them . First, a complex rural security approach based on the security concept of the Copen-
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hagen School was given particular attention to in the lecture held by Colonel Prof . Tibor 
Szilágyi, PhD, and Colonel Gábor Boldizsár, PhD, (“Operational Success without a Weapon 
or Rural Security Alert”). In connection with this, Csaba Bognár analysed the latest trends 
in bioterrorism (“Bioterrorism, The Latest Trend in Bioterrorism”) and finally Péter Miletics 
presented the population movements triggered by climate change in the Carpathian Basin 
(“Chapters of the Climate Change-driven Migration History of the Carpathian Basin”) . 
Examining and understanding these ongoing processes that are currently taking place and af-
fecting the communities will allow them to timely prepare for the challenges they will face .
The most crucial lectures delivered on the first day of the conference addressed the top-
ics of non-kinetic threats, such as social media and data analysis that are popular even with 
the laic audience . György Körmendi depicted the latest techniques and trends in the analysis 
of unstructured data sets generated by law enforcement by using some case studies (“Ar-
tificial intelligence and data analysis are going to be deployed”). In this context, Gergely 
Takács presented how different data mining methods can be utilized in the sphere of national 
security (“Big Data Analysis Methods in the National Security Sector”). At the end of the 
section, Second Lieutenant Balázs Lóderer, PhD, presented (“SOCMINT”) how to exploit 
the methods of analysing and defending social media in modern warfare such as creating a 
noisy dataset, application of different structures, and separation of data systems.
The first lecture on the second day of the conference was delivered by Péter Balogh, 
PhD, (“Armed Forces (Development) and Trust (Building): Capability Building as a Social 
Embedding Operation”) . He discussed how the Defence Force was being (re)embedded into 
society and how this process was taking place as a specific non-kinetic operation affecting 
the inclusive society . András Jung, PhD, presented the latest tools of mobile spectral im-
aging, their international and domestic applications, and their possible uses, with the title 
“Spectral Imaging Systems in Remote Sensing and in the Field Data Collection”, underlin-
ing that the gap between data collection and decision making will be decreased by making 
the remote sensing data chain more closed, therefore more accurate results are expected .
Colonel Zoltán Jobbágy, PhD, in his lecture entitled “Non-War Operations, Non-Ki-
netic Skills: The British Mission Command” presented the British characteristics of NA-
TO’s mission-oriented leadership philosophy . Subsequently, László Szelke, PhD, present-
ed Operation Bodyguard, a disinformation operation which sought to divert the attention 
of the German General Staff from operation Overlord and as part of it, he presented the 
actors and the plans of operation Zeppelin and the plans of the Balkan invasion, (“Infor-
mation and Disinformation Operations in World War II”). The closing lecture was held 
by Lieutenant Colonel Norbert Hegedűs, aiming to optimize the operation of the territo-
rial reserve system (“Geographical aspects and projections of the voluntary territorial 
reserve system”). 
Subsequently, Lieutenant Colonel Csanádi outlined to what extent intelligence affects 
the success of military activity and the seriousness of cybernetic blasts on which they are 
based (“How Painful Weapon is Information?”). Colonel László Keszely, PhD, present-
ed the co-ordinated and joint use of civil, military and law enforcement capabilities as a 
non-kinetic ability of national defence, emphasizing the importance of the role of national 
defence management (“Cooperating with Civil and Law Enforcement Agencies as Non-Ki-
netic Defence Ability”). In the closing contribution of the conference (“The link between 
cryptocurrencies and terrorism”), Major Klára Fekete-Karydis (Res .) outlined the features 
of cyberspace and the stages relevant to cyber defence in the international security architec-
tures, including the regulations that are in force in Hungary and the requirements imposed 
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on them. In addition to presenting the background, she sought to find out whether, besides 
the financial sector and terrorism, there could be other points of attachment between the new 
technology and Armed Forces Development Program . 
SUMMARY
The presentations at the conference reflect the importance of witnessing a slow change in 
attitude in which military and civilian capabilities that used to be strictly separated are now 
not only complementary but also in most cases an indispensable combination of crisis man-
agement tools, creating a complex operational environment . The symposium provided an 
excellent opportunity to share the knowledge accumulated during the application of non-ki-
netic capabilities of the defence forces, it allowed to renew, develop and update the strategic 
background, as well as presented new areas that came to the fore last year and the Hungarian 
Defence Forces can have a practical benefit from. The research, focusing on these issues, 
professional plenary sessions and discussions were and are useful because within the frame-
work of National Defence and Armed Forces Development Program Zrínyi 2026, the port-
folio’s core aim is to summarize, process and implement the theoretical and, in particular, 
practical lessons learned during the modernization process . In addition to the representatives 
of military sciences, the researchers of diverse interdisciplinary areas and the participants of 
the private sector were involved in the conference . This event was a great example of civ-
il-military cooperation since it is essential for the Hungarian Defence Forces – as an integral 
part of the society – to look for new alternatives of the cooperation in order to carry out its 
missions and activities and to achieve its objectives in the most efficient way possible.
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Maj Zoltán Somodi: 
NIHILISM OR ISLAMIC JIHAD? 
Oliver Roy’s theory on the roots of European jihadism
Olivier Roy’s most recent book on the nature of contemporary jihad is a summary and fur-
ther development of his idea, the “Islamization of radicalism” . It claims that Islamic religion 
is not the main motivating force behind jihadi violence; in fact, jihadists possess only a 
low level of religious knowledge . Instead, it is their pre-existing radicalism and nihilism 
that find Islam as a framework to channel their frustration and fulfil their revolutionary and 
nihilistic desire for death and destruction . Disagreeing with scholars who explain this form 
of violence via a line of thought descending from authentic, sacred religious texts through 
Ibn Taymiyya and Sayeed Qutb to Osama bin Laden, he uses a cross-cutting approach, and 
compares jihadism to other forms of violent radicalism, like self-destruction and doomsday 
cults, claiming that these are somehow similar to Islamic radicalism . 
On the nature of religious fundamentalism, his position is that this alone will not result 
in violence . Fundamentalists may promote a radical break from society, but do not necessar-
ily turn to violence . As an example, Hasidic Jews or Benedictine Catholics are comparable 
to “most Salafists”, by which he means the non-violent ones. Arguably, it would be useful 
to differentiate between types of fundamentalism based on the difference between the actual 
fundaments, where the respective movements want to return, but Roy’s contextual approach 
leads us away from discussing core doctrinal foundations . Touching on the problem of “re-
ligious radicalization” and “moderate religion”, he writes that it hardly makes sense to write 
about a moderate theology, since there is no moderate 
religion only moderate followers . 
One of his central thoughts that raises questions in 
the reader is the distinction between terrorists and ji-
hadis . His hypothesis is that terrorists are a subset of ji-
hadis, and the main distinguishing factor appears to be 
the geographical location of their death . “Terrorists” 
commit their attacks in the West, whereas “jihadis” go 
to wage war in the Middle East, and fight for the foun-
dation and expansion of the Caliphate. Another differ-
ence would be the level of their connectedness, since 
jihadis are recruited over the internet, but nearly all 
terrorists are connected to jihadist organizations, like 
al-Qaeda or ISIS . 
This imaginary differentiation between the sub-
groups of jihadis is harmless as long as no government 
policy is founded upon it . However, it is somewhat dis-
turbing to think about certain Western European gov-
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ernments’ completely flawed and mistaken approach of letting jihadis back to their countries 
and trying to “integrate” them, instead of doing their best to keep them as far away from 
Europe as possible . It appears as if the word “jihadi” had less negative connotations than the 
popular euphemism “terrorist”, they almost appear as timeless revolutionaries, embedded 
in a so-called nihilistic “youth culture”, using and abusing the framework of an otherwise 
harmless ideology to channel their fervour .
Perhaps the hardest statement to agree with is “What fascinates is pure revolt, not the 
construction of a utopia . Violence is not a means . It is an end in itself .” The appropriate jiha-
di label reminds us of their goal, which is global Islamic world order based on the sovereign-
ty of Allah and sharia law . It is their goal which is important and not their means (violence) 
or theatre of operations . Roy also maintains that “everyone and everything” is an enemy for 
the Islamic radicals, but this is questionable . For instance, we can look at jihadists (some of 
them would be called “terrorists” by Roy) who let those hostages go who are clearly Mus-
lim, and can recite the Quran, and kill only the kuffar . Their violence is not indiscriminate at 
all, it is carefully selective, and their targets are only the kafir civilization, heretics and apos-
tates . Collateral damage is possible, but they should never be looked at as intended targets . 
Another debate where Roy clearly positions himself is whether the content of Islamic re-
ligious texts is important in the radicalization of individual Muslims . His claim is that while 
“an Islamophobic segment” thinks that there is no such thing as moderate Islam, traditional 
Muslim authorities, liberal Muslims, and secular state authorities “try to draw a dividing 
line between a good Islam, that rejects terrorism and gives jihad a spiritual definition, and 
a radical Salafi, Wahhabi Islam that is the seedbed of terrorism and jihadism.” Indeed, this 
is the core of the problem, and a main dividing line between agreeing and disagreeing with 
Roy . On several occasions throughout the book, Roy mentions the lack of proper religious 
knowledge of Western jihadis, and their poor command of Arabic as one of its main reasons . 
This is a somewhat surprising critique from a scholar who himself does not speak Ara-
bic . So, the question boils down to the core problem whether it is possible to comprehend the 
message of Islam without speaking Arabic and going through the traditional learning pro-
cess with some religious authority whose knowledge we accept as more authentic than ours, 
or not . However, if we accept Roy’s idea that “the question is not: ‘What does the Quran 
really say?’ but rather: ‘What do Muslims say about what the Quran says?’, then we end up 
needing to choose from one Muslim theologist’s opinion or the other’s .
The lack of a professional command of Quranic Arabic makes this choice all the more 
difficult, and the unfortunate reality is that neither the traditional Muslim authorities, nor 
liberal Muslims, nor secular state authorities are in the position to tell what is true Islam and 
what is not . None of their opinions is more authentic than those of others, although some can 
be more appealing to our ears, especially if they reject so-called “terrorism” and define jihad 
as a spiritual struggle . The usual problem these traditional authorities and liberal or secular 
Muslims encounter is that their definition of terrorism is quite ambiguous, and they have 
limited success in supporting their claims with authentic and truly authoritative religious 
sources . Therefore, these are simply opinions, and even if they were shared by the majority 
of Muslims, Islam is not a creation of a majority decision, but of divine revelation and Mu-
hammad’s example .
The book certainly brings the debate on contemporary jihadists forward and has several 
points that can be welcomed by critics and enthusiasts alike . The fact that volunteers travel-
ling to the Middle Eastern jihad fronts are called what they are, jihadists, and not terrorists, 
insurgents, foreign fighters, or militants is already positive, even if their terminological sepa-
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ration from so-called “terrorists” on Western home fronts can be disputed . In the conclusions 
part the author stresses another important point, that deradicalization programs are unlikely 
to be a successful strategy . He also acknowledges that jihadism is not rooted in former co-
lonial history or economic problems, but then positions Islam only as a framework for the 
channelling of a pre-existing nihilism, and definitely not as the cause of political violence. 
Roy’s book leaves one wonder why exactly Islam is the preferred framework for today’s 
nihilists, and certainly leaves the question unanswered, what we can do to protect ourselves 
from this “Islamized radicalism” . Even if we agree with Roy’s assessment that Western, sec-
ond generation “jihadists and terrorists” alike are in fact nihilist rebels in search of a cause, 
we must not forget that Western-born nihil-jihadists are but a fragment of the world’s com-
munity of global jihad, and we are left guessing why young Muslims grown up in entirely 
different social and cultural circumstances also end up fighting side by side with them for 
the same political goals . 
Olivier Roy: Jihad and Death: The Global Appeal of Islamic State. New York,  
NY. Oxford University Press, 2017, 130 pages, ISBN 9781849046985
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EDITORIAL POLICIES
Peer Review Process
In order to ensure that articles are of a high quality, all submissions are reviewed by at least 
two subject matter experts. The review process is anonymous and confidential (double blind 
peer review) . 
Open Access Policy 
The General Staff of the Hungarian Defence Force grants permission to institutions of higher 
learning to deposit in their repositories scholarly articles authored or co-authored by their 
researchers and published in Hungarian Defence Review, provided that the final publisher’s 
version is archived and its layout is kept intact, and 
a . The link to the original publication is provided;
b . The publication details are included as part of the metadata;
c . The publisher (Hungarian Defence Review) is indicated . 
Articles published in Hungarian Defence Review may also be reproduced electronically 
or in print as instruction materials in professional courses for military and civilian special-
ists, provided that full bibliographic information and a link to the original publication are 
provided to the readers . The Editors request that they be informed when material published 
in the journal is used as instruction material .
The authors of articles published in Hungarian Defence Review are authorized to make 
their work accessible to the public through their websites, provided the above conditions are 
met .
Ethical Guidelines
Hungarian Defence Review is committed to the dissemination of high-quality research 
through its articles according to the set norms and ethics of the social scientific community. 
Conformance with the standards of ethical behaviour and norms of research of all involved 
in the process, namely the editors, the editorial advisory board, peer reviewers, publisher(s) 
and contributors to the publication is important in order to maintain a cutting-edge journal 
worthy of international academic citizenship . In particular, the following is required of the 
stakeholders:
Editorial Advisory Board – The Editorial Advisory Board consists of recognised and well-
known academics, theorists and expert practitioners in their subject area . The Editorial Ad-
visory Board members act as an example and subscribe to the norms and ethical standards 
of the international scientific community and the ethical guidelines of this journal. While the 
members’ task is mainly advisory in nature, they also provide advice and serve as a source of 
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experience during the review and publication process as set out in the instructions to authors 
and the particular ethical guidelines for the journal set out here .
Editors – Editors evaluate manuscripts only in terms of their academic merit and suitability 
in terms of the focus of the journal . Editors take care that peer reviewers that are selected are 
academics in good standing and with suitable knowledge and expertise in the particular field 
of the article submitted . Editors will take responsible and reasonable responsive measures 
with regard to ethical complaints received . Complaints of ethical transgressions will be in-
vestigated and reasonable steps taken as per the circumstances of a particular case .
Authors – Authors should ensure that their submissions are their own original work, suf-
ficient in detail, well-argued and according to a proper reference system (consult the Hun-
garian Defence Review guidelines for authors) . Where the work of other authors are used 
proper and full referencing is required . No paraphrasing or indirect paraphrasing is accept-
able without attribution . All sources will be properly acknowledged . Plagiarism in any of its 
forms, whether construed as unconscious or naïve plagiarism, direct or indirect plagiarism, 
is unacceptable and will lead to immediate rejection of articles including the blacklisting 
of the person involved . Submitting an article or review article to more than one journal is 
not acceptable . Where co-authorship is at stake the person responsible for submission will 
ensure that the co-author(s) concur on the submission in that particular version both in terms 
of contents, argument and format .
Reviewers – Hungarian Defence Review uses a double blind peer-review process . All ar-
ticles/submissions are treated as strictly confidential. All information obtained through the 
peer-review process, including research data are not for use by the reviewers or anyone as-
sociated with the reviewer either privately or for purposes of dissemination . Peer reviewers 
strive to conduct their reviews in an unbiased way and observations and comments (includ-
ing constructive criticism or the identification of shortcomings in articles) are to be formu-
lated clearly and with supporting arguments. Any peer reviewer that feel unqualified or not 
interested for any reason in reviewing a particular submission should notify the editors and 
kindly excuse himself from the process . Reviewers should under no circumstances review 
articles in which they observe and/or are aware of a conflict of interests, be it due to personal, 
collaborative or competitive relationships, connections or networks during the process from 
the start of the initial article to the publication of the output . Reviewers should respond ac-
cording to the set requirements and feedback period in good time as requested by the editors 
to the benefit of the authors and the journal.
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GUIDELINES FOR AUTHORS 
Manuscripts must be submitted electronically, as OpenOffice, Microsoft Word, RTF, or 
WordPerfect documents. When maps, figures and graphs are presented, they must be 
professionally produced and submitted separately as graphics files, ready for electronic 
processing .
The length of papers should be between 25,000 and 40,000 characters, including 
footnotes, tables and reference lists . Book reviews should be 7,000-10,000 characters . A 
written statement that the manuscript has not been submitted to other publishers is required . 
Papers must be written in English with grammar, terminology and style appropriate for 
the subject . The journal reserves the right to reject without prejudice those papers that 
do not meet academic standards of grammar and style .
The final decision concerning the publication of papers lies with the editorial commit-
tee . No correspondence will be carried on in this respect .
Copyright on all published material in Hungarian Defence Review rests with the jour-
nal . However, authors are encouraged to publish their articles on their own websites and 
in academic forums . In all such cases Hungarian Defence Review must be identified as the 
publishing forum .
Authors submitting papers, which originally formed part of dissertations or theses, 
should seek the advice of their consultants prior to submission .
Manuscripts must be accompanied by a brief biography or CV of the author detailing 
such information as would establish his credibility and authority on the subject (e .g . rank, 
profession, current unit or appointment, educational qualifications, significant courses 
attended or taught, past appointments in his parent service, practical experience, service 
under hostile fire, etc.).
Opinions expressed in the Journal, or conclusions made, are those of the author(s) 
alone and do not imply endorsement on the part of the editors .
The editors realise that the value and impact of many submissions lie in their time-
liness . However, the assessment of papers could take a considerable length of time . To 
strike a balance between these two contradictory requirements, the editors will respond to 
each submission with a preliminary assessment within four weeks . Authors are requested 
not to make further enquiries before three months has elapsed .
Style
It is difficult to be prescriptive about the use of a certain style in an international multidis-
ciplinary journal . However, as a general guideline, the most important considerations are con-
sistency and clarity: authors may use either UK or US or any other version of English, but not 
mix them (i .e . no “program” and “programme” in the same paper, except in direct quotes) .
References
As with all serious professional publications, sources used and ideas borrowed in Hun-
garian Defence Review articles must all be acknowledged to avoid plagiarism . Research 
containing no references will not be considered . Note numbers should be inserted after 
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punctuation . For the purpose of uniformity and to simplify the editorial process, the use of 
footnotes is required. The footnote containing the first reference to a specific source should 
be detailed . The short-title method is used for subsequent references to the same source . 
The use of Ibid. and op. cit. is discouraged . All direct quotes require a reference with a 
specific page number. When referring to a central idea in a specific work, no page numbers 
are required .
Abbreviations and acronyms
Abbreviations and acronyms should be given in full when they occur for the first time and 
the abbreviation/acronym should be given in parentheses . Acronyms such as ECOWAS 
and HIV/AIDS should be written in caps . Do not use full stops in acronyms, for exam-
ple USA ., RSA ., UN . Avoid the use of abbreviations/acronyms in headings . Please note, 
that acronyms and abbreviations that are well known and in daily use in one professional 
discipline or in one particular region of the world may be completely unknown in another .
Bulleted lists
Start all bulleted lists with capital letters . Semicolons are required between bullets and a 
full stop after the last item in the list .
Captions
Table, graph, map and figure captions should be placed at the bottom. When reproducing 
data from a diagram or table, or when copying the entire table or diagram, it should be 
referenced by means of a footnote .
Dates
Use the format appropriate for the version of English selected for the paper .
Headings
Indicate the hierarchy of levels, preferably not more than two . Use capitalization, number-
ing and font (boldface, italics) to distinguish between levels .
Italicisation
Use italics for the titles of books, periodicals and newspapers .
Names
Given names should be mentioned in bibliographical notes and reference list only by initials .
Numbers
Numbers from one to ten are written out, except dates, page numbers, percentages, etc . 
Use a comma as the thousands separator, for example 1,000, and a period for decimals, for 
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example percent . The term ‘percent’ is to be used in text, while the symbol (%) should be 
used in tables, graphs, etc .
Quotations
Use double quotation marks for quotations . Long quotations (40 words or more) are usu-
ally indented and blocked, without quotation marks . Do not use italics in these indented 
paragraphs . Use square brackets to indicate authors’ insertions and changes to the origi-
nal . Additional emphases are noted as [my italics/emphasis] . Omitted text is indicated 
by an ellipsis in square brackets […]
STYLE OF REFERENCE
Hungarian Defence Review is using Chicago Manual of Style for citing other publications 
as below:
Archival references
Archival depot, library or museum followed by the collection, group of documents or pa-
pers .
Examples:
Footnote and reference list: Department of Defence Archives (hereafter DOD Archives), 
Chief of the General Staff (hereafter CGS) 607, CGS/3/2/1Vol. 1, CGS Adjutant General 
(hereafter AG), 6 June 1952 .
Subsequent reference to this archival group can be made as follows: DOD Archives, 
CGS/3/2/1Vol . 1, CGS-AG, 6 June 1952 .
Journal article
Last name, Initials . “Title of Article” . Journal Title Vol ./Nr . Year . pages . DOI .
Examples:
Footnote: Scholtz, L . “The South African Strategic and Operational Objectives in An-
gola, 1987–1988” . Scientia Militaria: South African Journal of Military Studies 38/1 . 
2010 . 79 .
Subsequent reference: Scholtz . “The South African Strategic…” . 80 .
Reference list: Scholtz, L . “The South African Strategic and Operational Objectives in 
Angola, 1987–1988” . Scientia Militaria: South African Journal of Military Studies 38/1 . 
2010 . 77–113 . DOI: 10 .5787/38-1-80 .
Book
Last name, Initials . Title of Book . Place of publication: Publisher, Year .
Examples:
Footnote: Gray, C . S . Modern Strategy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999 . 56 .
Subsequent reference: Gray . Modern Strategy. 62 .
Reference list: Gray, C .S . Modern Strategy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999 .
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Two or more authors:
Examples:
Footnote: Ward, G . C . and Burns, K . The War: An Intimate History, 1941–1945 New York: 
Knopf, 2007 . 52 .
Subsequent reference: Ward and Burns . The War… 85 .
Reference list: Ward, G . C . and Burns, K . The War: An Intimate History, 1941–1945. New 
York: Knopf, 2007
For four or more authors, list all of the authors in the bibliography; in the note, list only the 
first author, followed by et al .
Chapter
Last name, Initials . “Title of Chapter” . In Last name, Initials and Last name, Initials (eds), 
Title of Book. Place of publication: Publisher, Year, pages .
Examples:
Footnote: Kiras, J . “Irregular Warfare: Terrorism and Insurgency” . In Baylis, J ., Wirtz, 
J . J . and Gray, C .S . (eds), Strategy in the Contemporary World: An Introduction to 
Strategic Studies. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010 . 189 .
Subsequent reference: Kiras . “Irregular Warfare…” . 200 .
Reference list:Kiras, J . “Irregular Warfare: Terrorism and Insurgency” . In Baylis, J ., 
Wirtz, J . J . and Gray, C . S . (eds), Strategy in the Contemporary World: An Introduction 
to Strategic Studies. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010, 185–207 .
Internet document
Last name, Initials . “Title of Document” . Site Owner . Date . URL, Accessed on Date .
Examples:
Footnote: Engelbrecht, L . “Analysts Welcome Defence Budget Boost” . defence-
Web. 28 October 2009. http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_con-
tent&task=view&id=4918&Itemid=379, Accessed on 3 June 2010.
Subsequent reference: Engelbrecht . “Analysts Welcome Defence Budget Boost” .
Reference list: Engelbrecht, L . “Analysts Welcome Defence Budget Boost” . defence-
Web. 28 October 2009. http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_con-
tent&task=view&id=4918&Itemid=379, Accessed on 3 June 2010.
Newspaper article
Last name, Initials . “Title of Article” . Name of Newspaper, Date . Section . Page .
Examples:
Footnote: Sefara, M . “Beast that instills only fear and loathing” . The Sunday Independent, 
30 May 2010 . Sunday Dispatches . 14 .
Subsequent reference: Sefara . “Beast that instills…” . 14 .
Reference list: Sefara, M . “Beast that instills only fear and loathing” . The Sunday Independ-
ent, 30 May 2010 . Sunday Dispatches . 14 .
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Thesis
Last name, Initials . “Title of Thesis” . Thesis presented for degree (stipulate in full) . Name 
of university, year .
Examples:
Footnote: Jordaan, E . “South African Defence since 1994: A Study in Policy-Making” . The-
sis presented in partial fulfilment of the MMil in Military Sciences. Stellenbosch Uni-
versity, 2005 . 25 .
Subsequent reference: Jordaan . “South African Defence since 1994…” 28 .
Reference list: Jordaan, E . “South African Defence since 1994: A Study in Policy-Making” . 
Thesis presented in partial fulfilment of the MMil in Military Sciences. Stellenbosch 
University, 2005 .
Conference paper
Last name, Initials . “Title of Paper” . Paper presented at Name of Conference, Place, Date
Examples:
Footnote: Heuser, B . “Strategy Making: The Theory vs . the Practice” . Paper presented at 
the First South African Conference on Strategic Theory, Stellenbosch, 11 June 2009 .
Subsequent reference: Heuser . “Strategy Making…”
Refernce list: Heuser, B . “Strategy Making: The Theory vs . the Practice” . Paper presented 
at the First South African Conference on Strategic Theory, Stellenbosch, 11 June 2009 .
For further information, please visit http://www.chicagomanualofstyle.org/tools_citationguide.
html, http://support.ebsco.com/knowledge_base/detail.php?topic=996&id=7029&page=1
Submission Preparation Checklist
As part of the submission process, authors are required to check off their submission’s com-
pliance with all of the following items, and submissions may be returned to authors that 
do not adhere to these guidelines .
1 . The submission has not been previously published, nor is it before another journal for 
consideration (or an explanation has been provided in Comments to the Editor) .
2 . The submission file is in OpenOffice, Microsoft Word, RTF, or WordPerfect document 
file format.
3 . Where available, URLs for the references have been provided .
4 . The text is single-spaced; uses a 12-point font; employs italics, rather than underlining 
(except with URL addresses); and all illustrations, figures, and tables are placed within 
the text at the appropriate points, rather than at the end .
5 . The text adheres to the stylistic and bibliographic requirements outlined in the Author 
Guidelines, which is found in About the Journal .
6 . If submitting to a peer-reviewed section of the journal, the instructions in Ensuring a 
Blind Review have been followed .
Ensuring a Blind Peer Review
To ensure the integrity of the blind peer-review for submission to this journal, every effort 
should be made to prevent the identities of the authors and reviewers from being known 
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to each other . This involves the authors, editors, and reviewers (who upload documents as 
part of their review) checking to see if the following steps have been taken with regard to 
the text and the file properties:
1 . The authors of the document have deleted their names from the text .
2.  With Microsoft Office documents, author identification should also be removed from the 
file properties.
For Microsoft 2003 and previous versions, and Macintosh versions of Word:
●  Under the File menu select: Save As > Tools (or Options with a Mac) > Security > Re-
move personal information from file properties on save > Save.
For MacIntosh Word 2008 (and future versions)
●  Under the File menu select “Properties” .
●  Under the Summary tab remove all of the identifying information from all of the fields.
●  Save the File .
For Microsoft 2007 (Windows):
●  Click on the office button in the upper-left hand corner of the office application
●  Select “Prepare” from the menu options .
●  Select “Properties” for the “Prepare” menu options .
●  Delete all of the information in the document property fields that appear under the main 
menu options .
●  Save the document and close the document property field section. 
For Microsoft 2010 (Windows):
●  Under the File menu select “Prepare for sharing” .
●  Click on the “Check for issues” icon .
●  Click on “inspect document” icon .
●  Uncheck all of the checkboxes except “Document Properties and Personal information” .
●  Run the document inspector, which will then do a search of the document properties and 
indicated if any document property fields contain any information.
●  If the document inspector finds that some of the document properties contain infor-
mation it will notify you and give you the option to “Remove all”, which you will click 
to remove the document properties and personal information from the document .
For PDF files:
●  With PDFs, the authors’ names should also be removed from Document Properties found 
under File on Adobe Acrobat’s main menu .
Privacy Statement
The names and email addresses entered in this journal site will be used exclusively for 
the stated purposes of this journal and will not be made available for any other purpose or 
to any other party .
Author Fees
This journal does not offer any honoraria, and does not charge any author fee, either.
NATO 4.0 and Hungary
20 years of membership – 30 years of cooperation
Written by Zoltán Szenes, Klára Siposné Kecskeméthy
In 2019, NATO and Hungary commemorate interrelated anniversaries: the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization was established 70 years ago, and Hungary has been its member for 
20 years. This volume, dedicated to the jubilee of the membership, pays close attention 
to presenting NATO’s development and functioning, which would like to emphasize the 
impact of the Alliance on Hungary. It discusses Hungary’s NATO membership as part of 
the Alliance policy and functioning, which expresses the principle of “all for one, one for 
all”. The “NATO part” of the book presents the development history of the Alliance based 
on current assessment; its structure is determined by the three essential core tasks of  
the strategic concept and the metamorphosis of NATO’s security theory functions. The 
“Hungarian part” of the book discusses national issues in the same triad, thus demon-
strating the part-whole relations and emphasizing nation-specific issues. Thus, the au-
thors hope that the readers will not only understand a unified NATO, but will also be able 
to imagine the contributions of other member states through the Hungarian example 
– thus receiving a whole picture of the Alliance’s policy and functioning.
The Hungarian and English language volume is illustrated by numerous figures, maps 
and photographs.
For more information, please contact us on: www.shop.hmzrinyi.hu/

